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This dissertation consists of three chapters that study dealer’s endogenous search effort
in over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets and its effect on asset’s liquidity risk in U.S.
corporate bond markets. In Chapter 1, I study dealer’s search intensity using a transaction-
level data set on U.S. corporate bonds. The main target of this chapter is to test whether
dealer’s search intensity is endogenously determined by their idiosyncratic states and how
search intensity affects market efficiency. Existing literatures commonly do not consider
dealer’s continuous adjustment of search intensity in search-and-match models and there
is no paper using transaction-level data to estimate the dealer-level state-dependent search
intensity. In this paper, I propose a search-and-match model with dealers’ endogeneous
and state-dependent search intensity and estimate it using the TRACE data for the U.S.
corporate bond market. I find that: [1] if we rank all dealers by their private valuations for
holding the bond, the dealer of the middle-level private valuation will choose the highest level
of search intensity, and she works as the “dealer of dealers” to reallocate bond positions from
the low-type dealers to the high-type dealers; [2] the estimated model gives us a quantitative
evaluation of the inefficiency due to the decentralized market structure. At the average level
ii
across all sub-markets in our sample, the model estimates that dealers’ search cost is 0.75%
of bond’s face value, and there is on average 8.64% of bond positions being misallocated,
comparing with a counterfactual frictionless market. In conclusion, the decentralized market
structure generates 8.96% welfare loss relative to the frictionless one.
In Chapter 2, I study the correlation between corporate bond’s misallocation among
dealers and liquidity risk. This chapter bridges the literature on search-and-match mod-
els and the literature on explaining the non-default component of corporate bond’s credit
spread variations. In this paper, I propose a measure of bond’s misallocation among dealers.
This measure is based on a structural search-and-match model, and is defined as the cross-
sectional covariance of dealers’ idiosyncratic private valuations for holding the bond and
their actual inventory positions in the bond. Using the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate
bond market, I construct a panel data which contains yearly series of empirical estimates of
bond’s misallocation and liquidity risk, and verify that: at the bond level, a higher magni-
tude of misallocation among the dealers is associated with a higher magnitude of liquidity
risk. This finding gives a preliminary market microstructural evidence supporting that: the
distribution of market maker’s states correlates with the magnitude of asset’s liquidity risk.
In Chapter 3, I theoretically study the social optimal policy function of dealer’s meeting
technology in over-the-counter markets. This chapter contributes to the existing literature
by considering the dealer-level state-dependent meeting technology in a random search model
and obtaining explicit-form solutions of the social optimal policy functions. In the model,
I allow the agents (dealers) to freely adjust their meeting technologies based on two types
of idiosyncratic states: asset position and liquidity need. I find that in the social optimal
policy functions, there is no intermediation in the sense that no dealer will choose to search
simultaneously on both the buy side and sell side of the market. This result applies for a
general form of search-cost function.
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CHAPTER 1
Dealers’ Search Intensity in U.S. Corporate Bond
Markets
1.1 Introduction
In the U.S. corporate bonds markets, dealers manage bond inventories to provide liquid-
ity to customers. Inventory management is facilitated by a decentralized over-the-counter
(OTC) interdealer market subject to search frictions: dealers need to locate other dealer-
counterparties with whom to trade. To overcome search frictions, dealers need to decide how
much time and how many resource to spend in building connections with other dealers or to
hire how many traders to staff their trading desks. Empirical papers on trading structures of
decentralized financial markets show that dealers exhibit persistently heterogeneous trading
frequencies1. Does this market structure emerge from dealers’ heterogeneous search efforts?
How does dealers’ choice of search efforts affect market efficiency? Examing these questions
will help provide a framework to study how search frictions affect the welfare of market
participants through affecting dealers’ trading activities and asset liquidity.
In this paper, we propose and estimate a search-based model for the U.S. corporate
bond market, extending Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018). There are two aspects of
1The recent empirical studies on OTC markets commonly use a conceptual framework inherited from the
analysis of static networks to document a “core-periphery” trading structure within the interdealer market.
Such market structure is documented by Di Maggio, Kerman, and Song (2017) for the U.S. corporate bond
market, Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014) for the U.S. treasury bond market, Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017)
for the U.S. securitizations market, and Bech and Atalay (2010) for the fed funds market.
1
contribution: on the theory side, the innovation is to consider dealers’ endogeneous and
state-dependent choice of search intensity based on dealers’ idiosyncratic states (holding
position and private valuation2 for each bond). Dealers’ endogeneous search intensity drives
heterogeneous frequency of trade and ultimately determines the impact of search costs on
equilibrium liquidity yield spread3; on the empirical side, we offer a structural estimation
of dealers’ search intensities and search model parameters by using the academic version
of TRACE data. This dataset includes the information on the identities of the dealer-
counterparties in each transaction. Using the estimated search intensities, we validate the
theoretical predictions on dealers’ heterogeneous roles in the intermediation process. Using
the estimated search model, we further quantify the over-the-counter inefficiencies in terms
of welfare per capita and bond misallocation in U.S corporate bond markets.
This model has the following features that distinguish it from the other search-based
models which also explain dealers’ heterogeneous frequency of trade:
First, dealers’ heterogeneous search intensities can be identified from transaction-level
data. The identification depends on the “separation” of the dealer sector from the customer
sector and the assumed matching technology in the model: [1] the separation of the dealer
sector from the customer sector allows us to identify the relative level of search intensities
across the dealers separately on the buy and sell sides of the market. If moving across dealers
on the same side, all the dealers have the same probability of meeting and trading with a
customer. This implies that, on either side of the market, dealers’ number of completed
transactions with customers are proportional to their search intensities. This allows us to
identify the relative trend of searching activity across the dealers on the same side; [2] the
matching technology allows us to use the realized transactions between two specific dealers,
2In the spirit of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), market participants have idiosyncratic private
valuation type (preference) for the target asset which is modelled as a “consol”. By holding the asset, market
participants obtain flow utility, the level of which equals the level of their valuation for the asset.
3Recent empirical analyses show that the interdealer search frictions drive the large unexplained common
factor in bond-level yield spread changes (see Friewald and Nagler (2018), Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2016)).
2
dealers with the maximum and the minimum private valuations, to identify the ratio of the
dealer-sector’s aggregate buying-search intensity over its aggregate selling-search intensity,
because the matching technology assumes for each dealer, the probability of contacting (being
contacted by) a trading counterparty is proportional to the counterparty’s (the dealer’s)
search intensity4. This ratio is further equal to the ratio of the conditional5 probability of
trading with a customer on the buy side over that on the sell side, for every dealer. Then
using this identified ratio, we further exclude the effect of “conditional probability of trading
with customers” from the difference in realized dealer-customer transactions between the
buy and sell sides, and we identify the remaining part as being from the difference between
each dealer’s buying- and selling- search intensities6. Then we finally identify each dealer’s
total searching activity by summing over her buying- and selling- search intensities.
Second, the model characterizes the shape of the distribution of search intensity among
dealers, and connects it with dealers’ heterogeneous roles in the intermediation of bonds. My
model generates the following two predictions that can both be empirically verified: [1] deal-
ers’ total search intensity is a hump-shaped function of dealers’ private valuation. Within
each cross section, dealers of intermediate private valuations choose higher total search in-
tensities and dealers of extreme (either low or high) private valuations choose relatively
lower total search intensities. Moreover, the lower total search intensities of the low(high)-
type dealers are mainly driven by lower selling(buying) intensities. This prediction implies
that the intermediate-type dealers behave as the intermediary and they trade actively on
both sides of the market to intermediate the bond from low-type dealers to high-type ones.
Empirically verifying this prediction makes my model complement the results of the other
4This matching technology is discussed and used by Mortensen (1982), Shimer and Smith (2001), and
U¨slu¨ (2019)
5Here by “conditional”, we mean conditional on searching on the buy or sell side of the market, a dealer
has a realized trade with a customer instead of another dealer.
6Another key assumption in my model is that dealers on either side of the market follow a unique policy
function to decide on their search intensity, and dealers change their search intensities whenever they switch
from one side of the market to the other.
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search-based models; and [2]: dealers play heterogeneous roles in the intermediation pro-
cess by specializating in transactions of different directions. Low-type dealers spend more
resources searching on the buy side and specialize in buying the bond from customers and
selling to other dealers; high-type dealers spend more resources searching on the sell side
and specialize in selling the bond to customers and buying from other dealers. Intermediate-
type dealers on average invest in equal amounts of average buying and selling intensities,
and contribute most to intermediating the bond from low-type dealers and/or customers to
high-type ones.
Finally, state-dependent search intensity allows the model to be used as a framework to
study how search frictions affect the welfare of market participants through driving dealers’
trading activities. The estimates of model parameters indicate nontrivial market inefficiencies
compared with frictionless markets in terms of welfare per capita and bond misallocation.7
In this paper, we define each market as a combination of bond j and quarter q, and con-
duct counterfactual analysis as in Gavazza (2016) for each Market(j, q). The main findings
include: [1] search frictions generate on average an 8.96% welfare loss across all markets,
compared to corresponding frictionless markets. For each market, we calculate welfare as the
difference between the total utility flow and the total search costs spent by all the dealers.
For each counterfactual frictionless market, welfare is equal to the total utility flow but with
no bond misallocation; [2] for each bond, there is on average 8.64% of total shares being
mis-allocated, in the sense of being held by customers and/or dealers with private valuations
lower than the marginal investor in a frictionless market; and [3] The levels of these two
dimensions of inefficiencies exhibit high variations across bonds and over time.
7Bond misallocation means the proportion of amount of bond that is being held by agents (either dealers
or customers) with valuation types lower than that of the marginal agent.
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Related literature
The model with state-dependent search intensity contributes to the theoretical literature
initiated by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) that uses a search-and-match model to
study asset price and liquidity in over-the-counter markets. My model studies fully de-
centralized market structure by setting a random search environment, which is similar to
one strand of the literature developed by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007), Vayanos
and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Weill (2008), Afonso (2011), Gavazza (2011),
Praz (2014), Trejos and Wright (2016), Afonso and Lagos (2015), Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and
Weill (2015). Another strand of literature focuses on semi-decentralized market structure
in which dealers trade in a frictionless centralized interdealer market which allows them to
immediately offload inventories through trading with other dealers, as in Weill (2007), La-
gos and Rocheteau (2009), Feldhu¨tter (2011), Pagnotta and Philippon (2018a), and Lester,
Rocheteau, and Weill (2015).
My model is most related to Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018) in the setting of deal-
ers’ heterogeneous valuation types and the incorporation of both dealer and customer sec-
tors. The main difference in my model is that we consider dealers’ explicit choice of state-
dependent search intensity based on their idiosyncratic states. In Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2018), dealers are endowed with homogeneous search intensities.
My model is different from Shen, Wei, and Yan (2018) who is the first to consider the
search intensity decision. They discuss the endogenous entry and exit of investors into an
over-the-counter market based on investors’ idiosyncratic trading needs and a common search
cost, which focuses more on the extensive margin of choosing whether to search or not. Once
entering the market, investors will adopt the same level of search intensity. My paper instead
considers dealers’ intensive margin of choosing how fast to search within the market, based
on dealers’ idiosyncratic trading needs and bond positions. The empirical identification of
dealers’ heterogeneous search intensities shows that the intensive margin of choosing the
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search speed is significant within the dealer sector.
There is a contemporaneous strand of literature that also considers heterogeneous search
intensity as the main mechanism of endogeneous intermediation under a random search en-
vironment: Neklyudov (2012) considers exogeneously heterogeneous search intensity among
dealers and two discrete valuation types; U¨slu¨ (2019) introduces ex-ante heterogeneity in
meeting rates into a fully decentralized market model with unrestricted asset holdings; Far-
boodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b) consider ex-ante choice of (distribution of ) search
intensity at the initial time, after which each agent maintains a fixed level of search intensity
even though their private valuations may change, but my model allows dealers to change
their search intensities as long as their state variables change.8
Moreover, my model relates to papers with alternative, other than search intensity, mech-
nisms of endogeneous intermediation, including Farboodi (2014) on bank heterogeneous risk
exposure, Neklyudov and Sambalaibat (2015) on dealers’ serving clients with different liquid-
ity needs, Wang (2016) on the trade-off between trade competition and inventory efficiency,
Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio (2017a) on dealers’ heterogeneous bargaining power, and
Bethune, Sultanum, and Trachter (2018) on private information and heterogeneous screen-
ing ability, among others.
This paper fills the gap in empirical analysis on heterogeneous search intensity/frequency
of trade in the search-based literature. In current papers, heterogeneity in dealers’ frequency
of trade is mostly motivated by the documented core-periphery structure based on the net-
work approach, as in Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014) for the U.S. treasury bond market, Di Maggio,
Kerman, and Song (2017) for the U.S. corporate bond market, Hollifield, Neklyudov, and
Spatt (2017) for the U.S. securitizations market, and Bech and Atalay (2010) for the fed
funds market. By using transaction-level data on corporate bonds, this paper quantifies this
8There exist other related papers that consider other mechnisms, other than heterogeneous search inten-
sity, to generate heterogeneous frequency of trade among market participants. For example, in Farboodi,
Jarosch, and Menzio (2017a), dealers’ frequency of trade is driven by heterogeneous bargaining power instead
of their search intensity.
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interdealer core-periphery structure by a search-based approach. From the search perspec-
tive, the core dealers are the ones choosing higher total search intensity over both sides of
the market and the periphery ones choose relatively lower total search intensity.
Finally, my paper empirically identifies dealers’ search intensity in an over-the-counter
financial market, based on which dealers’ search cost and financial asset misallocation are
quantified. In terms of estimation, my paper is most related to Gavazza (2016), who esti-
mates a search-and-bargaining model of a decentralized market by using transaction data on
business aircraft, and quantifies the effects of trading frictions and the existence of dealers
on asset price, allocation and social welfare. Hendershott, Li, Livdan, and Schu¨rhoff (2017)
also do structural estimation for a one-to-many search-and-match model with endogeneous
network size and transaction prices, and quantify the effects of client-dealer relations on
execution quality in the OTC market for corporate bonds. Other papers that structually es-
timate search models focus mostly on labor markets, including Eckstein and Wolpin (1990),
and Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007), among others.
1.2 Model
The model is an extension of Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), but with state dependent
dealer search intensity.
1.2.1 Environment
Market participants and preferences Market participants include a continuum of cus-
tomers with measure normalized to 1 and a continuum of dealers with measure m ≤ 1.
Dealers and customers trade a long-lived indivisible bond in fixed supply s < 1 + m, and
each participant’s holding a is assumed to be either zero or one.9 Market participants are
9This {0, 1} assumption for bond holding and the indivisibility of bonds determine that the trading
volume in each transaction equals one.
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all risk neutral and discount future utility flow at rate r. By holding one unit of bond, each
participant obtains a utility flow per unit time, which is equal to her idiosyncratic private
valuation type.10
Customers’ private valuation type takes two possible values, either low or high, denoted
by y ∈ {y`, yh} with y` < yh. Each customer draws a new private valuation with intensity α.
Private valuation processes are independent across customers and independent of everything
else. Customers’ new private valuation y′ follows a discrete distribution with P (y′ = yc) = pic,
c = `, h. In a stationary equilibrium, pic is equal to the measure of customers with type c.
Dealers’ private valuation type δ ∈ [δ`, δh] follows an arbitrary continuous distribution
with pdf f(δ). As in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), we assume dealers’ private valua-
tions are stable over time.11
Search, matching, and trade All market participants randomly search and trade in the
market. Each dealer chooses the optimal search intensity λ∗a(δ) as a function of her current
asset position a ∈ {0, 1} and private valuation type δ ∈ [δ`, δh]. The flow cost of choosing
λ∗a(δ) is given by c × λ∗a(δ)2 with c > 0. The value of c captures the market level of search
friction. Customers have constant search intensity ρ > 0. We assume dealers search to meet
and trade with both other dealers and customers, while customers search to meet and trade
only with dealers.
We adopt the matching technology discussed by Mortensen (1982), Shimer and Smith
(2001), and U¨slu¨ (2019). The intensity with which a dealer with search intensity λ contacts
or is contacted by another dealer with search intensity λ′ equals m(λ, λ′) = 2 × m
1+m
× λλ′
Λ
,
where m
1+m
is the probability of meeting a dealer conditional on a meeting and Λ is the
aggregate level of all dealers’ search intensities. Therefore the intensity of meeting a specific
10The private valuation can be determined by dealers’ idiosyncratic liquidity needs, financing costs, hedging
needs, and etc. Within each cross section, dealers can be ranked by their private valuation types.
11In the data, dealers’ trading behavior (total trading volume, fractions of trading volume with different
directions, and centrality, etc) is much more stable than customers’.
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trading counterparty is not only proportional to the corresponding physical measure but
also proportional to the counterparty’s search intensity. Similarly, the intensity with which
a dealer with search intensity λ contacts or is contacted by a customer equals m(λ, ρ) =
λ× ( 1
1+m
+ ρ
mΛ
)
.
Once two participants meet, trade only happens when there exist positive gains from
trade, and transaction price is determined by Nash bargaining. We assume a dealer’s bar-
gaining power with other dealers is equal to 1
2
. Dealers’ bargaining power with customers is
equal to θ s.t. 0 < θ < 1.
1.2.2 Model solutions and stationary equilibrium
Within each group of dealers of the same private valuation type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], there exist
dealer-owners and dealer-non-owners. We denote the density of dealer-owners of type δ by
φ1(δ) and that of dealer-non-owners of the same type by φ0(δ). Dealer-owners hold one unit
of bond and search to sell the bond to other dealers or customers. Once a sale is completed,
they become dealer-non-owners and search to buy one unit of bond from other dealers or
customers. There are four groups of customers: high- and low-type owners and non-owners.
We denote the corresponding measures by µh1, µh0, µ`1, µ`0.
A dealer/customer’s willingness to pay for the bond is determined by her reservation
value, which is equal to the difference between the values of holding and not-holding the
bond. Therefore, if Va(δ) is the value of a dealer with type δ ∈ [δ`, δh] and holding position
a ∈ {0, 1}, then the reservation value is 4V (δ) = V1(δ) − V0(δ). Similarly, the value and
reservation value of a customer with type y ∈ {y`, yh} and holding position a ∈ {0, 1} are
denoted by Wa(y) and 4W (y) = W1(y)−W0(y).
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1.2.2.1 Dealers’ reservation value
As is standard, Va(δ), with a ∈ {0, 1} and δ ∈ [δ`, δh], satisfies the HJB equation:
rVa(δ) = max
λ
{−cλ2 + aδ
+
∑
c∈{`,h}
λ
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µc,1−aθ ((2a− 1)(4W (yc)−4V (δ)))+
+
∫ δh
δ`
2λ
m
1 +m
λ∗1−a(δ
′)
Λ
φ1−a(δ′)
((2a− 1)(4V (δ′)−4V (δ)))+
2
dδ′
}
(1.1)
where x+ = max{0, x}, λ∗0(δ) is the optimal search intensity of a dealer non-owner with type
δ, λ∗1(δ) is the optimal search intensity of a dealer owner with type δ, and Λ is the aggregate
level of all dealers’ search intensities Λ =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)dδ +
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ.
According to (1.1), by choosing search intensity λ, a dealer of type δ who holds a = 1
unit of bond pays flow cost cλ2 and enjoys the utility flow δ until one of following two events
occur: first, with intensity 2λ m
1+m
the dealer owner contacts or is contacted by a dealer non-
owner of higher private valuation type and receives half of the trade surplus; second, with
intensity λ
(
1
1+m
+ ρ
mΛ
)
the dealer owner contacts or is contacted by a customer non-owner
with type yh and receives θ of the trade surplus. Similar interpretations work for dealer
non-owners with holding position a = 0 and not enjoying any utility flow.
Given distributions, reservation values, and all other dealers’ optimal search intensities,
by FOCs of the HJB equation (1.1), the optimal search intensities λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) satisfy
the following conditions:
2cλ∗1(δ) =
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µh0θ(4W (yh)−4V (δ))
+
m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))dδ′ (1.2)
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2cλ∗0(δ) =
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µ`1θ(4V (δ)−4W (y`))
+
m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))dδ′ (1.3)
∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]. Then the HJB equation for the reservation value function 4V (δ) is:
r4V (δ) = −cλ∗12(δ) + cλ∗02(δ) + δ + 2λ∗1(δ)
m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)
4V (δ′)−4V (δ)
2
dδ′
+ λ∗1(δ)
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µh0θ(4W (yh)−4V (δ))
− 2λ∗0(δ)
m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)
4V (δ)−4V (δ′)
2
dδ′
− λ∗0(δ)
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1θ(4V (δ)−4W (y`)) (1.4)
The equations (1.2)-(1.4) presume the monotonicity of reservation value function4V (δ) and
that dealers always want to buy from low-type customers and sell to high-type customers.12
1.2.2.2 Customers’ reservation value
The reservation value of a customer with private valuation type y ∈ {y`, yh} satisfies the
following HJB equation by similar steps:
r4W (y) = y +
∑
j∈{`,h}
αpij (4W (yj)−4W (y))+ (1.5)
+
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
(1− θ)
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)(4V (δ)−4W (y))+dδ
−
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
(1− θ)
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)(4W (y)−4V (δ))+dδ
12The presumption of monotonicity of 4V (δ) is a guess and will be verified in the proof of Proposition
1. The presumptions that dealers always want to buy from (sell to) low-type (high-type) customers require
a parametric restriction, as in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018). We will verify numerically that these
restrictions hold in the numerical examples.
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The difference in a customer’s reservation value from that of a dealer is: with intensity α, a
customer switches her private valuation type. Again, equation (1.5) presumes that dealers
always want to buy from low-type customers and sell to high-type customers.
1.2.2.3 Distribution of dealers and customers
The densities of dealer owner φ1(δ) satisfy the following inflow-outflow equations in equilib-
rium:
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)µh0 (1.6)
=
2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)µ`1
∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]. In (1.6), the left-hand side is the outflow due to trading with dealer non-owners
with higher types and high-type customer non-owners. The right-hand side is the inflow
due to trading with dealer owners with lower types and low-type customer owners. Given
the condition φ1(δ) + φ0(δ) = f(δ), ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh], the inflow-outflow equation of φ0(δ) is
redundant.
The measures of high-type customer non-owner µh0 and low-type customer owner µ`1
satisfy the following inflow-outflow equations:
αµ`0pih = µh0
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ + αµh0pi` (1.7)
αµh1pi` = µ`1
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)dδ + αµ`1pih (1.8)
In both (1.7) and (1.8), the left-hand side represents the inflow due to type switch and
the right-hand side represent the outflow due to switching type and trading with dealers.
Given the measures of high-type customer pih and low-type customer pi`, the inflow-outflow
equations of µh1 and µ`0 are also redundant.
Then we define stationary equilibrium as follows:
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Definition 1.2.1: A stationary equilibrium contains 4V (δ), φ0(δ), φ1(δ), λ∗0(δ), λ∗1(δ) and
4W (y`), 4W (yh), µ`0, µ`1, µh0, µh1, such that
1. Given distributions φ0(δ), φ1(δ), µ`0, µ`1, µh0, µh1, and f(δ), δ ∈ [δ`, δh]:
– 4V (δ), λ∗0(δ), λ∗1(δ) solve dealers’ HJB equation (1.4) and first-order conditions
for search intensities (1.2)-(1.3);
– 4W (y`), 4W (yh) solve customers’ HJB equation (1.5).
2. Given λ∗0(δ), λ
∗
1(δ), ρ, the endogeneous distributions φ0(δ), φ1(δ), µ`0, µ`1, µh0, µh1
satisfy:
– φ0(δ) + φ1(δ) = f(δ),∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh] where
∫ δh
δ`
f(δ)dδ = m;
– µ`1 + µ`0 = pi`, µh1 + µh0 = pih where pi` + pih = 1;
– the inflow-outflow equations (1.6)-(1.8).
3. Market clears:
–
∫ δh
δ`
φ1(δ)dδ + µ`1 + µh1 = s
For the existence of such a stationary equilibrium, we consider a continuous and compact
mapping based on a system of equations. This system of equations includes dealers’ and
customers’ HJB equations, the first-order conditions for search intensities, the evolution
equation of the asset-owner density function φ1(δ), the evolution equation of the high-type
customer-nonowner density µh0, and the evolution equation of the low-type customer-owner
µ`1.
13 A proof of existence will not be included in this paper, and a similar proof based on
Schauder’s fixed-point theorem can be referred in Liu (2018).14
13All the evolution equations are based on the inflow-outflow equations that at each time the net change
in the density of a specific group of agents is obtained by subtracting the outflow from the inflow of that
group.
14In the numerical algorithm, we obtain the other equilibrium components φ0, µh1, and µ`0 by equilibrium
conditions φ0(δ) + φ1(δ) = f(δ), µ`1 + µ`0 = pi`, and µh1 + µh0 = pih. The market clear condition is used for
checking whether the model solution converges to a fixed point.
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1.2.3 Model predictions
Compared with models with either constant or exogeneous search intensity, this model allows
us to study how search intensity varies as a function of private valuation types and also varies
between owners and non-owners within each type, since search intensity is dealers’ state-
dependent choice. The distribution of search intensity determines that of trading volume
across dealers, which further implies the role played by dealers in the intermediation process.
1.2.3.1 Dealers’ heterogeneous search intensities
We define the total search intensity for a dealer of type δ ∈ [δ`, δh] as follows:
λ¯(δ) = φ1(δ)× λ∗1(δ) + φ0(δ)× λ∗0(δ)
where φ1(δ) × λ∗1(δ) is interpreated as the selling intensity of a dealer with type δ, and
φ0(δ) × λ∗0(δ) is the buying intensity of a dealer with type δ. Total search intensity is
empirically relevant such that it can be regarded as a measure of a dealer’s search behavior
over both buy and sell sides at medium frequency. Alternatively, it measures a dealer’s
instantaneous search behavior with many traders. Formally, we can imagine a dealer is a
continuum coalition of traders with identical type but idiosyncratic trading histories. The
size of the coalition of type-δ traders is equal to f(δ), where a fraction φ1(δ) of the traders
own the bond and a fraction φ0(δ) of the traders do not own the bond.
As for the distribution of total search intensity λ¯(δ) among the cross section of dealers,
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In any stationary equilibrium with 4W (y`) < 4V (δ) < 4W (yh), ∀δ ∈
[δ`, δh]:
1. λ∗1(δ) is strictly decreasing in δ, λ
∗
0(δ) is strictly increasing in δ;
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Figure 1.1: Policy functions and total search intensity
(s = pih = 0.5, y` = 0.5, yh = 1.7, δ` = 0.6, δh = 1.6, α = ρ = m = θ = 0.5, c = r = 0.05)
2. If the distribution of private valuation f(δ) is a uniform distribution on [δ`, δh], there
exists a symmetric equilibrium s.t. φ1(δ) = φ0(δ` + δh− δ) and λ∗1(δ) = λ∗0(δ` + δh− δ),
∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]. In this symmetric equilibrium, ∃c∗ > 0 s.t. for any c < c∗, λ¯(δ) is
hump-shaped and attains its maximum at intermediate type δ`+δh
2
.
All proofs are in the Appendix 1.A.1.1. The condition c < c∗ implies that the hump-shaped
property applies for the not very high level of search friction. When c > c∗, this property may
fail. Specifically, for a very high level of c, the function of λ¯(δ) may switch to be u-shaped.
For a single dealer owner holding one unit of bond, the lower the dealer’s private valuation,
the more willing she is to search fast (on the sell side) to sell the bond, due to the higher
marginal gains of searching. Similarly, for a single dealer non-owner, the higher the dealer’s
private valuation, the higher the gains from searching (on the buy side) to buy the bond.
Dealers’ total search intensity is hump-shaped with private valuation δ ∈ [δ`, δh], which is
driven by a composition effect in a market with a low enough level of search friction. Dealers
with extreme valuations (either very high or very low) choose lower total search intensities
than the dealer with middle valuation. To understand this finding, consider a dealer with
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a very high valuation. When this dealer is on the buy side, she chooses very high search
intensity because she values the bond more than most other dealers (on the buy side), she
has incentive to search quickly to acquire the bond from the dealers on the sell side. Once
she acquires the bond, she switches to the sell side and chooses a very low search intensity,
since there are very few dealers on the sell side with private valuations that are higher than
hers. As a result, in stationary equilibrium, this high-valuation dealer buys very quickly and,
is more likely to be on the sell side of the market, with a low search intensity. The key that
this high-valuation dealer is able to buy quickly and spends more time on the sell side is the
low level of search friction which enables her to quickly acquires the bond. So in terms of
total value with densities φ0(δ) and φ1(δ) being as weights, her total search intensity is at a
low level. Similar result works for the low-valuation dealer, she sells very quickly and is more
likely to be on the buy side, also with a low search intensity, which makes her total search
intensity at a low level. By contrast, the dealer with middle valuation has equal weights to
be on the buy and the sell sides of the market, with relatively high search intensity on both
sides. So considering both sides of the market, she searches more actively than other dealers.
Another way to interprete the hump-shaped property of total search intensity λ¯(δ) is
it depends on the gap between the absolute changes in the buying and selling intensi-
ties, for per unit change in private valuation type within the cross section of dealers.
For example, as type varies from low to high in the lower range, for per unit increase,
the decrease in probability of trade happening conditional on a meet for dealer owners
| d
dδ
(∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
)
| = λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ
is always larger than the increase in that for dealer non-
owners | d
dδ
(∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
)
| = λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ
, because the buying intensity is always above the
selling intensity in the neighbourhood of each δ ∈ [δ`, δ¯]. This drives the amount by which
the selling intensity λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ) curve increases to be larger than that by which the buying
intensity λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ) curve decreases, for per unit increase in δ, to maintain that the total
number of selling transactions equals that of buying transactions. This further determines
that λ¯(δ) increases with δ in the lower range. Similiar explanations apply for the decreasing
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of λ¯(δ) in the higher range.
1.2.3.2 Dealers’ heterogeneous roles in the intermediation process
In this section, we further characterize the implication of endogeneous and state-dependent
search intensity on dealers’ heterogeneous roles in the intermediation process.
For each dealer of private valuation type δ, we calculate volumes of four types of trans-
actions: sell-to-customer VS2C(δ), buy-from-customer VBfC(δ), sell-to-dealer VS2D(δ), and
buy-from-dealer VBfD(δ). Figure 1.2 compares the levels of these four types of transactions
among dealers. Figure 1.3 shows how the proportion of each type in dealers’ total trading
volume varies with private valuation types. Both examples are under the symmetry restric-
tions. We also construct the gross, intermediation and net trading volumes, similarly defined
in Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2015), Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), and U¨slu¨ (2019),
separately for the interdealer and dealer-customer markets. Equations of all types of volumes
are in Appendix 1.A.3.
The distribution of endogeneous search intensity and the distribution of various types
of trading moments jointly imply that: [1] lower-type dealers, on average, invest in higher
buying intensity and contribute most to buying the bond from (low-type) customer owners
and selling to higher-type dealer non-owners. Therefore, low-type dealers are net buyers
in the dealer-customer market and net sellers in the interdealer market; [2] intermediate-
type dealers, on average, invest in equal amounts15 of average buying and selling intensities
and contribute most to intermediating the bond from lower-type participants to higher-
type ones in both the interdealer and dealer-customer markets. In the interdealer market,
the intermediate-type dealers behave as the dealer of dealers and tend to lie in the mid-
dle of intermediation chains defined in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018); Meanwhile in
the dealer-customer market, these dealers also directly buy and sell to customers at equal
15The result that it is the intermediate-type dealers that invest in equal average buying and selling inten-
sities is based on the symmetry restriction on stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 1.2: Model implied levels of different transaction types
(s = pih = 0.5, y` = 0.5, yh = 1.7, δ` = 0.6, δh = 1.6, α = ρ = m = θ = 0.5, c = r = 0.05)
amounts16; [3] higher-type dealers, which are closer to the high-type customer buyers, on
average invest in higher selling intensity and contribute most to selling the bond to (high-
type) customers and buying from lower-type dealer owners. Therefore, they are net sellers
in the dealer-customer market and net buyers in the interdealer market.
1.3 Identification
Testing the model’s predictions creates two key challenges: the first is to identify dealers’
private valuations, the second is to measure dealers’ search intensities. In this section, by
using bond transaction-level data with assigned dealer identities, we construct a measure of
16Interpreting by intermediation chains, the intermediate-type dealers also contribute most to constructing
chains with only one dealer (themselves) to connect customer sellers and buyers.
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Figure 1.3: Model implied proportions of different transaction types
(s = pih = 0.5, y` = 0.5, yh = 1.7, δ` = 0.6, δh = 1.6, α = ρ = m = θ = 0.5, c = r = 0.05)
dealers’ private valuation based on the Nash bargaining assumption and separately identify
dealers’ buying- and selling intensities using a group of transaction-related moments.
1.3.1 Data description
We use the Academic Corporate Bond TRACE Data set provided by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA). This data set contains dealers’ reports to the Trade Re-
porting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) which disclose information on all transactions in
corporate bonds. One advantage of the data is we can observe identities of the dealers in all
transactions. This allows us to track how the bonds are transacted between the dealers, so
that we can characterize how actively each dealer trades with the other dealers and/or the
outside bond investors.17
17In the analysis, we define all registered members of FINRA as dealers and all non-registered outside trad-
ing counterparties as customers. The main registered firm members of FINRA include broker-dealer firms,
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We filtered the data following the procedure in Dick-Nielsen (2014), and we recover
the trading counterparties in locked-in and give-up trades18.We merge the cleaned data
with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS) Bonds Return Database to obtain bond fundamental characteristics and
credit ratings. We construct a monthly panel containing both dealer-wise and bond-wise
variables19.
Following the academic literature using the same data set, we further filtered the data
by excluding some “unusual bonds” and some specific types of transactions: [1] We exclude
bonds with optional characteristics, such as variable coupon, convertiable, exchangable, and
puttable, etc, and we also exclude asset-backed securities and private placed instruments; [2]
To faciliate measuring each dealer’s search intensity for each single bond, we further drop the
inactively traded bonds, defined as those traded in fewer than 25 months throught the whole
sample period; [3] Finally, we exclude the “on-the-run” transactions which happened within
three months since bonds’ offering dates, to only consider secondary market transactions.
funding portals, and capital acquisition brokers, etc, which are all dealer-like firms. The ID numbers assigned
by FINRA to registered members are all virtual IDs. In the data, non-registered trading counterparties are
assigned with the ID of “C” by FINRA.
18By the user guide of FINRA, a “Give Up” trade report is reported by one FINRA member on behalf of
another FINRA member who is the real one to buy or sell the bonds and thus has a reporting responsibility.
For such reports, we call the FINRA members, who asked other members to submit reports for them, the true
trading counterparties; Locked-in report is a trade report representing both sides of a transaction. FINRA
members such as Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs), and
clearing firms have the ability to match buy and sell orders, and therefore to report on behalf of multiple
parties using a single trade report submitted to FINRA and indicate that the trade is locked-in. Similarly, we
call the FINRA members who submit the buy or sell orders, instead of those clearing platforms, as the true
trading counterparties. In the error filters, for these two types of trades, we use the IDs of the true trading
counterparties as dealers’ IDs and we adjust the reported prices accordingly to account for the agency fees
charged by reporting firms and clearing platforms (ATSs, ECNs, and clearing firms).
19The raw data is high-frequency data that records the time of each transaction in seconds. In empirical
literature using TRACE data to analyze U.S. corporate bond market liquidity, it is common practice to
process the data to monthly frequency as corporate bonds are relatively illiquid compared with stock markets,
see Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Crotty (2013), Friewald and Nagler (2016), and Friewald and Nagler (2018),
etc. Specifically, An (2019) documents that dealers’ average inventory duration in the U.S. corporate bond
market is around three weeks by using the same data, which implies that the average frequency dealers
adjust their inventories is around one month.
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The final sample ranges from Jan 2005 to Sep 2015, and contains 10760 bonds traded by
3050 dealers. The total outstanding amount of all bonds in our sample is $5.37 trillion. The
average bond rating is BBB by the S&P rating categories. Among these bonds, around 84%
are investment grade and the remaining ones are high-yield or non-rated.20 The Panel A in
Table 1.1 reports additional bond fundamentals.
The summary statistics in the Panel B of Table 1.1 suggests that we can possibly ignore
the different values of transaction size since the standard deviation of trading volume is much
lower than its average level. Then we can assume all transactions have the same size as the
average level, and use the number of realized transactions to calculate the transaction-related
moments to estimate the model.
1.3.2 Identifying dealers’ private valuation
In the model with a continuum of dealers, for a dealer with type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], her transaction
price with another dealer with type δ′ ∈ [δ`, δh] is:
P (δ, δ′) =
4V (δ) +4V (δ′)
2
On the sell side of a dealer with type δ, since 4V (δ′) > 4V (δ), so the lowest selling price is
exactly equal to4V (δ) for continuum of dealers. Vice versa, on the buy side of a dealer with
type δ, since 4V (δ′) < 4V (δ), the highest buying price is exactly equal to 4V (δ). Again
based on monotonicity of 4V (δ), in data, we construct the following consistent estimator21
20By the S&P rating categories, investment grade are S&P BBB or higher; and high-yield(junk) are below
or equal to S&P BBB-.
21In finite samples, on the buy side of each dealer, the maximum purchasing price is a downward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation; on the sell side, the minimum selling price is an upward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation. Taking the average of the sample maximum purchasing price and
the sample minimum selling price will make the bias cancel out. In small samples with dealers’ unbalanced
buy and sell trades, the levels of the upward bias and the downward bias may not be equal. Then to make
the bias cancel out completely, the weights assigned on the two extreme prices can be adjusted according to
the realized number of buy and sell trades.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics on the Final Sample of TRACE Data (Jan 2005 - Sep 2015)
Panel A: bond fundamental characteristics (10760 bonds)
Mean Std. dev. Q5 Q50 Q95
Offering amount ($million) 458.97 577.99 5.74 300.00 1500.00
Coupon(%) 5.72 1.88 2.50 5.65 9.00
Maturity (years) 11.29 7.61 3.28 9.99 30.03
Amount outstanding($million) 499.35 615.95 6.88 350.00 1750.00
Credit rating 8.53 (BBB) 3.94 3.00 (AA) 8.00 (BBB+) 16.00 (B-)
Age (years) 3.70 2.55 0.48 3.17 8.72
Month turnover (%) 6.92 11.42 0.39 3.57 23.76
Note: [1] For variables “Offering amount ($million),” “Coupon(%),” and “Maturity (years),” we
calculate summary statistics based on bond-wise observations; for variables “Amount outstand-
ing($million),” “Credit rating,” “Age (years),” and “Month turnover (%),” we calculate summary
statistics based on bond-month observations as these variables change over time; [2] Month turnover
is calculated using bonds’ monthly total trading volumes (par amounts) and dividing by bonds’
average amount outstanding for that month.
Panel B: dealer trading activity (3050 dealers)
All Sale to customer Buy from customer Interdealer
Num of trades (million) 57.62 20.88 15.43 21.31
Total par value($trillion) 27.80 10.57 10.52 6.70
Average par value ($million) 0.48 0.51 0.68 0.31
Average vol (thousand) 482.41 506.25 681.86 314.59
Std. vol (thousand, all bonds) 4.47 5.47 4.46 3.22
Std. vol (thousand, within bond) 1.58 1.62 1.89 0.87
Note: [1] Total par value ($ trillion) is calculated by summing up the par values of all transactions.
Average par ($million) is calculated through dividing “Total par value ($trillion)” by “Num trades.”
[2] Trading volume (“trade vol”) is in unit of share of bonds. “Std. vol (thousand, all bonds)” is
the standard deviation of all trading volumes (unit: share) by pooling all dealers transactions for
all bonds in corresponding markets (customer-dealer or interdealer market). “Std. vol (thousand,
within bonds)” is the average standard deviation of trading volumes within each bond. “Std. vol
(thousand, within bonds)” measures whether volume per trade has a large dispersion among the
cross section of dealers within each bond.
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as a proxy for dealers’ private valuation type δ:
δˆji,t =
max{Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
}+min{Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}
2
where {Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
} ({Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}) is the collection of all buying (selling) prices by dealer i for
bond j within month t and nj,Bi,t (n
j,S
i,t ) is the correspondinng number of total buying (selling)
transactions (including both dealer-customer and interdealer transactions) within month t.
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1.3.3 Identifying dealers’ search intensity
We identify dealers’ heterogeneous search intensities separately on the buy- and sell-side of
the market using the following transaction-related moments,23 where variables with a hat
are obtained directly from the data:
1. expected number of selling transactions for each dealer of type δ ∈ [δ`, δh]:
T̂ radeS(δ) = φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)

(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µh0︸ ︷︷ ︸
trading with customers
+
2m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
trading with higher-type dealer non-owners

(1.9)
2. expected number of buying transactions for each dealer of type δ ∈ [δ`, δh]:
T̂ radeB(δ) = φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)

(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1︸ ︷︷ ︸
trading with customers
+
2m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
trading with lower-type dealer owners
 (1.10)
22In quantitative analysis, we define each market by one bond j and one quarter q. Each dealer i’s private
valuation for bond j in quarter q is calculated as the weighted average of all monthly private valuations δˆji,t
in quarter q weighted by dealer i’s monthly total trading volume in bond j.
23We calculate the moments at the bond and month/quarter level.
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3. for each selling transaction made by a dealer of type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], the probability that
the dealer δ’s trading counterparty is another dealer rather than a customer:
P̂ r [SellToDealers|Sell] (δ) =
2m
1+m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′(
1
1+m
+ ρ
mΛ
)
µh0 +
2m
1+m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ
φ0(δ′)dδ′
(1.11)
4. for each buying transaction made by a dealer of type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], the probability that
the dealer δ’s trading counterparty is another dealer rather than a customer:
P̂ r [BuyFromDealers|Buy] (δ) =
2m
1+m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′(
1
1+m
+ ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1 +
2m
1+m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ
φ1(δ′)dδ′
(1.12)
where T̂ rade and P̂ r are the number of transactions and probability of trading with dealers
conditional on a trade happening, for each dealer on either the buy- or sell-side of the market.
We show how to identify the total-selling-intensity function φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) and total-buying-
intensity function φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) both up to a constant. For notational simplicity, we define
the following measures based on data moments T̂ rade and P̂ r for each dealer with type
δ ∈ [δ`, δh]:
f̂1(δ) =
(
1− P̂ r [SellToDealers|Sell] (δ)
)
× T̂ radeS(δ) (1.13)
f̂2(δ) =
(
1− P̂ r [BuyFromDealers|Buy] (δ)
)
× T̂ radeB(δ)
f̂3(δ) = P̂ r [SellToDealers|Sell] (δ)× T̂ radeS(δ)
f̂4(δ) = P̂ r [BuyFromDealers|Buy] (δ)× T̂ radeB(δ) (1.14)
where f̂1(δ) is the number of selling-to-customer transactions for a dealer with type δ and
f̂2(δ) is the corresponding number of buying-from-customer transactions.
The following Proposition 2 gives the identification results of the selling- and buying
intensities up to a same constant relating to the measure of all dealersm. Proof of Proposition
24
2 is in Appendix 1.A.1.2.
Proposition 2: Assuming that the selling intensity of the minimum-type dealer-owner equals
the buying intensity of the maximum-type dealer non-owner:
φ1(δ`)λ
∗
1(δ`) = φ0(δh)λ
∗
0(δh)
the following functions of private valuation type and the ratio of aggregate buying intensity
versus aggregate selling intensity Λ0
Λ1
are identified by:
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) =
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
f̂1(δ`)
× f̂1(δ)
2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) =
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
f̂2(δh)
× f̂2(δ)
Λ0
Λ1
=
f̂3(δ`)
f̂4(δh)
where f̂1(δ)− f̂4(δ) are defined by (1.13)-(1.14).
The key to the identification results is: the intensities of trading with customers con-
ditional on the choice of selling/buying intensities are constant across dealers of different
private valuation types, on either the sell- or buy side of the market. Therefore f̂1(δ) (f̂2(δ))
is equal to φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) (φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)) multiplied by a constant that equals the intensity of
selling to (buying from) customers. However, the value of the intensity of trading with
customers on the sell side is different from that on the buy side. To identify φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
and φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) up to a same constant, we focus on different types of transactions only for
dealers of the minimum and maximum private valuation types. The reason we specifically
focus on these two extreme private valuation types, δ` and δh, is that there always exists a
positive trading surplus between the δ`-type dealer-owner (δh-type dealer-nonowner) and all
other dealer nonowners (owners), which reduces the intensity of trading with dealers to be
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only proportional to the probability of meeting a dealer 2m
1+m
and aggregate buying intensity
Λ0 (aggregate selling intensity Λ1) for the δ`-type dealer-owner (δh-type dealer-nonowner).
Additionally, the assumption in Proposition 2 helps to identify the ratio Λ0
Λ1
by only using
interdealer transactions for δ`- and δh-type dealers. Therefore we can further disentangle the
probability of meeting a dealer 2m
1+m
from either Λ0 or Λ1. The final step is to compare the
number of dealer-customer transactions with the number of interdealer transactions sepa-
rately for δ`- and δh-type dealers, which allows us to replace the intensities of trading with
customers (different between the two sides) with the same constant 2m
1+m
.
1.3.4 Identifying other parameters
System of equations to identify parameters except for c and θ With identified
search intensity functions by the group of transaction-related moments above, we use the
following system of equations to identify the model parameters except for c and θ:
µh0
µ`1
=
Λ0
Λ1
(1.15)
αµ`0pih = αµh0pi` + µh0
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ (1.16)
αµh1pi` = αµ`1pih + µ`1
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)dδ (1.17)
pih = µh0 + µh1
pi` = µ`0 + µ`1
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pih + pi` = 1
s = µh1 + µ`1 +m1 (1.18)
[
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
] ∫ δh
δ`
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)dδ = ContactC2D (1.19)
(
1 +
(1 +m)ρ
mΛ
)
µh0
m
=
2f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
(1.20)
(
1 +
(1 +m)ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1
m
=
2f̂2(δh)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
(1.21)
where (1.15)-(1.18) are equilibrium conditions, ContactC2D in (1.19) is the intensity with
which customers meet dealer-buyers similarly defined in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018),
(1.20)-(1.21) are based on the identification results of Proposition 2, and f̂1(δ) − f̂4(δ) are
defined by (1.13)-(1.14). Details of the identification are in Appendix 1.A.2.1.
Calibration The identification of parameters from the system of equations (1.15)-(1.21)
depends on calibrating bond supply per capita s, and also targeting on intensity ContactC2D
and the fraction of shares of a bond that held by dealers m1
s
.
Our calibration works as follows: [1] we calibrate the bond supply per capita s through
dividing the amount outstanding variable from the FISD database by the average trading
volume across all transactions which is a measure of average trade size, then by the number
of customers N . For the value of N , we follow the approach in Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2018) assuming half of the household population from the U.S. Census is directly or
indirectly investing in financial market in general,24 and then applying the average ratio of
24This assumption in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018) is also motivated by data from the Survey of
Consumer Finance (SCF) and Bricker and et al (2017).
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shares of corporate bonds in household holdings of liquidity assets relative to that of mu-
nicipal bonds throughout 2002 to 2015 by the factbook of the SIFMA. Our calibration of
the number of customers per bond is then around N = 35896; [2] the intensity with which
customers meet dealer-buyers
[
1
1+mj
+ ρ
j
mjΛ
j
] ∫ δjh
δj`
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)dδ is derived from the average
trading delay for customers to contact dealers through voice-based OTC trading in corpo-
rate bonds, which is calibrated by an approach similar to that of Pagnotta and Philippon
(2018a). Since we mainly report estimated model parameters at bond and quarter levels,
and also corporate bond market is relatively more liquid than the municipal bond market,
we calibrate the average trading delay as one business day for a customer to meet a dealer-
buyer. Therefore, ContactC2D equals 60 per quarter; and [3] we calibrate the (average)
fraction of shares of a bond held by dealers based on the data on security broker-dealers’
holding positions of corporate bonds from Flow of Funds. The average fraction over the
sample period 2005-2015 is around 2.82%. Details of calculation are in Appendix 1.A.2.2.
The identification of the measure of dealers per capita m depends on the former identifi-
cations of aggregate buying/selling intensities, the calibration of the fraction held by dealers
and also the following assumption: 25
Assumption 1: Dealer-owners’ average selling intensity is equal to dealer-non-owners’ av-
erage buying intensity:
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
φ1(δ
′)
m1
dδ′ =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ
′)
φ0(δ
′)
m0
dδ′
Therefore m can be identified as m1 × f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)f̂4(δh) .
25We also alternatively identify m by using a calibrated number of customers N and the number of dealers
that ever provide liquidity within each month, quarter or throughout the whole sample period, since TRACE
data allows us to identify dealer counterparties for each completed transaction. The main concern of this
identification approach other than relying on Assumption 1 is that the physical size of dealers will highly
depend on choosing the length of unit period since the corporate bond market is illiquid relative to equity
markets and dealers may not complete any transactions if the length of the unit period is too short.
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Price-related moments for estimating c and θ Based on identified search intensi-
ties and model parameters above, we use the following group of price-related conditions to
estimate search cost coefficient c and dealers’ bargaining power to customers θ:
1. average interdealer transaction price:
m1 : E(PDD) =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
(4V (δ′)+4V (δ))
2
dδ′dδ∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
dδ′dδ
(1.22)
2. average price of transactions that customers sell to dealers within bond j:
m2 : E(PCD) =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ0
[(1− θ)4V (δ) + θ4W (y`)]dδ
3. average price of transactions that dealers sell to customers within bond j:
m3 : E(PDC) =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ1
[(1− θ)4V (δ) + θ4W (yh)]dδ (1.23)
1.4 Quantitative analysis
1.4.1 Estimation procedure
The estimation contains two main steps. In the first step, we construct B-spline nonpara-
metric estimators26 of unknown functions f̂1(δ)-f̂4(δ) and obtain fitted values. Then we plug
in fitted unknown functions back to the group of moment conditions (1.9)-(1.10) and use
the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the two following constant terms:(
1 + (1+m)ρ
mΛ
)
µh0
m
and
(
1 + (1+m)ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1
m
, subject to constraints (1.15)-(1.19). In the second
step, we follow Hansen (1982) and Gavazza (2016) to use the two-step simulated method
26Expressions of estimators are in Appendix 1.A.2.3.
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of moments (SMM) approach to estimate the unknown parameters ψ =
[
c θ
]T
by plug-
ging estimated parameters in the first step into moment conditions (1.22)-(1.23). By similar
notations, the two-step estimator takes the form
ψˆ = argmin
ψ∈Ψ
(m(ψ)−ms)′
ms
Ω(ψ˜)
(m(ψ)−ms)
ms
where m(ψ) =
[
m1(ψ) m2(ψ) m3(ψ)
]T
is the vector of price-related moments that com-
puted from the model stationary equilibrium solutions which are evaluated at the parameter
vector ψ; ms =
[
m1,s m2,s m3,s
]T
is the vector of sample moments; Ψ is the parameter
space. We firstly use identity matrix as the weight matrix to calculate the preliminary con-
sistent estimate ψ˜ of ψ, then we use the consistent estimate of the inverse of asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix Ω(ψ˜) as the weight matrix in the second step. We minimize the
percentage deviation of model-implied moments from sample moments.
Estimates We define each market by one bond j and one quarter q and denote it as
Market(j, q). We further restrict that there are at least 25 observations within each market,
and each observation is defined by one dealer i in Market(j, q) who trades on both sides of
the market. This restriction further shrinks our sample 27 used for estimation to include 6301
bonds and 47634 markets. For each dealer i’s state variables in Market(j, q), we construct
the dealer’s private valuation for bond j by calculating the volume-weighted average of dealer
i’s monthly private valuations δˆji,t within quarter q.
For each Market(j, q), we estimate the dealers’ search intensity functions and model
27The reason we choose one quarter as the time period for each market is that for each market, we would
like to have a relatively large size of cross section of observations, which allows us to obtain more accurate
estimates. The median size of cross section (number of dealers) across all markets is 38 dealers for quarterly
data, compared with 12 dealers for monthly data. For robustness check, we re-do all quantitative analysis
for markets defined by monthly data, i.e., each market is defined as a bond j and month t, and the results
are qualitatively same, except that there is quite a proportion of dealers only trading on one side (only buy
or only sell) within one month, which could generate negative estimated search intensities for the direction
with no transaction.
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Figure 1.4: Average estimated search intensities across bond grades
parameters using the moments and equilibrium conditions in the previous section. Figure
1.4 shows quarterly average search intensities separately for investment grade and speculative
grade bonds by S&P ratings. Search intensities are generally more volatile for lower-rated
bonds and manifest a decreasing trend after the financial crisis. Moreover, selling intensities
are on average higher than buying intensities, which is consistent with the fact that the
estimated measure of high-type customers is lower than that of low-type customers. This
requires the whole dealer sector to search more actively on the sell side.
Most estimates of parameters exhibit large variation across markets and are right-skewed.
Specifically, the estimate of the measure of high-type customer pih has a very close distribution
to that of bond supply per capita s, which indicates that the marginal investors in most
frictionless markets have private valuation types equal or close to that of the high-type
customer yh. This is shown in Table 1.10 and Figure 1.5. The calibration of bond supply per
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Table 1.2: Estimated and Calibrated Parameters for 47634 markets (6301 bonds)
Estimates
Parameter Description Mean Median Std. dev.
ρ customer search intensity (per quarter) 3.23 1.92 3.53
α customer intensity of switching type (per quarter) 1.46 0.89 1.63
m measure of dealers 0.006 0.005 0.004
pih measure of high-type customers 0.08 0.06 0.06
pi` measure of low-type customers 0.92 0.94 0.06
c coefficient of search cost function c× λ2 0.83 0.85 0.17
θ dealers’ bargaining power to customers 0.73 0.65 0.27
Calibration
s bond supply (per capita) 0.09 0.06 0.07
Note: “Mean” and “Median” are calculated over all markets, with each market defined by one
bond and one quarter.
customer s is calculated by firstly dividing each bond’s amount outstanding by the bond’s
average trading volume (among all market participants) within each Market(j, q), and then
dividing the result further by the calibrated number of customers per bond N = 35896,
as explained in Section 1.3.4. The estimated model parameters and corresponding model
implied components (both on a quarterly basis) in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 will be used for
welfare analysis in Section 1.4.3. Table ?? in Appendix 1.A.2.4 compares the fitted values
of model-implied moments with empirical moments calculated from data.
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Table 1.3: Model-implied endogeneous components for 47634 markets (6301 bonds)
Measures Description Mean Median Std. dev.
µh0 measure of high-type customer-non-owner 0.0078 0.0044 0.0095
µ`1 measure of low-type customer-owner 0.0029 0.0021 0.0024
Λ1 aggregate dealer-sector selling intensity 15.95 7.00 23.97
Λ0 aggregate dealer-sector buying intensity 21.78 14.05 22.10
Λ aggregate dealer-sector total search intensity 38.48 22.83 43.75
m1 measure of all dealer-owners 0.0025 0.0017 0.0020
m0 measure of all dealer-non-owners 0.0034 0.0034 0.0043
Note: “Mean” and “Median” are calculated over all markets, with each market defined by
one bond and one quarter.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
fre
qu
en
cy
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
fre
qu
en
cy
Figure 1.5: Summary of estimate of pih and bond supply per capita s
33
1.4.2 Results about search intensity and trading roles
Distribution of search intensity among dealers We give examples of two sub-markets
to intuitively show how (identified) search intensities are distributed among dealers, as in Fig-
ure 1.6. Market-1 has the maximum number of dealers among all sub-markets, and Market-2
has the median number of dealers. In both markets, the distributions of search intensities
are “hump-shaped”. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model with
endogeneous search efforts. Moreover, the distribution of search intensity deviates from that
of dealers’ private valuations. This implies that it is more likely dealers choose heterogeneous
search intensities.
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Market-1: 155 dealers
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Market-2: 48 dealers
Figure 1.6: Examples of two markets
(Market-1: bond 013817AP6, 2010-Q3, BBB-, terms to maturity 8.6 years, 750k shares; Market-2:
bond 803111AM5, 2010-Q3, BBB, terms to maturity 22.2 years, 500k shares.)
Using data on all the markets, we fit search intensities as a quadratic function of dealers’
scaled private valuation δˆjS,i,q, which is computed through dividing quarterly private valuation
δˆji,q by cross-dealer mean level δˆ
j
q for each Market(j, q)
28. The quardratic fitting has the
28The scaled private valuation is expressed in percentage of the cross-dealer mean level, thus being a
measure of the distance of dealers’ private valuation to the cross-dealer mean level. The reason we divide
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following form:
λ̂
j
i,q = β0 + β1 × δˆjS,i,q + β2 × (δˆjS,i,q)2 + Γ1Xjq + Γ2Yi,q + τi + φj + ηy + ji,q (1.24)
where the vector Xjq includes as bond-related controls bond j’s credit rating, bond j’s HHI
(Herfindahl index) calculated by using market shares of all dealers to measure whether
transactions are concentrated to a specific group of dealers, bond j’s previous-three-month
turnover, amount outstanding, time to maturity and coupon rate; the vector Yi,q includes as
dealer-related controls dealer i’s quarterly eigenvector centrality29 in the interdealer network,
dealer i’s “HHI for bonds” calculated by using her trade shares of all bonds, and dealer i’s
“HHI for trade types” calculated by using her trade shares of different trading directions
(customer-to-dealer, dealer-to-customer or dealer-to-dealer). These two HHI indices are to
measure whether a dealer specializes in a specific bond or trading direction; fixed effects by
dealer τi, bond φj and year ηy are also controlled. We also include selling intensity λ̂
S,j
i,q and
buying intensity λ̂
B,j
i,q as dependent variables. In Table 1.4, we mainly report estimates of
β1 and β2. Regression results of (1.24) verify that, within each Market(j, q), total search
intensity λ̂
j
i,q is hump-shaped over dealers’ private valuation. Specifically, the composition
effect implied by the model is consistently verified by the fact that the increasing total
search intensity in the lower range of private valuation is driven by faster increase in selling
intensity λ̂
S,j
i,q than decrease in buying intensity λ̂
B,j
i,q , which is shown in Figure 1.7; similarly,
the decreasing total search intensity in the higher range of private valuation is driven by
the raw private valuations by cross-dealer mean level is to control for unobserved factors that drive bonds
to be traded at a discount or premium.
29“Eigenvector centrality” is one measure of vertices’ network centralities. By using all the interdealer
transactions, we construct an interdealer network in which we regard each dealer as one “vertice” and
each transaction record as a link connecting two vertices. The advantage of using eigenvector centrality
is it incorporates not only direct but also indirect trading counterparties for each dealer and thus more
accurately measures each dealer’s importance in the network by assigning scores to them. The higher the
value of eigenvector centrality, the more central and important the dealer is in the interdealer network. We
calculate daily values of eigenvector centrality on a rolling basis. Specifically, for each day, we use all the
previous-90-day transactions of each dealer to calculate her eigenvector centrality for the current day. Then
we calculate the quarterly average by using daily values.
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Table 1.4: Distribution of search intensity among dealers
(quadratic form)
Depji,q λ̂
j
i,q λ̂
S,j
i,q λ̂
B,j
i,q
δˆjS,i,q (%) 1788.54*** 968.84*** 466.04***
(36.92) (35.77) (28.12)
(δˆjS,i,q)
2 -8.93*** -4.54*** -2.57***
(-36.89) (-33.65) (-30.97)
# of obs 1,500,047 1,500,047 1,500,047
Adj R2 0.1547 0.1241 0.1689
Dealer×Bond×Year FE YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are
clustered in dealer#bond#year.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of search intensity among dealers (quadratic form)
faster decrease in buying intensity λ̂
B,j
i,q than increase in selling intensity λ̂
S,j
i,q .
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Dealers’ heterogeneous trading roles We verify the model predictions on dealers’ het-
erogeneous roles in the intermediation process by replacing the dependent variables in (1.24)
with the following empirical moments30: number of sell-to-customer transactions V jS2C,i,q,
number of buy-from-customer transactions V jBfC,i,q, number of sell-to-dealer transactions
V jS2D,i,q, and number of buy-from-dealer transactions V
j
BfD,i,q. As in the theoretical part,
we also construct the gross number of transactions and proportion of intermediation trans-
actions, separately for the interdealer and dealer-customer markets. Regression results in
Appendix 1.A.3 are also consistent with model predictions.
Table 1.5: Distribution of transactions of different directions
Depji,q V
j
S2C,i,q V
j
BfC,i,q V
j
S2D,i,q V
j
BfD,i,q
δˆjS,i,q (%) 2.29*** 1.02*** 2.08*** 1.99***
(28.56) (21.68) (21.76) (28.09)
(δˆjS,i,q)
2 -0.0111*** -0.0054*** -0.0111*** -0.0094***
(-27.41) (-23.06) (-23.37) (-26.52)
# of obs 1,500,090 1,500,090 1,500,090 1,500,090
Adj R2 0.1731 0.2278 0.2193 0.2249
Dealer×Bond×Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered in
dealer#bond#year.
Regression results in Table 1.5 and Figure 1.8 verify that as private valuation ranges
from low to high, dealers switch from “buying from customers and selling to dealers” to
“buying from dealers and selling to customers.” Dealers with private valuations closer to the
mean level, by composition effect, on aggregate trade more actively than other dealers in
both the dealer-customer and interdealer markets, which is further shown by the curve of
the gross number of transactions in Appendix 1.A.3. Moreover, those dealers trade closer
30Here we mainly show the results for dependent variables as the number of transactions of different
directions, which is consistent with the low standard deviation of trading volume in Panel B of Table 1.1,
and also consistent with the measures of search intensities which are also identified using the number of
transactions. In the Appendix, we show the results for dependent variables as the volume of transactions of
different directions for the robustness check.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of transactions of different directions (quadratic form)
amounts in the buy- and sell side of the market to intermediate shares of bonds from low-
type customers/dealers to high-type ones. We further characterize how dealers’ specializing
in transactions of different directions correlates with the signed distance31 of dealers’ private
valuations relative to the mean level across all dealers. Figure 1.9 shows how the proportions
of different types of transactions vary with the signed distance. We also characterize the
relationship separately for each subperiod in Appendix 1.A.5.2.
Figure 1.9 indicates that: [1] for dealers of each level of private valuation, the aggregate
proportion of selling transactions (either to customer or to other dealers) is close to that
31The signed distance is defined as
δˆji,q−ˆδ
j
q
| ˆδjh,q−
ˆ
δjl,q|
, i.e., the normalized distance in (1.50) without absolute value
on the numerator. The signed distance measures not only how far each dealer’s private valuation is to the
corresponding cross-dealer mean level, but also indicates whether the value is below or above the mean level.
The difference in the scaled private valuation is that it also controls for the dispersion of all dealers’ private
valuations for the same bond and same month.
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Figure 1.9: Dealer’s private valuation and proportions of transactions in different directions
(values are averages taken over all bonds and all quarters)
of buying transactions; [2] as private valuation ranges from low to high, on the buy side,
dealers switch from “buying mainly from customers” to “buying mainly from other dealers.”
Similarly on the sell side, dealers switch from “selling mainly to other dealers” to “selling
mainly to customers”; [3] dealers in the lower range of private valuations take the main roles
to buy from low-type customers and sell to higher-type dealers, and similarly, dealers in the
higher range of private valuations take the main roles to buy from lower-type dealers and
sell to high-type customers; [4] dealers with private valuations close to the mean level trade
equally on either of the four types.
1.4.3 Market inefficiencies compared to a frictionless market
In terms of market inefficiency, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to evaluate how search
frictions between customers and/or dealers affect bond prices and misallocation, based on
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estimated model parameters in Section 1.4.1. Here search frictions refers to frictions to
contact/locate potential counterparties caused by the decentralized structures in both the
dealer-customer market and the interdealer market. The counterfactual scenarios would be
Walrasian markets of the same model parameters but with centralized exchanges to which
both customers and dealers have frictionless access.
Walrasian price Consider the corresponding Walrasian (frictionless) market in which
there is a central exchange where customers and dealers can buy or sell the target bond
immediately at equilibrium price P , which is unique within each stationary equilibrium (or
Market(j, q) for bond j and quarter q).
As is standard, the Walrasian price P = u
∗
r
where u∗ is the private valuation (utility
flow) of the marginal investor which is defined as the asset owner with the lowest private
valuation type in a frictionless market:
u∗ =

yh if s <= pih;
{u ∈ [δ`, δh] : pih +
∫ δh
u∗ f(δ)dδ = s} if pih < s < pih +m;
y` if s >= pih +m.
For most markets, the marginal investor in corresponding frictionless markets are high-
type customers or high-type dealers.32 Based on estimates of parameters in Section 1.4.1,
there are 10.2% of markets with s ≤ pih and 89.8% with pih < s < pih + m. Therefore, in
the remaining section, we only consider the two cases of s ≤ pih and pih < s < pih + m. In
the latter case, we denote the marginal-investor private valuation type as δ∗. The derivation
32In the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate bond market, since we are not able (or allowed by FINRA)
to uncover the true identities of registered members (or dealers), some of the registered members may be
actually customers based on their trading behavior, for example, they may mostly trade on one side of the
market, but under regulation of FINRA. Since in our sample, we exclude the dealers that only trade on one
side of the market, this may lead to an under-estimation of the measure of high-type customers pih, and thus
the proportion of markets with the marginal investor as high-type customers in corresponding frictionless
markets.
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and estimation of Walrasian price P are in Appendix 1.A.4.
We report the Walrasian prices and average OTC transaction prices P (and all other mea-
sures of interest) in Table 1.6, separately for markets with the frictionless-market marginal
investor as high-type customers (s ≤ pih) and markets with the marginal investor as dealers
(s > pih). In the first group of markets, the average Walrasian price is higher than the re-
alized average transaction price, which is consistent with similar counterfactual analysis on
over-the-counter markets as in Gavazza (2016). However, in the second group of markets, the
average Walrasian price is lower than the realized transaction price. The possible reason is
that,33 for most markets, total search costs on the sell side are higher than those on the buy
side, which requires the average transaction price to be higher to compensate for the dealers
on the sell side. Additionally, since the private valuation of the marginal investor is lower
than that of the high-type customers, for dealers with private valuations in between, there
still exist positive gains from intermediation, which makes it possible for the transaction
price to be higher than the Walrasian price.
Bond misallocation In this paper, bond misallocation is defined as the proportion of bond
amount outstanding being held by low-type customers and/or dealers with private valuation
types lower than that of the marginal investor in a corresponding frictionless market.
The ratio of bond misallocation Rmis is correspondingly defined as below:
Rmis =

s−µh1
s
or µ`1+m1
s
if s ≤ pih;
µ`1+
∫ δ∗
δ`
φ1(δ)dδ
s
if s > pih.
The average misallocation ratio over all markets is 8.64% with standard deviation as
2.93%. Moreover, there is a significant different misallocation ratio between markets with
the marginal investor as high-type customers (i.e., s ≤ pih) and markets with the marginal
33This is indicated by formula of Walrasian price (1.49) in Appendix 1.A.4.
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investor as dealers (i.e., s > pih). In the former case, the average misallocation ratio is
17.11%, which is more than twice that of the latter case, 7.96%. Therefore, the effect of
search frictions on bond misallocation is larger for markets with the marginal investor as
high-type customers. For a robustness check, we also calculated the value of
µh0+
∫ δh
δ∗ φ0(δ)dδ
s
for the latter case, which is very close to that of
µ`1+
∫ δ∗
δ`
φ1(δ)dδ
s
.34
Total flow utility Total flow utility is defined as the summation of all bond-owners’ utility
flows in stationary equilibrium:
Tot utility =
∫ δh
δ`
φ1(δ)δdδ + µh1yh + µ`1y`
Total flow utility measures the total benefits of all market participants by holding the
bond and positively contributes to the total welfare of each market. In Table 1.6, total flow
utility is in percentage of bond face value and further scaled by the number of customers per
bond. The gap between Walrasian markets with s ≤ pih and s > pih is mainly driven by the
gap in the supply of bond per capita s.
Dealers’ search costs The average search cost per contact for the whole dealer sector is
calculated by dividing total search cost by the aggregate level of all dealers’ search intensities
Λ.
Ave SearchCost = c×
∫ δh
δ`
(
λ∗1
2(δ)φ1(δ) + λ
∗
0
2(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ
)
dδ
where Λ =
∫ δh
δ`
(λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)φ0(δ))dδ. In Table 1.6, the total search cost is also scaled
by the number of customers per bond.
In Table 1.6, total search costs are larger for OTC markets with s ≤ pih, which is due
to limited supply of bonds, higher bond misallocation, and thus higher gains from interme-
34The mean of the difference is 0.02% with standard deviation as 0.4%. To estimate φ1(δ), we assume φ1(δ)
is proportionate to dealers’ standardized inventory position, subject to φ1(δ`) = 0 and
∫ δh
δ`
φ1(δ)dδ = m1.
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diation that motivate more dealers to spend on searching. Over all markets in our sample,
the mean level of search cost per contact is 0.75% of face value, with standard deviation as
1.48%. With conjecture that search cost per contact is compensated by bond price (yield),
using the approximated relationship35 between bond price and yield, we calculate that the
search cost per contact 0.75% corresponds to approximately 22.7 basis points of bond yield.
Finally, we calculate the welfare (per customer) as the gap between total flow utility and
total search costs. Compared with Walrasian markets, OTC markets exhibit a close level of
total flow utility (per capita) but nontrivial total search costs (per capita), which on average
reduces the welfare by about 8.96% relative to Walrasian markets.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a search-based model for the U.S. corporate bond market with
dealers’ endogeneous and state-dependent search intensity. The model generates the follow-
ing implications that can be empirically verified: [1] endogeneous intermediation: dealers
with intermediate private valuation type choose higher search intensities than others and
intermediate shares of bonds from low-type to high-type dealers. Low-type dealers mainly
trade on the buy side to buy bonds from customer-sellers. High-type dealers mainly trade on
the sell side to sell bonds to customer-buyers; [2] over-the-counter efficiencies: the estimated
model indicates nontrivial market inefficiency that, taking the average over all markets in
our sample, dealers’ search cost per contact is 0.75% of the bond’s face value, which gen-
erates an 8.96% welfare loss relative to corresponding frictionless markets, and there is on
average 8.64% of bond misallocation. Moreover, the level of market inefficiency exhibits
large variation across different bonds and over time.
35The approximated formula is: ApproxY TM =
C+F−Pn
F+P
2
where C is bond coupon/interest payment, F is
face value, P is transaction price, and n is years to maturity. See https://financeformulas.net/Yield_
to_Maturity.html.
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Table 1.6: Comparison with corresponding frictionless markets for 47634 markets (6301 bonds)
Markets with s ≤ pih
OTC market Walrasian market
(mean/std.dev of all markets) (mean/std.dev of all markets)
µ`1+m1
s (%) 17.11% 0
(6.85%)
Tot flow utility (% of face value) 4.73% 4.77%
(4.03%) (4.04%)
Tot search costs (% of face value) 0.99% 0
(2.76%)
Welfare (per customer) 3.74% 4.77%
(3.71%) (4.04%)
P 99.58% 102.34%
(average transaction price) (8.06%) (6.95%)
Markets with s > pih
OTC market Walrasian market
(mean/std.dev of all markets) (mean/std.dev of all markets)
µ`1+
∫ δ∗
δ`
φ1(δ)dδ
s (%) 7.96% 0
(2.13%)
Tot flow utility (% of face value) 10.24% 10.27%
(8.91%) (8.96%)
Tot search costs (% of face value) 0.49% 0
(1.56%)
Welfare (per customer) 9.75% 10.27%
(7.68%) (8.96%)
P (% of face value) 103.02% 101.88%
(average transaction price) (7.08%) (9.64%)
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Appendix 1.A Appendix of Chapter 1
1.A.1 Proof of propositions
1.A.1.1 Proof of proposition 1
In this proof, we assume stationary equilibrium exists.36
[1] λ∗1
′(δ) < 0 and λ∗0
′(δ) > 0:
By (1.2)-(1.4), we obtain:
r4V (δ) = δ + cλ∗21 (δ)− cλ∗20 (δ) (1.25)
λ∗1
′(δ) = (−4V ′(δ)) 1
2c
[(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µh0θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
]
(1.26)
λ∗0
′(δ) = 4V ′(δ) 1
2c
[(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µ`1θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
]
(1.27)
(1.25)-(1.27) =⇒
r4V ′(δ) = 1 + 2c× λ∗1(δ)λ∗1′(δ)− 2c× λ∗0(δ)λ∗0′(δ) (1.28)
= 1 + (−4V ′(δ))
(
λ∗1(δ)
[(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µh0θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
]
+λ∗0(δ)
[(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µ`1θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
])
36The proof of existance of stationary equilibrium is similar as in Liu (2018) and Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2018).
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(1.28) =⇒
4V ′(δ)
=
1
r + λ∗1(δ)X1(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)X0(δ)
(1.29)
> 0
where
X1(δ) =
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µh0θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
X0(δ) =
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
µ`1θ +
m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
(1.26)-(1.27) and (1.29) =⇒
λ∗1
′(δ) < 0 and λ∗0
′(δ) > 0
[2] If symmetric restrictions apply and the distribution f(δ) is uniform distribution, then
∃c∗ > 0, s.t. for any c < c∗:
λ¯′(δ) > 0, ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ` + δh
2
] and λ¯′(δ) < 0, ∀δ ∈ [δ` + δh
2
, δh]
Proof: When symmetric restrictions apply and f(δ) ≡ U , such that U = 1
δh−δ` , search
intensity policy functions and density functions trivally satisfy the following conditions:
λ∗1(
δ` + δh
2
) = λ∗0(
δ` + δh
2
) (1.30)
λ∗1(δ) > λ
∗
0(δ) and φ1(δ) < φ0(δ), ∀δ ∈ [δ`,
δ` + δh
2
) (1.31)
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λ∗1(δ) < λ
∗
0(δ) and φ1(δ) > φ0(δ), ∀δ ∈ (
δ` + δh
2
, δh]
φ′1(δ) > 0 and φ
′
0(δ) < 0, ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]
λ∗1
′(δ) = −λ∗0′(δh + δ` − δ) and φ′1(δ) = −φ′0(δh + δ` − δ), ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]
µh0 = µ`1 and Λ0 = Λ1 (1.32)
where µh0 = µ`1 is obtained by inflow-outflow equations (1.7)-(1.8) and also Λ0 = Λ1.
Then by definition,
λ¯′(δ) = φ′1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) + φ1(δ)λ
∗
1
′(δ) + φ′0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) + φ0(δ)λ
∗
0
′(δ) (1.33)
= φ′1(δ)(λ
∗
1(δ)− λ∗0(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
*
+
1
2c
4V ′(δ)
(φ0(δ)µ`1 − φ1(δ)µh0)( ρmΛ + 11 +m
)
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
**
+(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ)) m
1 +m

where
a(δ) =
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
b(δ) =
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)
Λ
dδ′
By (1.30)-(1.32), both terms ∗ and ∗∗ in (1.33) are positive for ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ`+δh2 ). To charac-
terize the sign of φ0(δ)a(δ) − φ1(δ)b(δ) in the range of [δ`, δ`+δh2 ), we use the inflow-outflow
equation (1.6) for φ1(δ):
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2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)µh0
=
2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+
1
1 +m
)
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)µ`1
=⇒
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
=
λ∗1(δ)
λ∗0(δ)
2m
1+m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
µh0
2m
1+m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ
φ1(δ′)dδ′ +
(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
µ`1
(1.34)
=
λ∗1(δ)
λ∗0(δ)
2m
1+m
b(δ) +
(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
µh0
2m
1+m
a(δ) +
(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
µ`1
By inflow-outflow equations of measures of high-type customer-non-owner and low-type
customer-owner (1.7)-(1.8),
µh0 =
αµ`0pih(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
Λ1 + αpi`
µ`1 =
αµh1pi`(
ρ
mΛ
+ 1
1+m
)
Λ0 + αpih
Since µ`0 < pi` ≤ 1, µh1 < pih ≤ 1, Λ0 = Λ1 = Λ2 , also Λ1 → ∞ and Λ0 → ∞ as c → 0, we
have:
lim
c→0
µh0 = lim
c→0
µ`1 = 0 (1.35)
Then by (1.31) and (1.34)-(1.35), we have:
lim
c→0
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
=
λ∗1(δ)
λ∗0(δ)
2m
1+m
b(δ)
2m
1+m
a(δ)
>
b(δ)
a(δ)
, ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ` + δh
2
)
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=⇒
lim
c→0
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ)) > 0, ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ` + δh
2
)
Then in (1.33), we have for ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ`+δh2 ):
lim
c→0
λ¯′(δ) >
1
2c
4V ′(δ) m
1 +m
lim
c→0
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ)) > 0
by 4V ′(δ) > 0, and both terms ∗ and ∗∗ in (1.33) are positive for ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δ`+δh2 ).
Finally, by symmetry conditions,
λ¯′(δ) = −λ¯′(δh + δ` − δ) ∀δ ∈ [δ`, δh]
=⇒ ∀δ ∈ ( δ`+δh
2
, δh]:
lim
c→0
λ¯′(δ) < 0

1.A.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
We use P to denote the intensity of trading at different directions conditional on the choice
of selling/buying intensity for each individual dealer, and use Pr to denote the conditional
probability that trading counterparty is a dealer or customer conditional on that transac-
tion of specific direction happens. Notations with hat refer to identified data moments.
Specifically, for each dealer with type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], we denote:
P (S2D|δ) = 2m
1 +m
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
P (BfD|δ) = 2m
1 +m
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
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P (S2C) =
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µh0
P (BfC) =
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µ`1
In (1.9)-(1.10), replace P (S2D|δ) and P (BfD|δ) by (1.11)-(1.12), the following two functions
are identified:
f̂1(δ) =
(
1− P̂ r [SellToDealers|Sell] (δ)
)
× T̂ radeS(δ) = φ1(δ)λ∗1(δ)× P (S2C) (1.36)
f̂2(δ) =
(
1− P̂ r [BuyFromDealers|Buy] (δ)
)
× T̂ radeB(δ) = φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)×P (BfC) (1.37)
In (1.9)-(1.10), replace P (S2C) and P (BfC) with P (S2D|δ) and P (BfD|δ) by (1.11)-(1.12),
the following two functions are identified:
f̂3(δ) = P̂ r [SellToDealers|Sell] (δ)× T̂ radeS(δ) = 2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
(1.38)
f̂4(δ) = P̂ r [BuyFromDealers|Buy] (δ)× T̂ radeB(δ) = 2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
(1.39)
Plug in δ` in (1.38) and plug in δh in (1.39), obtain:
f̂3(δ`) =
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ`)λ
∗
1(δ`)
Λ0
Λ
(1.40)
f̂4(δh) =
2m
1 +m
φ0(δh)λ
∗
0(δh)
Λ1
Λ
(1.41)
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by assumption φ1(δ`)λ
∗
1(δ`) = φ0(δh)λ
∗
0(δh), we obtain:
f̂3(δ`)
f̂4(δh)
=
Λ0
Λ1
,
f̂3(δ`)
f̂4(δh)
1 + f̂3(δ`)
f̂4(δh)
=
Λ0
Λ
,
1
1 + f̂3(δ`)
f̂4(δh)
=
Λ1
Λ
(1.42)
then plug (1.42) into (1.40)-(1.41), we obtain:
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh) =
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ`)λ
∗
1(δ`) =
2m
1 +m
φ0(δh)λ
∗
0(δh) (1.43)
Plug in δ` in (1.36) and plug in δh in (1.37), obtain:
f̂1(δ`) = φ1(δ`)λ
∗
1(δ`)× P (S2C)
f̂2(δh) = φ0(δh)λ
∗
0(δh)× P (BfC) (1.44)
Since 2m
1+m
, P (S2C) and P (BfC) are all constants (within each market), by (1.43)-(1.44),
we obtain:
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
=
P (S2C)
2m
1+m
(1.45)
f̂2(δh)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
=
P (BfC)
2m
1+m
(1.46)
The (1.45)-(1.46) allow us to replace trading intensities P (S2C) and P (BfC) in (1.36)-
(1.37), obtain:
f̂1(δ) = φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)×
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
× 2m
1 +m
f̂2(δ) = φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)×
f̂2(δh)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
× 2m
1 +m
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then 2m
1+m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) and
2m
1+m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) can be identified as:
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) =
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
f̂1(δ`)
× f̂1(δ)
2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) =
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
f̂2(δh)
× f̂2(δ)
and then 2mΛ1
1+m
and 2mΛ0
1+m
can also be identified by calculating the full integral over [δ`, δh]. 
1.A.2 Identification and estimation
1.A.2.1 Identy parameters except for c and θ
Based on the second group of restrictions as (1.15)-(1.19), rewrite (1.45) as:
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`) + f̂4(δh)
=
P (S2C)
2m
1+m
=
1 +m
2m
(
1
1 +m
+
ρ
mΛ
)
µh0 (1.47)
By (1.47), (1.15), (1.19) and identification of 2mΛ0
1+m
, we identify:
µh0 =
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
(1.48)
then plug (1.48) in (1.15), we identify:
µ`1 =
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1+m
Λ0
Λ1
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After identifying µh0 and µ`1, by (1.18), we identify:
µh1 = s−m1 − µ`1 = s−m1 −
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1+m
Λ0
Λ1
then pih, pil and µ`0 are identified as:
pih = µh0 + µh1 =
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
+ s−m1 − µ`1
= s−m1 +
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
× Λ0 − Λ1
Λ0
pil = 1− s+m1 +
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
× Λ1 − Λ0
Λ0
µ`0 = pil − µ`1 = 1− s+m1 +
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
× Λ1 − Λ0
Λ0
−
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1+m
Λ0
Λ1
= 1− s+m1 −
f̂1(δ`)
f̂3(δ`)+f̂4(δh)
ContactC2D
× 2mΛ0
1 +m
By assumption
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ
′)
m1
dδ′ =
∫ δh
δ`
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ
′)
m0
dδ′, m0 is trivally identified as:
m0 = m1 × Λ0
Λ1
and also
m = m0 +m1 = m1 × Λ
Λ1
Given identification of 2m
1+m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ),
2m
1+m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ),
2mΛ0
1+m
and 2mΛ1
1+m
: Λ0, Λ1, Λ and two
functions φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ), φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) are then also identified.
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Plug identified m, Λ and µh0 back into (1.47), we can identify ρ:
ρ =
(
ContactC2D
Λ0
− 1
1 +m1 × ΛΛ1
)
×m1 × Λ
Λ1
× Λ
the condition (1.47) comes from (1.45), and ρ is overidentified by conditions (1.45) and
(1.46), so we can estimate ρ separately in each of the two conditions and then take average.
Finally, we turn to conditions (1.16) and (1.17) (these two conditions are same and can
be reduced to one condition) to identify α.
1.A.2.2 Calibration of average fraction of positions held by broker-dealer sector
Table 1.7: Holding positions on corporate and foreign bonds ($billion) by different
sectors
Year Ratio of Broker-dealer (%) Broker-dealer (asset+liability) Total assets
2005 4.59 378.1 8236.1
2006 4.57 424.3 9275.2
2007 4.20 447.6 10653.5
2008 2.17 220.9 10167.1
2009 2.36 247.3 10477.4
2010 3.06 319.2 10441.2
2011 1.87 196.3 10502.5
2012 2.09 230.2 10995.8
2013 2.17 241.3 11134.7
2014 2.06 239.4 11600
2015 1.91 223.4 11722.2
Average 2.82 288 10473.3
Sources: Flow of Funds L.213, Federal Reserve Board.
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1.A.2.3 B-spline nonparametric estimator of unknown functions
The B-spline nonparametric estimator of unknown functions f̂i(δ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4. in (1.36)-
(1.39) have the following forms:
f̂i(δ) =
5∑
k=1
βjk,iB
j
k(δ)
where Bjk(δ), k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are B-spline basis functions of dealers’ type δ for bond j, for a
natural cubic spline with degree of freedom equals 5 (4 intercept knots).
1.A.2.4 Model fits
For model fitting results, please refer to ? and ?.
1.A.3 Dealers’ gross, net and intermediation trading volumes
1.A.3.1 Model prediction
In both the dealer-customer market DC and the interdealer market DD, for each dealer of private
valuation type δ, GM (δ) denotes the gross trading volume over both sides of the interdealer market,
NM (δ) denotes the net trading volume which equals to the absolute level of difference in the amount
of bond between buying and selling transactions by dealer δ with other dealers, and IM (δ) denotes
the intermediation volume which equals gross trading volume minus net trading volume and it
represents the magnitude of intermediation service that dealer δ provides to all other dealers in
market M ∈ {DC,DD}.
GDD(δ) =
2m
1 +m
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ +
2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
NDD(δ) =
∣∣∣∣ 2m1 +mφ1(δ)λ∗1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ − 2m
1 +m
φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
∣∣∣∣
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Table 1.8: Model Fit (Part A) for 47634 markets (6301 bonds)
Theoretical Moment Empirical Value Fitted Value
(1) (2) (3)
∫ δjh
δj`
φj1(δ)λ
j∗
1 (δ)
mj
[(
1
1+mj
+ ρ
j
mjΛ
j
)
µjh0
]
dδ 2.401 2.364
(1.255) (4.643)
∫ δjh
δj`
φj0(δ)λ
j∗
0 (δ)
mj
[(
1
1+mj
+ ρ
j
mjΛ
j
)
µj`1
]
dδ 1.914 1.877
(0.985) (3.443)
∫ δj
h
δ
j
`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
∫ δj
h
δ
λ
j∗
0 (δ
′)φj0(δ
′)
Λj
(4V j(δ′)+4V j(δ))
2
dδ′dδ
∫ δj
h
δ
j
`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
∫ δj
h
δ
λ
j∗
0 (δ
′)φj0(δ′)
Λj
dδ′dδ
96.986 93.264
(10.121) (15.291)
∫ δjh
δj`
λj∗0 (δ)φ
j
0(δ)
Λj0
[(1− θj)4V j(δ) + θj4W j(yj` )]dδ 96.475 84.014
(10.087) (14.891)
∫ δjh
δj`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
Λj1
[(1− θj)4V j(δ) + θj4W j(yjh)]dδ 97.689 94.054
(9.521) (14.899)
Note: The expectation operator is over all dealers within each bond j. For both
Empirical Value and Fitted Value, the mean level and standard deviation across all
markets are reported.
IDD(δ) = GDD(δ)−NDD(δ)
=
4m
1 +m
×min
{
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ δh
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ
φ0(δ
′)dδ′, φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
δ`
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
}
Both gross and intermediation trading volumes manifest the ability/incentive of dealers to re-
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Table 1.9: Model Fit (Part B) Mapping between Theoretical and
Empirical Moments
Theoretical Moment Empirical Moment
(1) (2)
∫ δjh
δj`
φj1(δ)λ
j∗
1 (δ)
mj
[(
1
1+mj
+ ρ
j
mjΛ
j
)
µjh0
]
dδ E
(
TradejS×
Prj [SellToDealers|Sell])
∫ δjh
δj`
φj0(δ)λ
j∗
0 (δ)
mj
[(
1
1+mj
+ ρ
j
mjΛ
j
)
µj`1
]
dδ E
(
TradejB×
Prj [BuyFromDealers|Buy])
∫ δj
h
δ
j
`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
∫ δj
h
δ
λ
j∗
0 (δ
′)φj0(δ
′)
Λj
(4V j(δ′)+4V j(δ))
2
dδ′dδ
∫ δj
h
δ
j
`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
∫ δj
h
δ
λ
j∗
0 (δ
′)φj0(δ′)
Λj
dδ′dδ
E(P jDD)
∫ δjh
δj`
λj∗0 (δ)φ
j
0(δ)
Λj0
[(1− θj)4V j(δ) + θj4W j(yj` )]dδ E(P jCD)
∫ δjh
δj`
λj∗1 (δ)φ
j
1(δ)
Λj1
[(1− θj)4V j(δ) + θj4W j(yjh)]dδ E(P jDC)
Note: The expectation operator is over all dealers within each bond j.
For both Empirical Value and Fitted Value, the mean level and standard
deviation across all markets are reported.
allocate the bond within the interdealer market. Figure 1.10 shows that dealers of intermediate
private valuation type search and trade most actively on both sides of the market, and thus provide
the highest level of intermediation service compared with other dealers.
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Table 1.10: Summary of estimate of pih and bond supply per capita s
Variable Mean Std dev Min Q25 Q50 Q75 Max
pih 0.0814 0.0660 0.0095 0.0347 0.0603 0.1061 0.3845
s 0.0882 0.0725 0.0101 0.0369 0.0650 0.1152 0.4251
Note: pih is the measure of high-type customers; s is the bond supply (per
capita).
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of dealers’ trading moments within the interdealer market
1.A.3.2 Empirical validation
Table 1.11: Distribution of trading moments among dealers (quadratic form)
Depji,t Gross V ol
j
i,t Inter V ol
j
i,t(%) Net V ol
j
i,t(%) Std Inv
j
i,t
δˆjS,i,t (%) 23906.38*** 0.5849*** -0.5849*** 0.0056***
(3.73) (3.53) (-3.53) (2.31)
(δˆjS,i,t)
2 -116.1845*** -0.0029*** 0.0029*** -4.51e-05***
(-3.76) (-3.66) (3.66) (-3.34)
# of obs 11,606,655 11,606,655 11,606,655 5,964,679
Adj R2 0.0779 0.4031 0.4031 0.1073
Dealer×Bond×Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered in dealer#bond#year.
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of trading moments among dealers (quadratic form)
Regression results in Table 1.11 verifie that the slopes of gross volume, intermediation volume
and volatility of inventory positions are consistent with that of total search intensity. The impli-
cation for endogeneous intermediation is: dealers with higher total search intensities trade actively
on both sides of the market to intermediate bonds from low-type dealers to high-type ones, through
maintaining more volatile inventory positions and lower net trading volume.
1.A.4 Market inefficiency
As in the earlier version of Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), the objectives of both customers
and dealers are to choose an asset-holding process at ∈ {0, 1}, subject to their utility-type process,
to maximize the following objective function:
E0,u
[∫ ∞
0
utate
−rtdt−
∫ ∞
0
Pe−rtdat
]
= E0,u
[∫ ∞
0
utate
−rtdt− Pe−rtat
∣∣∣∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
Pate
−rt(−r)dt
]
= E0,u
[∫ ∞
0
utate
−rtdt+ Pa0 +
∫ ∞
0
Pate
−rt(−r)dt
]
= Pa0 + E0,u
[∫ ∞
0
ate
−rt(ut − rP )dt
]
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where ut denotes customers’ or dealers’ utility-type process, yt ∈ {y`, yh} or δt ∈ [δ`, δh], the
expectation operator E0,u is conditional on initial time and initial utiltiy type u, a0 is initial
holding position, and dat ∈ {1,−1}.
The optimal asset-holding process for both customers and dealers are:
at =

1 if ut > rP ;
1 or 0 if ut = rP ;
0 if ut < rP .
By market clear condition, there exists ∃!u∗ ∈ [δ`, δh] ∪ {y`, yh} s.t. P = u∗r and u∗ has the
expression:
u∗ =

yh if s <= pih;
inf{u ∈ [δ`, δh] : pih +m−
∫ u
δ`
f(δ)dδ ≤ s} if pih < s < pih +m;
y` if s >= pih +m.
Based on estimation results, we calculate the corresponding Walrasian prices based on reservation
values of the marginal investors in OTC markets which solve (1.2)-(1.5):
For pih < s < pih +m: P =
δ∗
r
= 4V (δ∗)− cλ
∗2
1 (δ
∗)− cλ∗20 (δ∗)
r
(1.49)
For s ≤ pih: P = yh
r
= 4W (yh)
1 + αpi` +
(
ρ
mΛ +
1
1+m
)
(1− θ)Λ1
r

−
αpi`4W (y`) +
∫ δh
δ`
(
ρ
mΛ +
1
1+m
)
(1− θ)λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)4V (δ)dδ
r
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1.A.5 Robustness check
1.A.5.1 Distribution of search intensity among dealers by monthly data
Fit search intensities as quardratic function of private valuation The quardratic
fitting using monthly data has the following form:
λ̂
j
i,t = β0 + β1 × δˆjS,i,t + β2 × (δˆjS,i,t)2 + Γ1Xjt + Γ2Yi,t + τi + φj + ηy + ji,t
where the controls are similarly defined except for monthly basis. In Table 1.12, the results verify
that total search intensity is still a hump-shaped function of dealers’ (scaled) private valuation. In
the lower range of private valuation, the upwards slope of total search intensity is driven by the
increase in average selling intensity; and in the higher range, the downwards slope of total search
intensity is driven by the decrease in average buying intensity.
Use measure of distance to mean-level private valuation as control For each dealer
i, we calculate
|δˆji,t−δˆ
j
t |
| ˆδjh,t−
ˆ
δjl,t|
as the measure of distance of dealer i’s private valuation type δˆji,t to the
cross-dealer mean level δˆ
j
t among the cross section of dealers within each bond j, which is further
normalized by the difference between the maximum and minimum private valuations. To verify the
model prediction about the shape of total search intensity among each cross section of dealers, we
run the following regression:
λ̂
j
i,t = β0 + β1 ×
|δˆji,t − δˆ
j
t |
| ˆδjh,t − ˆδjl,t|
+ Γ1X
j
t + Γ2Yi,t + τi + φj + ηt + 
j
i,t (1.50)
where all the other controls are same as (1.24).
Regression results are in Table 1.13. where we also include Tradeji,t, λ̂
S,j
i,t and λ̂
B,j
i,t as dependent
variables. The results indicate that average selling intensity always increases with private valuation
on both sides of the cross-dealer mean level, and average buying intensity increases on the left side
of the mean level and decreases on the right side. By composition effect, total search intensity
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Table 1.12: Distribution of search intensity among dealers
(quadratic form)
Depji,t λ̂
j
i,t λ̂
S,j
i,t λ̂
B,j
i,t
δˆjS,i,t (%) 8.2698*** 5.4695*** 3.3484***
(6.30) (8.97) (3.58)
(δˆjS,i,t)
2 -0.0423*** -0.0172*** -0.0279***
(-5.91) (-6.33) (-5.23)
HHIbondi,t (thousands) 1.9031 3.0577*** -1.2108**
(1.64) (2.78) (-2.46)
HHI typei,t (thousands) -6.9322*** -5.8018*** -0.6129
(-4.27) (-3.81) (-0.83)
HHIj,concent (thousands) -17.097*** -9.7139*** -7.6099***
(-19.44) (-12.42) (-17.36)
EVi,t 110.0916*** 46.4680** 64.4953***
(4.85) (2.13) (9.55)
Ratingjt 2.0028*** 3.1608*** -1.1348***
(5.05) (8.12) (1.11)
Pre3Mturnoverjt (%) 0.2300*** 0.1108*** 0.1211***
(6.31) (5.89) (5.6)
amtoutjt (million) (%) -0.022*** 0.0019 -0.0248***
(-9.96) (1.56) (-13.81)
TTM jt (days) 1.1006*** 0.9427*** 0.2178*
(3.57) (3.25) (1.84)
Couponj (%) -0.7678** -2.9136 -10.8165
(-2.28) (-0.56) (-1.54)
# of obs 11,606,655 11,434,333 11,406,360
Adj R2 0.0593 0.0493 0.1241
Dealer×Bond×Year FE YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered
in dealer#bond#year.
increases on the left side of the mean level and decreases on the right side, which is mainly driven
by decrease in buying intensity.
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Table 1.13: Distribution of search intensity among dealers
Depji,t λ̂
j
i,t Trade
j
i,t λ̂
S,j
i,t λ̂
B,j
i,t
|δˆji,t−δˆ
j
t |
| ˆδjh,t−
ˆ
δjl,t|
-136.2285*** -6.1430*** -85.3014*** -54.3122***
(-24.77) (-384.71) (-13.58) (-21.63)
|δˆji,t−δˆ
j
t |
| ˆδjh,t−
ˆ
δjl,t|
× 1(δˆji,t > δˆ
j
t) 46.9200*** -40.2532***
(7.27) (-16.51)
HHIbondi,t (thousand) 1.9887 * 2.82e-04 3.1318*** -1.1766***
(1.71) (0.05) (2.86) (-2.39)
HHI typei,t (thousand) -4.9329*** -0.0344*** -5.155*** 0.2775
(-3.04) (-7.04) (-3.39) (0.37)
HHIj,concent (thousand) -15.9301*** -0.446*** -9.1246*** -7.0549***
(-18.12) (-182.23) (-11.68) (-16.14)
EVi,t 107.2886*** 2.7191** 9.2142*** 63.1459***
(4.73) (54.23) (1.57) (9.36)
Ratingjt 1.5266*** 0.0056*** 2.2030*** -0.6837***
(4.34) (4.13) (6.44) (-6.45)
Pre3Mturnoverjt (%) 0.0022*** 7.31e-05*** 0.0010*** 0.0013***
(6.25) (7.18) (5.62) (5.54)
amtoutjt (million) -0.024*** -3.22e-04** 0.0028** -0.0281***
(-11.25) (-2.52) (2.40) (-15.75)
TTM jt (days) 1.0714*** 0.0067*** 0.9386*** 0.1920***
(3.47) (7.89) (3.23) (1.62)
Couponj (%) -0.6868** -0.0459** 9.2142 -21.8105***
(-2.19) (-2.22) (1.57) (-3.08)
# of obs 11,606,655 11,606,655 11,434,333 11,406,360
Adj R2 0.0593 0.1168 0.1241 0.1241
Dealer×Bond×Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered in
dealer#bond#year.
1.A.5.2 Proportions of different types of transactions in subperiods
We look at the relationship between the distribution of transactions of different types with distance
of dealers’ private valuations to cross-dealer mean level within each subperiod. Similar as Bessem-
binder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2016), we divide the whole sample period into five
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Figure 1.12: Dealer’s private valuation and proportions of transactions in different directions
(by subperiod)
subperiods: Pre-crisis (Jan 2006-Jun 2007), Crisis (Jul 2007-Apr 2009), Post-crisis (May 2009-Jun
2010), Regulation (Jul 2010-Mar 2014), Volcker (post April 1, 2014).
64
CHAPTER 2
Bond Misallocation and Liquidity Risk
2.1 Introduction
U.S. corporate bonds trade in decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets, in which deal-
ers provide liquidity to customer investors. Empirical studies starting from Collin-Dufresn,
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) document that there is a common non-default component in
the variations of all corporate bonds’ yield spreads over time. This component can not
be captured by bond fundamentals, firm-level fundamentals or macroeconomic variables.
Later studies show that this common component is closely related to a market-level liquid-
ity factor. Motivated by the theoretical rationalization on that OTC market frictions drive
the liquidity-related part of transaction price in decentralized markets, Friewald and Nagler
(2018) empirically show that OTC market frictions, namely systemic inventory, search and
bargaining frictions, jointly explain a large proportion of the common component. However,
to my best knowledge, there have not been papers talking about whether those common
frictions drive different bonds’ yield spreads by different magnitudes, and which market
microstructural factors can explain this heterogeneity.
In this paper, we construct a measure of “bond’s misallocation among dealers” and we
find that this measure is closely correlated with bonds’ heterogeneous yield spread loadings
on the common OTC search friction. The measure of bond’s misallocation is based on a
search-and-match model with dealers endogenously choosing search intensities based on their
idiosyncratic states. Specifically, we define this measure as the cross-sectional covariance of
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dealers’ private valuations for holding the bond and their actual inventory positions in the
bond. So it can further be regarded as a summary statistic on the joint distribution of
dealers’ idiosyncratic states. At a lower level of the cross-sectional covariance, there will
be more dealers of lower-type private valuations holding bond positions, comparing with a
counterfactual frictionless market. In this case, we regard the bond positions as being more
misallocated among the dealers, because in a frictionless market all bond positions are held
by dealers of the highest private valuations. Correspondingly, a higher level of the cross-
sectional covariance implies a lower level of bond’s misallocation. This measure is motivated
by the fact that in U.S. corporate bond markets, transactions happen bilaterally and the
reallocations of bond positions rely on dealers’ market-making and searching efforts. The
common OTC search friction, together with the distribution of dealers’ idiosyncratic states,
drives dealers’ market-making and searching decisions over time. The latter will further drive
the distribution of realized transaction prices and thus the average yield spread variations
over time.
Firstly, we use the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate bond market to test whether bonds
have significantly heterogeneous factor loadings of yield spread on the common OTC search
friction. Since the search friction is a market-level liquidity factor, in this paper, we also
call the factor loading as “bond’s liquidity risk attributed to search frictions”. Specifically,
it measures how much a bond’s yield spread changes in response to one unit change in the
common OTC search friction. Similar as Friewald and Nagler (2018), we use the length of
intermediation chain as a measure of the OTC search friction. By theoretical rationalization
in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), the expected length of intermediation chain decreases
with the level of search friction. Then we follow the procedures in the literature to estimate
bonds’ heterogeneous liquidity risk attributed to search frictions in a reduced-form multi-
factor model. Our estimation results are consistent with Friewald and Nagler (2018) and we
further show that there is a high variation in the magnitude of liquidity risk across different
bonds. The standard deviation of the liquidity risk is more than three times of the mean
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level.
Secondly, we estimate the series of dealers’ idiosyncratic states, namely dealers’ private
valuations for holding each bond and their inventory positions in each bond, following the
procedures in Liu (2020) and Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998). With the estimated
series, we construct a panel data which contains yearly series of empirical estimates of bond’s
misallocation and liquidity risk. By estimating a panel data model, we verify that: at the
bond level, a higher magnitude of misallocation among the dealers is associated with a higher
magnitude of liquidity risk. This finding gives a preliminary market microstructural evidence
which supports that: in decentralized financial markets, the distribution of market maker’s
idiosyncratic states correlates with the magnitude of the asset’s liquidity risk.
Finally, we give a simple numerical explanation on the verified correlation between bond’s
misallocation and liquidity risk, by solving the search-and-match model with dealers’ endo-
geneous search efforts. The numerical solutions show that in a stationary equilibrium where
the cross-sectional covariance of dealers’ private valuation and inventory position is at a
lower level, the higher level of bond misallocation motivates more dealers to choose a higher
search intensity to buy or sell to adjust their holding positions. As a result, the average
level of all dealers’ search intensities is also high. With a qudratic-form search cost, the
average level of marginal search cost in the dealer sector is monotonically increasing with
the dealers’ average search intensity. Since this average marginal cost will be compensated
by bond’s average yield spread, in equilibrium the bond has its average yield-spread being
more exposed to shocks to OTC search frictions.
Related literature
This paper firstly contributes to the empirical literature initiated by Collin-Dufresn, Gold-
stein, and Martin (2001) that uncovers fundamental factors to explain U.S. corporate bonds’
yield spread variations over time. In this literature, Collin-Dufresn, Goldstein, and Mar-
tin (2001) establish that there is an unexplained single common factor in corporate bonds’
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yield spreads after controlling for commonly used explanatory variables; Longstaff, Mithal,
and Neis (2005) measure the size of the default and non-default components in corporate
spreads, and show that the non-default component is related to bond-specific as well as
macroeconomic measures of liquidity. Latter papers add other liquidity factors to improve
the explanation, see Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), De Jong and Driessen (2012), Bongaerts,
De Jong, and Driessen (2017), Crotty (2013), Friewald and Nagler (2016), and He, Khor-
rami, and Song (2019), among others. Specifically, Friewald and Nagler (2018) attribute the
unexplained part of the non-default component to over-the-counter (OTC) market frictions.
In this paper, we specifically focus on bond’s yield spread loading on search frictions. Using
similar measures, we further document that there is a high variation in the magnitude of
yield spread loading on OTC search frictions across different bonds. And we further con-
struct a measure of bond’s misallocation and correlates it with the magnitude of the yield
spread loading.
The search-and-match model in this paper also belongs a theoretical literature initiated
by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) that uses a search-and-match model to study
asset price and liquidity in over-the-counter markets. My model studies fully decentralized
market structure by setting a random search environment, which is similar to one strand
of the literature developed by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007), Vayanos and Wang
(2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Weill (2008), Afonso (2011), Gavazza (2011), Praz (2014),
Trejos and Wright (2016), Afonso and Lagos (2015), Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2015).
My model is most related to Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018) in the setting of dealers’
heterogeneous private valuation types and the incorporation of both dealer and customer
sectors. The main difference in my model is that we consider dealers’ explicit choice of state-
dependent search intensity based on their idiosyncratic states. In Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2018), dealers are endowed with homogeneous search intensities. Based on my model,
we construct the cross-sectional covariance of dealers’ private valuations and bond holding
positions as the measure of bond’s misallocation among the dealers. Papers in this literature
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which also consider endogenous and/or heterogeneous search intensity include Shen, Wei, and
Yan (2018), Neklyudov (2012), U¨slu¨ (2019), and Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b), etc.
This paper connects the empirical literature on explaining corporate bond’s yield spread
variations and the theoretical literature on studying OTC market structure using the struc-
tural search-and-match framework. Most papers in the theoretical literature focus mainly
on how searching and trading activities determine the transaction price and volume between
each pair of two trading counterparties. This paper instead focuses on giving a more struc-
tual explanation on bond-level yield spread patterns, rather than only bilateral-based terms
of trade. Also this paper considers dealer-level market-making and searching behavior as
a channel that connects the change in OTC search friction and the bond-level yield spread
variations. The empirical verification also motivates future theoretical research.
2.2 Data description
We use the Academic Corporate Bond TRACE Data set provided by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA). This data set contains dealers’ reports to the Trade Re-
porting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) which disclose information on all transactions in
corporate bonds. One advantage of the data is we can observe identities of the dealers in all
transactions. This allows us to track how the bonds are transacted between the dealers, so
that we can construct intermediation chains, and also construct the measure of bond misallo-
cation within the dealer sector. 1 We filtered the data following the procedure in Dick-Nielsen
(2014), and we recover the trading counterparties in locked-in and give-up trades2.We merge
1In the analysis, we define all registered members of FINRA as dealers and all non-registered outside
trading counterparties as customers. Main registered firm of FINRA include broker-dealer firms, crowd-
funding portals, and capital acquisition brokers, etc, which are all dealer-like firms. The ID numbers assigned
by FINRA to registered members are all virtual IDs. In the data, non-registered trading counterparties are
assigned with the ID of “C” by FINRA.
2By the user guide of FINRA, a “Give Up” trade report is reported by one FINRA member on behalf of
another FINRA member who is the real one to buy or sell the bonds and thus has a reporting responsibility.
For such reports, we call the FINRA members, who asked other members to submit reports for them, the true
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the cleaned data with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS) Bonds Return Database to obtain bond fundamental char-
acteristics and credit ratings. We construct a monthly panel containing both dealer-wise and
bond-wise variables3.
Following the academic literature using the same data set, we further filtered the data
by excluding some “unusual bonds” and some specific types of transactions: [1] We exclude
bonds with optional characteristics, such as variable coupon, convertiable, exchangable, and
puttable, etc, and we also exclude asset-backed securities and private placed instruments; [2]
To estimate bonds’ factor loadings on OTC search frictions, we further drop the inactively
traded bonds, defined as those traded in fewer than 25 months throught the whole sample
period; [3] Finally, we exclude the “on-the-run” transactions which happened within three
months since bonds’ offering dates, to only consider secondary market transactions.
The final sample ranges from Jan 2005 to Sep 2015, and contains 10760 bonds traded
by 3050 dealers. The total outstanding amount of all bonds in our sample is $5.37 trillion.
The average bond rating is BBB by the S&P rating categories. Among these bonds, around
84% are investment grade and the remaining ones are high-yield or non-rated.4 Bonds on
trading counterparties; Locked-in report is a trade report representing both sides of a transaction. FINRA
members such as Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs), and
clearing firms have the ability to match buy and sell orders, and therefore to report on behalf of multiple
parties using a single trade report submitted to FINRA and indicate that the trade is locked-in. Similarly, we
call the FINRA members who submit the buy or sell orders, instead of those clearing platforms, as the true
trading counterparties. In the error filters, for these two types of trades, we use the IDs of the true trading
counterparties as dealers’ IDs and we adjust the reported prices accordingly to account for the agency fees
charged by reporting firms and clearing platforms (ATSs, ECNs, and clearing firms).
3The raw data is high-frequency data that records the time of each transaction in seconds. In empirical
literature using TRACE data to analyze U.S. corporate bond market liquidity, it is common practice to
process the data to monthly frequency as corporate bonds are relatively illiquid compared with stock markets,
see Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Crotty (2013), Friewald and Nagler (2016), and Friewald and Nagler (2018),
etc. Specifically, An (2019) documents that dealers’ average inventory duration in the U.S. corporate bond
market is around three weeks by using the same data, which implies that the average frequency dealers
adjust their inventories is around one month.
4By the S&P rating categories, investment grade are S&P BBB or higher; and high-yield(junk) are below
or equal to S&P BBB-.
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average have time to maturity as 7.6 years. There are 57,623,804 transactions with total par
amount as $27.8 trillion. The average trade size is $482.41 thousand with standard deviation
as $4.47 thousand.
2.3 Liquidity risk attributed to search frictions
In this paper, we specifically focus on bonds’ liquidity risk attributed to over-the-counter
(OTC) search frictions (henceforth “liquidity risk” for short). Friewald and Nagler (2018)
show that changes in OTC market frictions can explain a large portion of variations in bond
yield spreads, by fitting a multi-factor model using the same data set. The OTC market
frictions they consider include search frictions, inventory frictions, and bargaining frictions,
etc. Specifically, we follow the similar procedure to use the weighted average length of
intermediation chain as a measure of OTC search friction5, and we regard the factor loading
of bond yield spread6 on the average chain length as a measure of the bond liquidity risk
attributed to OTC search frictions. We will show that the magnitude of this measure of
liquidity risk varies across different groups of bonds.
2.3.1 Length of intermediation chain
Intermediation chains were firstly constructed in Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014) and Hollifield,
Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) to track how municipal bonds and securitization instruments
are reallocated from a customer-seller to a customer-buyer through a series of dealers in the
interdealer market. The length of an intermediation chain is defined as the number of dealers,
5The weighted average length of intermediation chains is equal to the average number of dealers being
involved in the intermediation process. Details about this measure are discussed in Appendix 2.A.2.2.
6Yield spread is defined as the difference between corporate bond yield and the treasury yield whose
term equals the corporate bond duration. Similar as in Crotty (2013), Friewald and Nagler (2018), etc, we
calculate treasury yields of different terms through linearly interpolating between points on the treasury
curve.
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through which the assets passed during the reallocation process. By Hugonnier, Lester, and
Weill (2018), the expected length of intermediation chain decreases with the level of search
frictions in the interdealer market. Specifically, in a more frictional interdealer market, it
is more difficult for dealers to meet and trade with each other, so that there will be fewer
dealers being involved in each reallocation of assets between customers, then the average
length of intermediation chain will be shorter.7
We calculate the average length of intermediation chain across all bonds for each month,
using volumes of reallocation as weights. Figure 2.1 shows that the average chain length
is relatively higher before the 2008 great financial crisis (GFS) when search frictions are
relatively low in corporate bond secondary market. Then it decreases by as large as 6%
during the crisis period when secondary market liquidity nearly dried up. Although the
average chain length recovers slightly in the post-crisis period.8, after Dodd-Frank act was
signed into law in July, 2010, it further decreases by nearly 8% till the third quarter of 2015.
This is consistent with the effects of Dodd-Frank act on restricting both dealers’ proprietary
tradings and dealers’ liquidity provision to customers.
To verify that the average chain length is negatively correlated with the level of search
frictions, we also plot the ratio of pre-arranged transactions among all transactions for each
month. This ratio tends to be higher when market is more frictional so that dealers are less
willing to commit their capital to liquidity provision, but more willing to pre-arrange trades
between buyers and sellers. In Figure 2.1, the ratio of pre-arranged trades is negatively
correlated with the average length of intermediation chain.
7As market-level search frictions increase, although intermediation chains will on average be shorter, it
does not necessarily mean the reallocations of assets between customers take shorter time.
8Similar as Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2016), we divide the whole sample
period into five subperiods: Pre-crisis (Jan 2006-Jun 2007), Crisis (Jul 2007-Apr 2009), Post-crisis (May
2009-Jun 2010), Regulation (Jul 2010-Mar 2014), Volcker (post April 1, 2014).
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Figure 2.1: The value-weighted average length of intermediation chain (Jun 2004 - Sep 2015)
2.3.2 Bond liquidity risk
We estimate bonds’ heterogeneous yield spread loadings on OTC search frictions using
monthly panel data, and we use this factor loading as a measure of bond’s liquidity risk
attributed to search frictions. We calculate yield spread as the gap between bond yield and
the same-maturity treasury yield. Then we regress the change in yield spread on multi-
ple regressors, including the regressors about the change in other OTC market frictions in
Friewald and Nagler (2018), regressors about the change in market fundamental factors (e.g.
equity pricing factors, market volatility, etc) in Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997),
Crotty (2013), and bond fundamentals. The yield spread loading on OTC search frictions is
the estimate of bond-wise coefficient on the regressor “average length of intermediation chain
across all bonds”. This coefficient measures how sensitively the non-default component of
73
credit spread responds to the change in OTC search frictions. The model is as follows:
4(Y ieldSpread)j,t = βjSysSearch4SystemChainLengtht + βjSysNetConcen4SysNetConcent
+βjMKTRMKT,t + β
j
SMBRSMB,t + β
j
HMLRHML,t + β
j
UMDRUMD,t
+γ j14It + γ j24Bt + γ j34X(j)t + j,t
where 4SystemChainLengtht is the change in the average length of intermediation chain,
which is a proxy for shocks to OTC search frictions. Therefore, βjSysSearch is the defined bond
j’s liquidity risk, and our main focus is to discuss how market structural factors (specifically,
bond’s misallocation among dealers) determine the magnitude of βjSysSearch. In Appendix
2.A.2.4, we show that the factor loading βjSysSearch is significantly priced in bonds’ yield
spreads.
The multi-factor model includes other controls as follows: [1] change in interdealer net-
work concentration 4SysNetConcent, which is measured by the summation of all dealers’
average degree centralities9 in month t; [2] returns on factor-portfolios RMKT,t, RSMB,t,
RHML,t and RUMD,t, namely market portfolio (S&P 500 portfolio), small-minus-big(SMB)
portfolio, high-minus-low(HML) portfolio and up-minus-down(UMD) momentum-factor port-
folio; [3] change in OTC inventory-related frictions4It = (4invt−1;4amtoutt;4prearranget),
in which 4invt−1 is the one-month-lagged change in all dealers’ inventories in all bonds,
4amtoutt is the change in all bonds’ amount outstanding, 4prearranget is the change
in pre-arranged ratio of all transactions; [4] change in OTC bargaining frictions 4Bt =
(4blocktradet;4HHIdealert), in which 4blocktradet is the change in ratio of block trades
9Degree centrality is another measure of vertices’ centralities in a network. Unlike eigenvector centrality,
degree centrality only takes into account all direct links directed from or to each vertice. For a network with
n vertices, the theoretical maximum value of the summation of all vertices’ degree centralities is n(n − 1).
Therefore, summation of all dealers’ degree centralities in the interdealer network is a better measure of the
concentration of the network. The closer the summation is to n(n − 1), where n is the number of dealers,
the less concentrated the interdealer network is.
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and4HHIdealert is the change in average value of all bonds’ HHI indices10; [4] all the other
bond-wise and market-aggregate controls
4Xt = (4(Y ieldSpread)j,t−1,4RFt; (4RFt)2;4SLOPEt;4turnoverjt ;Ratingjt ;TTM jt ) in
Collin-Dufresn, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Friewald and Nagler (2018), in which
4(Y ieldSpread)j,t−1 is the lagged term of change in yield spread, 4RFt is the change in
10-year treasury rate, (4RFt)2 is the square value to capture potential non-linear effect,
4SLOPEt is the change in the slope of yield curve, 4turnoverjt is the change in bond j’s
current-month turnover rate, Ratingjt is bond j’s credit rating in month t and TTM
j
t is bond
j’s time to maturity in month t.
The mean value of βjSysSearch across all bonds is significantly negative, as shown in Table
2.1. This indicates that, when intermediation chains are longer (in other words, OTC search
frictions decrease), bond’s yield spread will decrease. The signs of other reported average
coefficients in Table 2.1 are consistent with those in Friewald and Nagler (2018). The full
regression results are in 2.4 in Appendix 2.A.2.1.
However, the average magnitude of βjSysSearch is significantly heterogeneous among dif-
ferent groups of bonds. We divide the whole sample of bonds into different groups based on
bonds’ credit rating and time to maturity. Table 2.2 shows that the factor loading βjSysSearch
has higher absolute value for high-yield bonds and/or bonds with longer time to maturity.
The higher the absolute value of βjSysSearch is, the more sensitively bond j’s yield spread
responds to shocks to OTC search frictions. Our next focus is to construct a new market
microstructural variable, “bond’s misallocation among dealers”, and use it to explain why
different bonds have different magnitudes of liquidity risk attributed to OTC search frictions.
10Block trades are defined as trades with trading volume being larger than $1, 000, 000. Each bond’s HHI
index is calculated by using all dealers’ market shares in that bond. Both variables are proxy for systemic
bargaining frictions in the U.S. corporate bond market: the higher the ratio of block trades is, the more
bargaining power the corporate bond customers (investors) have, and the higher the average value of all
bonds’ HHI indices is, the more concentrated are bonds’ transactions to a subset of dealers, therefore, the
lower bargaining power of the customers (investors) have
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Table 2.1: Bond-level liquidity risk
4(Y ieldSpread)j,t (%) (1) (2) (3)
4SystemChainLengtht -2.32*** -1.67*** -1.55***
(-32.80) (-21.38) (-21.38)
4SysNetConcent (thousand) -9.83e-03*** -4.77e-03*** -4.43e-03***
(-48.16) (-22.30) (-20.10)
4invt−1 ($trillion) 7.55*** 5.55*** 5.74***
(24.07) (16.39) (17.51)
4prearranget (%) 0.26*** 1.28*** 1.08***
(3.43) (15.87) (13.43)
4blocktradet (%) -66.67*** -29.29*** -28.65***
(-50.94) (-22.37) (-22.15)
4amtoutt ($trillion) -0.32*** -0.47*** -0.38***
(-6.17) (-8.12) (-6.54)
4HHIdealert (thousand) -1.04*** -0.67*** -0.67***
(-46.70) (-28.99) (-30.82)
Mean Adj R2 0.18 0.35 0.37
#ofBonds 11176 11176 9595
#ofObs 515514 515514 479146
market aggregates and FFC 4 factors NO YES YES
bond liquidity and fundamentals NO NO YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In Panel A, we exclude bonds with total
number of observations smaller or equal to 19 for model (1)-(2) and smaller or equal to
25 for model (4). The reported estimated coefficients are average values taken across all
bonds. The corresponding t-statistics are calculated by dividing each reported (average)
coefficient value by the standard deviation of the estimates and scaling by the square
root of the number of bonds.
2.4 Correlation between bond misallocation and liquidity risk
In this section, we construct a measure of bond’s misallocation among dealers, and show
that this measure is closely correlated with the magnitude of bond’s liquidity risk. The main
takeaway is: a bond which is more misallocated among the dealers has its yield spread being
more exposed to shocks to OTC search frictions, because the dealers are more willing to re-
allocate the bond between themselves and a larger portion of the bond price will compensate
the dealers for paying the search costs.
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Table 2.2: Group-level liquidity risk
4(Y ieldSpread)j,t (%) (1) (2) (3)
4SystemChainLengtht -0.38*** -0.32*** -0.15*
(-8.99) (-6.29) (-1.92)
4SystemChainLengtht × 1 (HY bonds) -0.19*
(-2.34)
4SystemChainLengtht × 1 (TTM 2nd) -0.57***
(-5.20)
4SystemChainLengtht × 1 (TTM 3rd) -0.43***
(-3.98)
Adj R2 0.1307 0.1307 0.1308
#ofBonds 11703 11703 11703
#ofObs 523586 523586 523586
market aggregates and FFC 4 factors YES YES YES
bond liquidity and fundamentals YES YES YES
OTC inventory and bargaining friction YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In Panel A, we exclude bonds
with total number of observations smaller or equal to 19 for model (1)-(2)
and smaller or equal to 25 for model (4). The reported estimated coefficients
are average values taken across all bonds. The corresponding t-statistics are
calculated by dividing each reported (average) coefficient value by the stan-
dard deviation of the estimates and scaling by the square root of the number
of bonds. In Panel B: TTM 1st: 13 days∼3 years, TTM 2nd: 3∼6 years,
TTM 3rd: > 6 years.
2.4.1 Bond misallocation among dealers
For each bond, we define its misallocation among dealers as the cross-sectional covariance
of dealers’ idiosyncratic private valuations11 for holding the bond and their actual inventory
positions in the bond. In the dealer sector, if there are more (less) low(high)-private-valuation
dealers holding the bond, the level of this covariance will be lower, then we regard the bond
as being “more misallocated” among the dealers.
11In the spirit of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), dealers’ idiosyncratic private valuations can
be understood as their idiosyncratic preferences in holding the bond, which can be determined by their
idiosyncratic liquidity needs, financing costs, and hedging needs, etc. Within each bond, dealers can be
ranked by their private valuation types. For example, a dealer who has a higher liquidity need or financing
cost than other dealers will manifest a lower private valuation for holding the bond than others.
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Theoretical counterpart of bond misallocation The measure of bond misallocation
is based on a structural search model in Liu (2020). In this section, we give a review on the
model environment and a simple numerical example to show that a higher (lower) level of
the cross-sectional covariance of dealers’ private valuations and bond inventories implies a
lower (higher) magnitude of bond misallocation among dealers.
The model environment is: there are two sectors of agents in the market, a continuum of
customers with physical measure normalized to 1 and a continuum of dealers with physical
measure as m ≤ 1. Dealers and customers search and trade a single bond with fixed supply
s. Each participant’s bond position a is assumed to be either zero or one.12 Each participant
has a private valuation for the bond: customers’ private valuation takes two possible values,
either low or high, denoted by y ∈ {y`, yh} with y` < yh, and follows a discrete distribution
P (y′ = yc) = pic, c = `, h; dealers’ private valuations δ ∈ [δ`, δh] lie in between customers’
low type and high type, and follow a continuous distribution fD(δ). The two types of
customers cannot directly trade with each other, so the bond needs to be intermediated
through the dealer sector. One position of the bond can be sold from a low-type customer to a
dealer, and transacted between several dealers, and then finally sold to a high-type customer.
Each customer periodically receives an idiosyncratic shock with Poisson intensity α, which
makes her valuation switch between the high type and low type. This shock generates the
fundamental trading needs in the market. Dealers do not receive such valuation shock, so
their relative valuations remain fixed over time. Dealers endogeneously choose their search
efforts λ(a, δ) based on their idiosyncratic states (a, δ), and pay a search cost c× λ2(a, δ) at
each time, where c > 0 is a proxy for the market-level OTC search frictions.
The model generates a stationary equilibrium which includes a density function φ1(δ).
The value of φ1(δ) on each δ ∈ [δl, δh] is the probability that a dealer with private val-
uation δ holds one position of the bond, i.e. this dealer is a dealer-owner in stationary
12This {0, 1} assumption for bond holding and the indivisibility of bonds determine that the trading
volume in each transaction equals one.
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equilibrium. Correspondingly, the probability that this dealer with private valuation δ is a
dealer-nonowner is denoted as φ0(δ) = fD(δ) − φ1(δ). As a result, the shape of the density
function φ1(δ) determines how the bond is allocated among dealers, and it uniquely maps to
the level of the cross-sectional covariance Cov(δ, a) of dealers’ private valuations and bond
positions. The covariance has the following form:
Cov(δ, a) =
∑
a∈{0,1}
∫ δh
δ`
(a− ad)(δ − δd)φa(δ)
m
dδ =
∫ δh
δ`
(δ − δd)φ1(δ)
m
dδ (2.1)
where δd is the average value of dealer’s private valuation and has an expression as∑
a∈{0,1}
∫ δh
δ`
δφa(δ)dδ =
∫ δh
δ`
δfD(δ)dδ. Based on the final expression
∫ δh
δ`
(δ − δd)φ1(δ)m dδ in
(2.1), we can regard the cross-sectional covariance Cov(δ, a) as a weighted average of (δ−δd),
with the values of the density function φ1(δ) as weights.
The value of Cov(δ, a) is negatively correlated with the level of the bond’s misallocation
among dealers. For example, if there is a larger proportion of the bond positions being held
by low-private-valuation dealers, in the term
∫ δh
δ`
(δ−δd)φ1(δ)m dδ larger weights will be imposed
on lower δ, which leads to a lower value of Cov(δ, a).
A numerical example of this model is shown in Figure 2.2. The area below the density
function φ1(δ) is equal to the total amount of bond positions being held by dealers. Suppose
in Walrasian (frictionless) market, the minimum private valuation among all the dealer-
owners is the middle level δl+δh
2
, then we call the dealer of this level of private valuation as the
“marginal investor”. Since in Walrasian market all of the bond positions are held by dealers
of the highest private valuations, we assume there is no bond misallocation among dealers
in this case. Then in any over-the-counter (OTC) market with search frictions, we regard
any bond positions which are held by dealers with private valuations lower than this middle
level δl+δh
2
as “being misallocated”. In the right graph of Figure 2.2, there are two OTC
markets with the same level of search frictions but different levels of bond misallocations.
Market-1 has relatively lower amount of bond positions being misallocated than market-
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Figure 2.2: Numerical example of dealer owner density function and bond misallocation
(Walrasian market: Cov(δ, a) = 0.130, µh1 = pih = 0.5, µl1 = 0. market-1: Cov(δ, a) = 0.103,
µh1 = 0.4969 < pih, µl1 = 0.0031, c = 0.07. market-2: Cov(δ, a) = 0.092, µh1 = 0.2563 < pih,
µl1 = 0.2437, c = 0.07.)
2. Correspondingly, the cross-sectional covariance Cov(δ, a) is higher in market-1 than in
market-2.
Data estimate of bond misallocation We follow the procedure in Liu (2020) to esti-
mate the monthly series of dealers’ idiosyncratic private valuations using realized transaction
prices. Detailed explanations on the estimator is in Appendix 2.A.1. For each bond-month
pair, each dealer’s private valuation is the simple average of the dealer’s maximum buying
price and minimum selling price for that bond-month pair. The estimator of a dealer’s
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private valuation type δ is as follows13:
δˆji,t =
max{Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
}+min{Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}
2
where {Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
} ({Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}) is the collection of all buying (selling) prices by dealer i for
bond j in month t, and nj,Bi,t (n
j,S
i,t ) is the correspondinng number of total buying (selling)
transactions (including both dealer-customer and interdealer transactions) in month t.
We follow the procedure in Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) to estimate the
monthly series of dealers’ inventory positions. We use Qji,t to denote the (unobservable)
dealer i’s inventory position in bond j and month t, s.t. 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is the last
month of our sample. We use qji,t to denote the corresponding observable signed net trad-
ing volume, which is positive (negative) when the dealer i increases (shrinks) her inventory
position of bond j in month t. With unobservable initial inventory Qji,0, Q
j
i,t satisfies:
Qji,t = Q
j
i,0 +
t∑
s=1
qji,s
Then we construct the standardized inventory for each dealer i, bond j and month t:
Iji,t =
Qji,t − Q¯ji
σji
where Q¯ji,t =
∑T
s=0Q
j
i,s
T+1
and σji =
√∑T
s=0(Q
j
i,s−Q¯ji,t)2
T
are the sample mean and standard deviation
of the monthly series.14
13In finite samples, on the buy side of each dealer, the maximum buying price is a downward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation; on the sell side, the minimum selling price is an upward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation. Taking the average of the sample maximum buying price and
the sample minimum selling price will make the bias cancel out. In small samples with dealers’ unbalanced
buy and sell trades, the levels of the upward bias and the downward bias may not be equal. Then to make
the bias cancel out completely, the weights assigned on the two extreme prices can be adjusted according to
the realized number of buy and sell trades.
14For a robustness check, we also follow Friewald and Nagler (2016) to calculate Q¯ji,t and σ
j
i,t only using
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The standardized inventory Iji,t essentially measures by how much the current inventory
Qji,t deviates from the unobserved target level Q¯
j
i,t, and the deviation is scaled by the volatility
of the series within each pair of dealer i and bond j. By similar derivation in Hansch,
Naik, and Viswanathan (1998), this standardization [1] excludes the effect of unobserved
initial inventory position Qji,0 after issuance
15, and writes standardized inventory as a linear
combination of a series of signed net trading volumes {qji,s}; and [2] controls for differences
in risk aversion to guarantee the comparability of inventories across dealers (see Friewald
and Nagler (2016)).
With the estimated monthly series {δˆji,t} and {Iji,t}, we calculate the cross-sectional co-
variance for each year by the following two steps: firstly, for each pair of dealer i and bond
j in year y, we separately calculate the dealer’s yearly weighted average of private valuation
δˆji,y and yearly weighted average of inventory position I
j
i,y, using the dealer’s monthly trading
volumes in year y as weights; secondly, for bond j and year y, we pool all dealers’ yearly
private valuations {δˆji,y}i∈Dy and inventory positions {Iji,y}i∈Dy together, and calculate the
cross-sectional covariance as follows:
Ĉov(δˆji,y, I
j
i,y) =
1
Nyd
∑
i∈Dy
(
δˆji,y − δˆ
j
y
)
∗
(
Iji,y − I
j
y
)
where Dy is the collection of all the dealers who completed at least one transaction in bond
j on both the buy and sell sides of the market in year y, and Nyd is the number of dealers
in group Dy; δˆ
j
y and I
j
y are the simple cross-dealer means of private valuation and inventory
position in year y.
series of signed trading volumes within the fixed rolling time window [t, t−R]. We obtain similar results for
our quantitative analysis.
15We calculate the series of standardized inventory {Iji,t} before dropping bond transactions during a
3-month on-the-run period following issuance.
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2.4.2 Correlation between bond misallocation and bond liquidity risk
In this section, we show that bonds with a lower level of cross-sectional covariance of dealers’
private valuation and inventory position (i.e. a higher magnitude of misallocation) will have
its yield spread more exposed to shocks to OTC search frictions (i.e. a higher magnitude of
liquidity risk). This finding gives a preliminary market microstructural evidence which shows
that: the distribution of market maker’s states correlates with the magnitude of corporate
bond’s liquidity risk.
To verify this correlation, we construct a yearly panel data on corporate bonds’ factor
loadings on OTC search frictions βjSysSearch,y and within-bond average cross-sectional covari-
ance Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey). Specifically, β
j
SysSearch,y is estimated for bond j which has transactions
completed in year y, using bond j’s all transactions within the time window [1, y]. Corre-
spondingly, Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey) is constructed as a weighted average of bond j’s yearly cross-
sectional covariance throughout all years ey ∈ [1, y]. Therefore, to construct each point
(βjSysSearch,y, Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey)) in the yearly panel data, we make use of all the cumulative
information until year y on bond transactions, market microstructure, bond fundamentals,
and market aggregates, etc.
We estimate the following reduced-form model to verify the correlation between bond’s
misallocation Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey) and liquidity risk β
j
SysSearch,y:
βjSysSearch,y = α0 + α1 ∗ Ĉovy(δˆji,ey, Iji,ey) +α2F jy + ηy + jy
where the vector F jy includes the weighted averages of bond fundamentals, proportions of
interdealer and dealer-customer transactions, liquidity measures, etc, and the year fixed effect
ηy controls the time window of cumulative information used to construct the data points.
The regression results in Table 2.3 indicate that, at the bond level, a higher magnitude
of misallocation among the dealers (a lower level of Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey)) is associated with a
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higher magnitude of liquidity risk (a higher absolute magnitude of βjSysSearch,y).
Table 2.3: Correlation of bond misallocation and liquidity risk
βjSysSearch,y (< 0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ĉovy(δˆ
j
i,ey, I
j
i,ey) (1, 000×%) 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22***
(6.00) (6.00) (5.99) (5.14)
turnoverjy (%) 0.06 0.09 0.06
(0.78) (1.07) (0.50)
Num DDjy (thousand) -0.64*** -0.47**
(-4.23) (-3.07)
Num DCjy (thousand) 0.26** 0.20*
(2.92) (2.11)
Amtoutjy ($trillion) -17.81
(-0.24)
TTM jy (thousand days) 0.06***
(5.47)
Ratingjy 0.06***
(4.56)
Adj R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
F statistics 52.11 47.82 43.12 38.26
# of Bonds 4754 4754 4754 4754
# of Obs 22359 22359 22359 22359
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All the following variables
are weighted averages within the time window [1, y]: turnoverjy is turnover
rate which is the ratio of total trading volume to total outstanding amount;
Num DDjy and Num DC
j
y are numbers of interdealer- and dealer-customer
transactions; bond fundamentals include outstanding amount Amtoutjy,
time to maturity TTM jy , and credit rating Rating
j
y.
Finally, in Table 2.7 of Appendix 2.A.2.4, we show that the bond-level liquidity risk
attributed to OTC search frictions is on average compensated by 8 bps yield spread across
all bonds. We extend the yearly panel data by adding the cumulative weighted average yield
spread for each point in the data. As a result, the value of compensated yield spread is also
at a weighted aveage level on a cumulative basis. It also varies across different bonds with
a maximum value as high as 66 bps. An increase in liquidity risk of one standard deviation
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is associated with around 18 bps.
2.5 Numerical explanation by search-and-match model
In this section, we apply the numerical solutions of the model in Section 2.4.1 under different
sets of parameters to give an explanation for the correlation between bond’s misallocation
among dealers and liquidity risk. The numerical solutions imply that dealers’ endogeneous
and state-dependent search intensity works as an important channel which connects bond’s
misallocation and liquidity risk.
The mechnism is: in equilibrium where the covariance of dealers’ private valuation and
inventory position is at a lower level, there are more dealers holding bond positions that
are less aligned with their private valuation types. Specifically, there is a larger proportion
of dealers who hold higher(lower)-than-average inventory positions but have lower(higher)-
than-average private valuation types. This motivates more dealers in the market to choose
a higher level of search effort to buy or sell to adjust their holding positions. We denote
the average level of search effort in the dealer sector as Λ
m
, where Λ
m
=
∫ δh
δ`
λ(1, δ)φ1(δ)
m
dδ +∫ δh
δ`
λ(0, δ)φ0(δ)
m
dδ. With a qudratic-form search cost c× ( Λ
m
)2
, the average level of marginal
search cost in the dealer sector can be approximated by 2c× Λ
m
. Since this average marginal
cost will be compensated by bond’s average price (yield), those bonds with a higher level of
dealers’ average search effort Λ
m
will have their average transaction price (yield) more exposed
to shocks to OTC search frictions c.16
In Figure 2.3, we draw the numerical solutions of the stationary equilibria in six markets
with different levels of bond misallocation Cov(δ, a). We focus on how bond’s liquidity risk
attributed to OTC search friction c varies across different markets at the each level of c.
Specifically, we vary the Poisson intensity α at which customers’ private valuation types
16There also exists a second-order effect of change in search friction c on the aggregate search intensity
Λ, but the magnitude of this effect is dominated by the first-order effect when equilibrium aggregate search
intensity is at a high level.
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switch between low and high values, to generate the varying level of bond misallocation
Cov(δ, a) across the markets.17 In this figure, bond’s average transaction price P is defined as
the weighted average price across all transactions, and bond’s price sensitivity to OTC search
frictions is then defined as the corresponding derivative ∂P
∂c
. This derivative has negative
values since a higher level of search friction implies a lower level of average transaction price
to compensate dealers and customers with a higher yield. Since bond’s price fully determines
its yield spread under fixed risk-free rate, ∂P
∂c
can also be regarded as a theoretical counterpart
of the bond liquidity risk βSysSearch as estimated in data. In subgraph-D of Figure 2.3, we
further construct the derivative of bond’s yield with respect to search frictions c, which
approximates the negative of the factor loading βSysSearch.
18
The numerical solutions verify that: at each fixed level of search frictions c, when we
move from the market with the highest magnitude of bond misallocation (α = 0.75) to the
market with the lowest magnitude of bond misallocation (α = 0.25), the absolute magnitude
of bond’s liquidity risk attributed OTC search frictions ∂Y TM
∂c
will increase across markets.
Specifically, in the market with the highest bond misallocation ((α = 0.75)), as OTC search
friction c increaes by one unit, the bond’s yield spread will increase by the largest value
among all the markets.
17Intuitively, for a bond with a higher α, customers receive i.i.d. shocks on their private valuation types
at a higher intensity which drives customers to more frequently search to trade with randomly selected
dealers. This increases the likelihood that a low-type dealer-nonowner or a high-type dealer-owner meets
and trades with customers, because there always exists a positive trading surplus between a high-type
customer-nonowner (low-type customer-owner) and any dealer-owners (dealer-nonowners). Therefore there
will be a larger proportion of dealers holding inventory positions which are not well-aligned with their private
valuation types and the value of Cov(δ, a) will be lower.
18Bond’s yield is approximated by the formula ApproxY TM =
C+F−Pn
F+P
2
where we choose time to maturity
n = 5, face value F = 100, and coupon rate C = 0.
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate trading incentive and bond price sensitivity to search friction
(s = pih = 0.5, y` = 0.5, yh = 1.7, δ` = 0.6, δh = 1.6, ρ = m = θ = 0.5, r = 0.05, c ∈ [0.05, 0.1] and
α ∈ [0.25, 0.75])
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a measure of corporate bond’s misallocation among dealers and doc-
ument that this measure is closely correlated with corporate bond’s liquidity risk attributed
to OTC search frictions. This measure of bond’s misallocation is based on a structural
search-and-match model with dealers’ endogeneous search efforts, and it is defined as the
cross-sectional covariance of dealers’ private valuations for holding the bond and their actual
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inventory positions in the bond. Using the TRACE data for the U.S. corporate bond mar-
ket, we construct a panel data which contains yearly series of empirical estimates of bond’s
misallocation and liquidity risk, and we verify that: at the bond level, a higher magnitude of
misallocation among the dealers (or a lower level of the cross-sectional covariance of dealers’
private valuations and inventory positions) is associated with a higher magnitude of liquidity
risk. This finding gives a preliminary market microstructural evidence which shows that:
the distribution of market maker’s states correlates with the magnitude of corporate bond’s
liquidity risk. The numerical solutions of the search-and-match model gives a preliminary
explanation on how the bond’s misallocation affects bond’s liquidity risk attributed to OTC
search frictions, through driving dealers’ investment in search efforts.
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Appendix 2.A Appendix of Chapter 2
2.A.1 Estimate of dealers’ private valuation
In the search-and-match model, we denote dealer-owners’ value function as V1(δ) and dealer-
nonowners’ value function as V0(δ), for δ ∈ [δl, δh]. Then we define dealers’ reservation value
function for the bond is 4V (δ) = V1(δ) − V0(δ), for δ ∈ [δl, δh], which measures how much
compensation each dealer requires for giving up holding one position of the bond. In the
bilateral search environment, when two dealers (suppose one holds one position of the bond
and the other does not hold any position) with different private valuations meet, trading
only happens when the dealer-owner’s private valuation is lower than that of the dealer-
nonowner. The realized transaction price is determined by a symmetric Nash bargaining
process. Specifically, for a dealer with a type δ ∈ [δ`, δh], her transaction price with another
dealer with a type δ′ ∈ [δ`, δh] is:
P (δ, δ′) =
4V (δ) +4V (δ′)
2
where whether P (δ, δ′) is a selling or buying price depends on whether the dealer δ “holds
the bond and search on her sell side” or “does not hold the bond and search on her buy
side”.
For transactions happening on the sell side of the dealer δ, since 4V (δ′) > 4V (δ)(or the
transaction would not happen), if it is possible for dealer δ to meet a continuum of other
dealers, the lowest selling price is exactly equal to 4V (δ). Vice versa, on the buy side of the
dealer δ, since 4V (δ′) < 4V (δ), the highest buying price is exactly equal to 4V (δ). Again
based on monotonicity of 4V (δ), in data, we construct the following consistent estimator19
19In finite samples, on the buy side of each dealer, the maximum buying price is a downward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation; on the sell side, the minimum selling price is an upward biased
estimate for the dealer’s marginal valuation. Taking the average of the sample maximum buying price and
the sample minimum selling price will make the bias cancel out. In small samples with dealers’ unbalanced
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as a proxy for dealers’ private valuation type δ:
δˆji,t =
max{Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
}+min{Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}
2
where {Buyj
i,nj,Bi,t
} ({Sellj
i,nj,Si,t
}) is the collection of all buying (selling) prices by dealer i for
bond j within month t and nj,Bi,t (n
j,S
i,t ) is the correspondinng number of total buying (selling)
transactions (including both dealer-customer and interdealer transactions) within month t.
20
2.A.2 Bond liquidity risk attributed to search frictions
2.A.2.1 Factors driving yield spread change
The full regression results are in Table 2.4.
2.A.2.2 Intermediation chain
The matching algorithm to construct intermediation chains is an extension of the algorithms in
Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) and Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014). Similarly, the intermediation
chains start from customer-sell-to-dealer trades and end at dealer-sell-to-customer trades. We also
use the first-in-first-out(FIFO) matching algorithm to look for the next trades for each incomplete
chain. The main difference is, we only allow the split matching in the first round of the loop. After
the first round, we track a fixed par amount of a bond until finding the final customer buyer.
Each intermediation chain starts from a trade that a customer Cs sells some amount of a bond
to a dealer D1. We then look for the next trade completed by dealer D1 selling to a customer
buy and sell trades, the levels of the upward bias and the downward bias may not be equal. Then to make
the bias cancel out completely, the weights assigned on the two extreme prices can be adjusted according to
the realized number of buy and sell trades.
20In quantitative analysis, we define each market by one bond j and one quarter q. Each dealer i’s private
valuation for bond j in quarter q is calculated as the weighted average of all monthly private valuations δˆji,t
in quarter q weighted by dealer i’s monthly total trading volume in bond j.
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or another dealer within a calendar time window from -1 day to +30 days around the initial Cs-
sells-to-D1 trade. The initial trade is then followed by a trade that the dealer D1 sells the same
amount (of the same bond) either to a customer Ce or to another dealer D2. In the first case of
selling-to-Ce, the current intermediation chain ends and it is recorded as a CDC chain, that is,
there is one dealer on the chain; In the second case of selling-to-D1, the current intermediation
chain is not ended and is temporarily recorded as an incomplete chain CDD. We continue looking
for trades completed by dealer D2 selling to a customer or another dealer within the same calendar
time window. This process will continue until finding a dealer-sell-to-customer trade of the same
bond in same par amount.
We only consider “split matching” in the first round of loop in the sense that, given the initial
Cs-sell-to-D1 trade, we look for a trade with D1 as the seller of the same bond and with the shortest
time gap to the initial trade. Suppose the initial trade has par amount Q1 and the next closest
trade is “dealer D1 sells Q2 of the same bond to a dealer D2”. Then if Q1 > Q2, that is, the initial
trade has larger par amount than the second trade, we split Q1 into two pieces Q2 and Q1−Q2, and
we record a new incomplete chain CDD with par amount Q2 and put the remaining par amount
Q1−Q2 (sold by Cs to D1) back to the pile of initial customer-to-dealer trades to be used to initiate
new intermediation chains; If Q1 < Q2, similarly, we split Q2 into two pieces Q1 and Q2 −Q1, and
we record a new incomplete chain CDD with par amount Q1 and put the remaining par amount
Q2 − Q1 (sold by D1 to D2) back to the pile of candidate interdealer trades that will be used to
generate more intermediation chains. After the first round of the loop, for all incomplete chains
CDD, we restrict that all matched trades on the same intermediation chain after the first round
need to have exacty the same par amounts. Same as Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014), we allow for up to 7
dealers on an intermediation chain. Figure 2.4 shows the “split matching” in the first round.
The matching algorithm matches a total of 6.7 million of complete intermediation chains. Table
2.5 reports the average trading information of intermediation chains of each length. The average
trading size is generally lower for longer chains, which implies that it is more difficult for a larger
amount of bond to be reallocated from the initial customer seller to the final customer buyer
through too many dealers, since dealers may tend to split the large amount into smaller pieces
when they trade with each other in the interdealer market. The total markup increases with the
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Figure 2.4: Split matching in constructing intermediation chains
chain length, because dealers on average buy at lower prices and sell at higher prices to gain the
intermediation profit. The total time gap also increases with the chain length, which is consistent
with our expectation that in an interdealer market with the level of search frictions fixed, it takes
a longer time for dealers to implement more trades with each other to form longer chains.
Table 2.6 reports the average bond information of intermediation chains for each length, which
implies that dealers’ search dynamics are heterogeneous across different bonds. This also motivates
the extension of my preliminary model to consider the case of multiple assets.
2.A.2.3 Heterogeneous bond-level liquidity risk
Figure 2.5 shows that for individual bonds, although the mean and median of βjSysSearch are both
negative, there exist quite a portion of bonds with positive βjSysSearch. Moreover, within the bonds
of negative βjSysSearch, the absolute level of β
j
SysSearch is heterogeneous across individual bonds.
The more negative βjSysSearch is, the more sensitively that bond j’s yield responds to innovation in
OTC search frictions. In Section 2.A.2.4, we verify that the factor loading βjSysSearch is significantly
priced in corporate bond yield spread, in the sense that bonds with more negative βjSysSearch will
on average exhibit a higher level of yield spread.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of yield loading on systemic search friction
(bond-level yield spread loadings for 11176 bonds)
2.A.2.4 Bond liquidity risk and level of yield spread
In this section, we test whether corporate bond’s liquidity risk is priced in cumulative weighted
average yield spread. Again, we estimate a reduced-form panel data model using the yearly panel
data. We extend the data by adding a cumulative weighted average yield spread Y ieldSpreadj,y
for each point in the data. The model is:
Y ieldSpreadj,y = λSysSearch ∗ βjSysSearch,y + λSysNetConcen ∗ βjSysNetConcen,y
+λprearrange ∗ γj1,prearrange,y + λinv ∗ γj1,inv,y
+λblocktrade ∗ γj2,blocktrade,y + λHHIdealer ∗ γj2,HHIdealer,y +BF
j
y + ηy + 
j
y
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where BF
j
is a collection of bond-specific factors that are also important determinants of bond’s
yield spread, including bonds’ liquidities measured by Amihud21, trade concentration (among deal-
ers), credit rating, bond-specific search frictions22 and number of trades in segmented markets
(interdealer market and dealer-customer market). All the points in the data are calculated by the
time window [1, y].
Table 2.7 shows that, nearly all of bond’s exposures to OTC market frictions are consis-
tently compensated by bond’s yield spread. Specifically, since the estimated bond’s liquidity risk
βjSysSearch,y is on average negative, the estimation results establish that a higher magnitude of liq-
uidity risk (more negative βjSysSearch,y) implies a higher yield spread level. The regression results
are robust when adding a collection of bond-specific factors or using truncated sample in which the
max and min values of βjSysSearch,y are both within three standard deviations from the mean level.
21Amihudjy is a liquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002), which is calculated as the average absolute
value of daily return divided by daily par dollar volume. Specifically, Amihudjt =
1
dj,t
∑dj,t
τ=1
|rj,τ |
V olumej,τ
, where
dj,t is the number of days with observed returns in month t for bond j, rj,τ is the return for bond j on day
τ , and V olumej,t is the par dollar volume traded on day τ .
22Bond-specific search frictions refer to the average time interval between consecutive trades on each
intermediation chain, excluding the head and tail trades. The reason we exclude the head and tail segments
of intermediation chains is that these trades are more likely to be pre-arranged or more likely imply directed
search of investors instead of the random search we focus on.
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Table 2.4: Bond yield loadings on multiple factors
4(Y ieldSpread)j,t (%) (1) (2) (3)
4SystemChainLengtht -2.32*** -1.67*** -1.55***
(-32.80) (-21.38) (-21.38)
4SysNetConcent (thousand) -9.83e-03*** -4.77e-03*** -4.43e-03***
(-48.16) (-22.30) (-20.10)
4invt−1 ($trillion) 7.55*** 5.55*** 5.74***
(24.07) (16.39) (17.51)
4prearranget (%) 0.26*** 1.28*** 1.08***
(3.43) (15.87) (13.43)
4blocktradet (%) -66.67*** -29.29*** -28.65***
(-50.94) (-22.37) (-22.15)
4amtoutt ($trillion) -0.32*** -0.47*** -0.38***
(-6.17) (-8.12) (-6.54)
4HHIdealert (thousand) -1.04*** -0.67*** -0.67***
(-46.70) (-28.99) (-30.82)
4RFt -2.72*** -2.68***
(-41.53) (-22.15)
(4RFt)2 -8.61*** -1.13***
(-9.66) (-14.96)
RMKT,t 6.35*** 6.31***
(60.26) (61.05)
4SLOPEt 0.24*** 0.27***
(19.93) (22.67)
RSMB,t 0.53*** 0.44***
(5.53) (4.70)
RHML,t 0.22** 0.08
(2.05) (0.75)
RUMD,t -2.58*** -2.60***
(-34.07) (-34.74)
4turnoverjt -1.45e-03 ***
(-3.10)
Ratingjt 6.41e-03 ***
(3.41)
TTM jt 1.20e-05 *
(1.96)
Mean Adj R2 0.18 0.35 0.37
#ofBonds 11176 11176 9595
#ofObs 515514 515514 479146
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reported estimated coefficients are
average values taken across all bonds. Similar to Friewald and Nagler (2018),
the t-statistics are calculated by dividing each reported (average) coefficient
value by the standard deviation of the estimates and scaling by the square root
of the number of bonds.
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Table 2.5: Chain Length and Trade Information (Jan 2005 - Sep 2015)
Num (thousands) Vol($1,000) Markup(%) Total time(mins) Pre-arranged(%)
CDC 3982.47 1092.33 0.999 10591.89 21.26
C(2)DC 1180.52 181.57 1.317 15192.10 2.37
C(3)DC 1028.50 155.09 2.102 16253.38 1.73
C(4)DC 351.85 55.57 2.334 19404.53 0.52
C(5)DC 104.86 112.42 2.112 25066.72 0.07
C(6)DC 32.57 64.68 2.374 34231.25 0.03
C(7)DC 12.69 125.46 2.272 40545.61 0.03
Note: C(i)DC means there are i dealers on the chain; Vol($1,000) is the average trading volume
per chain calculated for each length throughout the whole sample period; Markup(%) is the
average total markup per chain calculated for each length throughout the whole sample period.
For each chain, the total markup is calculated by using the last dealer-sell-to-customer price on
the chain minus the initial customer-sell-to-dealer price, then dividing the difference by the initial
customer-sell-to-dealer price; Total time(mins) is the average total time gap per chain calculated
for each length throughout the whole sample period. For each chain, the total time gap (in
minutes) is the length of time between the time point at which the last dealer-sell-to-customer
trade happens and the time point at which the initial customer-sell-to-dealer trade happens; We
record an intermediation chain as being pre-arranged if its total time is shorter than 1 minute.
Table 2.6: Chain Length and Bond Information (Jan 2005 - Sep 2015)
Investment-grade(%) Amount out($million) Maturity(years) TTM/TTO
CDC 68.21 881.92 10.85 22.54
C(2)DC 81.53 1169.34 10.54 4.89
C(3)DC 71.81 961.74 10.84 5.58
C(4)DC 68.99 964.9 11.30 3.46
C(5)DC 61.42 1042.67 11.24 4.72
C(6)DC 54.63 1370.50 11.27 4.04
C(7)DC 50.42 1490.65 11.20 5.26
Note: The higher the value of “Credit rating” is, the lower the credit rating of the bonds
under an S&P rating scheme; Investment-grade(%) is the proportion of bonds that are in-
vestment grade ones with S&P credit ratings as BBB- or higher; Amount out($million) is the
bonds’ amount outstandings; Maturity(years) is the bonds’ whole maturities; TTM/TTO
is a calculated ratio of time to maturity versus time to offering, which is used to measure
whether a bond is relatively young or not.
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Table 2.7: Level of yield spread and factor loadings on systemic OTC market
frictions
Y ieldSpreadj,y (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
βjSysSearch,y -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.08*** -0.05***
(-12.92) (-10.81) (-18.83) (-13.53)
βjSysNetConcen,y 0.40 0.10 1.23* 2.08***
(1.55) (0.52) (2.21) (4.74)
γj1,prearrange,y 226.8*** 114.7*** 738.8*** 385.1***
(23.56) (15.76) (41.13) (26.82)
γj1,inv,y 4.78e-03*** 2.36e-03*** 12.48e-03*** 6.82e-03***
(24.04) (15.72) (34.08) (23.43)
γj2,blocktrade,y -24.73*** -10.81*** -58.19*** -28.91***
(-40.18) (-22.98) (-54.17) (-33.15)
γj2,HHIdealer,y -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.13*** -0.08***
(-9.44) (-8.91) (-22.81) (-19.16)
Amihudjy 212.4*** 399.2***
(6.35) (7.44)
Ratingjy 0.47*** 0.37***
(173.79) (130.01)
HHIdealerjy (1,000) -0.10*** -0.11***
(-12.16) (-14.23)
ChainT imeGapjy (mins) 9.91e-05*** 9.50e-05***
(15.81) (15.57)
Num DDjy (1,000) 0.42*** 0.42***
(10.61) (11.30)
Num DCjy (1,000) -0.24*** -0.17***
(-11.15) (-7.93)
Adj R2 0.08 0.48 0.20 0.51
Year FE YES YES YES YES
# of Obs 41332 41332 28932 28932
# of Bonds 11176 11176 8803 8803
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regression (1) and (2) use all the bonds
(obs). Regression (3) and (4) use the truncated sample which is obtained by dropping
the bonds with βjSysSearch ranked within the top and bottom 15% of the whole range
of all the bonds, to eliminate the possible effect from extreme values. The reason we
choose 15% as the cutoff is, by doing this, in the truncated sample, the max and min
values are both within three standard deviations away from the mean.
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CHAPTER 3
Agent’s Social Optimal Meeting Technology in
Over-the-Counter Markets
3.1 Introduction
Over-the-counter (OTC) market played an important role in the 2008 financial crisis. Nearly
all of the securities and derivatives involved in the financial turmoil that began with a 2007
breakdown in the U.S. mortgage market were traded in OTC markets. 1 There have been
some common stylized facts in OTC markets documented by a series of papers, one of which
is the stable core-periphery interdealer network. For example, Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014)
documents the structure of dealer network in the municipal bonds market and concludes
that the dealership exhibits a stable core-periphery structure based on measures such as the
number of trading connections and the order flow between dealers; Hollifield, Neklyudov,
and Spatt (2017) also documents the core-periphery network structure of the market for the
144a and registered instruments; Bech and Atalay (2010) uses federal fund loans data to
analyze the topology of the daily networks and documents the similar pattern.
Existence of the core-periphery interdealer network can be attributed to dealers’ het-
erogeneity in meeting technologies as in Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b). Dealers
choosing more advanced meeting technology behave more active and have larger central-
ity in the interdealer network. Dealers choosing less advanced one behave less active and
1Randall Dodd, Markets: Exchange or Over-the-Counter, International Monetary Fund. https://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/markets.htm
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lie closer to the periphery of the network. In Neklyudov (2012), meeting technology is in-
terpreted as trading frequency which is a result of costly investment in customer-relations
capital (also highly correlated with interdealer activeness) and also legal support and extent
of in-house expertise.
In this paper, we construct a search-and-bargain model with dealers being free2 to choose
and change their meeting technology (or the search intensity in the model) based on their
own asset position and liquidity need, which is new to the current literature, to explain
the formation of core-periphery interdealer network in different market environments. Then
the model is applied to evaluate the effectiveness of policy responses targeting at different
groups of dealers in response to an unexpected aggregate liquidity shock. Then we further
discuss whether intermediation service is necessary in social optimal solution and its policy
implication. In our model, the trading motive between two randomly matched counterpar-
ties comes from the difference in their current holding positions and private valuations for
the target asset, which determines the current flow utility received from holding the asset.3
Our model is closest to Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018) and Farboodi, Jarosch, and
Shimer (2017b). Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018) contributes to the literature by firstly
analyzing the microstructure and trading patterns in OTC market through the heterogene-
ity in trader’s private valuation on the target asset. And they maintain the assumption of
homogeneous search intensity among all traders. Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b)
contributes to firstly discussing the formation and welfare consequences of endogenous het-
erogeneity in trader’s search intensity (also interpreted as meeting technology) more from a
social planner perspective. Based on their model setup, the meeting technology is invariant
2Here the “being free” means dealers are allowed to have time varying meeting technology or the adjust-
ment cost of meeting technology can be regarded as zero, but dealers are still subject to investment cost of
meeting technology. This mainly contrasts our model with that in Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b)
in which they assume agents’ meeting technologies, once initially chosen, will be time invariant, which is
equally like assuming infinite adjustment cost.
3This setting of trading motive is consistent with a long and fast growing literature following Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), which will be discussed more in Section 1.1.
99
once it is determined for each individual trader. While our model discusses the endogenous
heterogeneity in trading frequency more from a competitive equilibrium perspective: agents
choose their current search intensity based on their current utility type4 and asset position,
and we allow agents to adjust their search intensities once their utility types shift up or
down, or their asset positions change through trading with others. In other words, there
exists a one-to-one mapping between the two-dimensional state variable “utility type and
asset position” and “search intensity” in our model.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the stationary equilibria in the interdealer market
where the distribution of dealers’ utility type is convex and symmetric with respect to the
intermediate-level utility type. Such equilibria can give us equilibrium components which
are more interesting and consistent with the economic intuition. We characterize the sta-
tionary equilibria and show that asset owner’s optimal meeting technology is monotonically
decreasing with respect to his valuation on the asset and asset nonowner’s optimal tech-
nology is monotonically increasing with respect to his valuation, which is consistent with
the general intuition that, for a nonowner (owner) with extremely high (low) valuation on
the asset, he has very strong incentive to search inside the market to correct his misaligned
asset position through trading with his potential counterparties. Then we characterize the
weighted average optimal meeting technology for each group of agents with a certain level of
utility type. We find that, in less-frictional market environments, which is mainly character-
ized by a lower searching cost and a lower Poisson intensity of idiosyncratic liquidity shock,
the intermediate-utility-type agents will behave most active thus becoming the core-dealers;
while in more-frictional market environments, where there is a higher searching cost and a
higher intensity of idiosyncratic liquidity shock, the extreme-utility-type agents will behave
relatively more active (or even most active) thus playing the role of core-dealers and the
4Since this paper mainly focuses on the interdealer market, we use “agents”, “investors”, “intermediators”,
“market makers” and “dealers” interchangably, but they all refer to the dealers in the OTC market in
this paper. Also, in this paper, we use “search intensity”, “trading frequency” and “meeting technology”
interchangably, and we use “utility type”, “liquidity needs” and “valuation on the asset” interchangably.
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intermediate-utility-type agents will instead behave like periphery-dealers. Then we char-
acterize each agent’s contribution to different measures of market liquidity, e.g. expected
instantaneous gross and intermediation trading volume, total intermediation profit, interme-
diation profit per trade, and etc. We find that, the magnitude of gross trading volume is
consistent with agent’s activeness but for the intermediation profit, which is also proxy for
dealers’ bid-ask spread, intermediate-utility-type agents always contribute the highest level
of aggregate bid-ask spread and the lowest level of bid-ask spread per trade.
Besides the implication for the formation of core-periphery interdealer network, we discuss
the effects of different rescue policies in response to a certain form of aggregate liquidity
shock, where we assume a certain proportion of both asset owners and nonowners of higher-
than-intermediate utility types will have their types shifted down by a certain amount, thus
suddenly changing the distribution of dealers’ utility type. We simply define the form of
rescue policy to be that, policy targetting at a certain group of agents will maintain those
agents’ liquidity needs as their pre-shock levels right after the aggregate liquidity shock
occurs. In reality, this policy is implemented through directly injecting liquidity into the
dealers. We conclude that, in all the market environments, policy that targets on dealers
of higher-than-intermediate utility types dominates the other ones in terms of recovering
the whole market’s liquidity level. Since such group of agents will choose different meeting
technologies in different market environments and it is easier for regulatory institutions to
identify dealers by their trading frequency and trading volume per unit of time, then our
model gives the policy implication that in less-frictional market, it will be better to firstly
inject liquidity into those less active (more periphery) dealers while in more frictional market,
it will be better to firstly save those more active dealers.
Finally, we discuss the policy function of social optimal meeting technologies. We find
that, it is always optimal for asset owners with higher-than-intermediate utility types to
remain silent (not search to sell) and correspondingly, asset nonowners with lower-than-
intermediate utility types to remain silent (not search to buy). In other words, there is no
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intermediation in our social optimal solution, since there does not exist any single agent
being assigned with positive meeting technologies in both asset-owner and asset-nonowner
densities. Moreover, agents with extremely mis-aligned asset positions will be assigned with
higher level of meeting technologies compared with competitive equilibrium solution. These
results, which are counterintuitive to the results in current literature, possibly come from the
setting of our social welfare objective function. If we define the asset owners with higher-than-
intermediate utility types and the asset nonowners with lower-than-intermediate utility types
as well-aligned agents, then the social level of well-alignement will be the unique part that
positively contributes to the social welfare. And the social level of investment cost in meeting
technologies will be the other part that negatively contributes to the social welfare. Then it
is intuitive that, for well-aligned agents, it is optimal to make them remain silent to save the
investment cost and maintain their current asset holdings, unless they become mis-aligned
ones due to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks; for extremely-misaligned agents, it is optimal
to make them more actively search to trade to reduce the social level of misalignement.5
Based on these key results, we can further solve out the explicit solution to the social
welfare problem and it coincides exactly with the numerical ones searched out by MatLab.
Specifically, in the case of linear cost function, we can obtain the one-dimention policy
measure that social planner only needs to identify a marginal utility type for asset owners
which is smaller than the intermediate utility type, and assign all asset owners lower than
this marginal type with the maximum meeting technology; correspondingly, identify the
symmetric marginal utility type for asset nonowners which is higher than the intermediate
utility type, and assign all asset nonowners higher than this marginal type with the same
maximum meeting technology.
5The conclusion that there is no intermediation in the social optimal solution is robust to several cost
functions. We discuss this in appendix.
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Related literature
There has been a fast-growing literature on documenting and modeling the stylized facts in
the OTC asset markets. Besides the core-periphery interdealer network, Li and Schu¨rhoff
(2014) also documents the positive correlation between dealers’ centrality and spreads they
earn in municipal bond market, which is also termed as “centrality premium”. The cor-
relation of centrality with other statistics such as inventory, trading cost and difference in
bargaining power, etc are also discussed. While in securities market for 144a and registered
instruments, Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) documents the negative correlation
between dealers’ centrality and spread, which is termed as “centrality discount”. Afonso
and Schoar (2013) researches the interbank lending market and documents that most banks
inside the market form long-term stable lending relationships, which will affect how liquidity
shocks are transmitted across the whole market, e.g. banks connected with concentrated
lenders will be less affected by the shocks. Moreover, they discover other facts in interbank
lending market, such as banks which borrow from a more concentrated and stable set of
lenders tend to have smaller sizes, the observed concentration of relationships more likely
reflects the need for liquidity hedging among all the market participants, etc. Siriwardane
(2015) uses credit default swap (CDS) data to document that the market is dominated by
only a handful of market makers (or net sellers) and such concentration of sellers increase
the fragility of the market.
For model setup, Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) firstly constructs a search-and-
bargain model with investors of only two utility types and explicit market markers in an
OTC market for a “consol”. And the interdealer market structure is simplified to be a perfect
competitive one which generates a unique interdealer market price. There are papers focus-
ing only on pure dealer markets, e.g., Gaˆrleanu (2009), Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011),
Feldhu¨tter (2011), Pagnotta and Philippon (2018b) and Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015).
Specifically, Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) develops a model of liquidity without restricting on
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asset positions of investors. For papers that model the whole decentralized market and en-
dogenously generate dealers and customers from random searching and bilateral bargaining
process, several versions of models are constructed. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007)
considers markets for both asset paying riskless dividend and asset paying risky dividend.
Asset position support is restricted to be {0, 1} and there are only two utility types (high and
low). Weill (2008) extends by constructing a multi-asset model and maintain the restriction
on asset positions of investors to be {0, 1}. Afonso and Lagos (2015) focuses on the market
for federal funds and assumes the loan sizes (asset positions) are elements of a countable
set. Other related papers are e.g. Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008),
Afonso (2011), Gavazza (2011), Gavazza (2016) and Trejos and Wright (2016). Most of these
papers restrict two utility types of the investors, which may potentially prevent the frame-
work from characterizing the stylized core-periphery interdealer network documented in the
empirical papers above and analyzing its policy implication. Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill
(2018) contributes by allowing arbitrary i.i.d distribution of preference shock to investors and
endogenously generate intermediation chains and core-periphery trading networks, which is
consistent with the empirical findings. But they maintain the homogeneous search intensity
in their model setup. U¨slu¨ (2019) constructs model combining unrestricted asset positions
and exogenous heterogeneity in search intensities among investors, and he also contributes
by using Fourier transformation to generate moments of stationary distributions of vari-
ables of interest. Besides U¨slu¨ (2019), there are other but not too many papers explicitly
assuming heterogeneity in search intensity, e.g. Neklyudov (2012), Farboodi, Jarosch, and
Shimer (2017b). The latter, as discussed above, evaluates the distribution of meeting tech-
nologies and further allows all agents to endogenously choose their meeting technologies to
analyze how distribution of search intensity is generated. They also model investors with
only two utility types thus there is no one-to-one mapping between utility type and meeting
technology.
Another strand of literature mainly uses explicit network approach to model the formation
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of links and process of bargaining between traders in the OTC markets, instead of using
search-and-bargain model to endogenously generate network characteristics. Related work
includes Babus and Kondor (2018), Malamud and Rostek (2017), Alvarez and Barlevy (2015),
Farboodi (2014), Gofman (2014), Chang and Zhang (2018). And there are also some papers
(including some papers listed above) combing search and network characteristics, including
Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2018), Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b), Neklyudov
(2012), and Shen, Wei, and Yan (2015). Specifically, Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2015)
develops hybrid model to analyze entry and exit equilibrium conditions in the OTC market
for credit default swap. With traders with homogeneous search intensity, they conclude that
banks with intermediate risk exposure per trader (essentially like intermediate utility type)
and large sizes endogenously enter the OTC market behaving like market maker to gain
intermediation profit.
Besides strands of literatures above, there are also some other papers departing from
search-and-bargain and network methods and research the OTC market from other perspec-
tives. For example, Acharya and Bisin (2009), Duffie and Lubke (2010).
3.2 Model
We consider the OTC interdealer market for asset in the form of “consol” which pays one
unit of dividend per unit of time. This asset is in fixed supply s = 1
2
.6 There exists a
continuum of agents (dealers) [0, 1] who have heterogeneous utility type δ ∈ [0, 1] following
arbitrary distribution Fδ(δ) (with PDF as fδ(δ))
7. Utility type δ can be interpreted as
the current flow utility that agents can receive from holding one unit of such asset. There
6In this paper, we will mainly focus on the symmetric equilibria which are more tractable. Similar to
Neklyudov(2015), since the switching rates between any two possible utility types are constantly equal to α,
the fixed asset supply s = 12 asssumption ensures that the mass of asset owners will be equal to that of asset
owners in the steady state dynamic equilibria.
7We firstly consider symmetric case that fδ(δ) is convex and symmetric with respect to δ =
1
2 . In
numerical example, we specifically consider the uniform case that fδ(δ) = 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
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is an idiosyncratic Poisson utility type shock arriving at intensity α. Based on their own
characteristics (including current utility type, wealth level and asset holding), agents are free
to choose their search intensity λ ∈ [0, λ¯], where λ¯ is the upper bound of level of meeting
technology that agents can choose8. Agents spend C(λ) = c1λ
2 as flow cost to invest in and
maintain their current search intensity λ.
In later analysis, we use the coefficient of flow cost c1 as a measure of the magnitude of
friction on the OTC market. The key difference in microstructure between OTC market and
frictionless exchange (Walrasian) market is how fast/advanced meeting technology agents
can choose to trade with each other, which can also be equally attributed to how large the
c1 is. Also, the Poisson intensity of idiosyncratic liquidity shock α will be used as a measure
of the number of the misaligned agents in the market. Intuitively, higher α makes it easier
for agents of high(low) utility types shift to low(high) utility types with their asset position
unchanged before trading with others through searching and bargaining. We will talk more
about this in Corollary 2 below.
We assume agents have CARA instantaneous utility as u(c) = −e−γc with risk aversion
coefficient γ. Agent’s wealth is denoted by W and asset holding9 is restricted to belong to
{0, 1}. Other parameters are risk free interest rate r and agent’s discount rate β.
3.2.1 HJB equation for reservation value
Let U(W, δ, a) be the value function of an agent with wealth level as W , utility type δ and
asset holding a, where a ∈ {0, 1}. Then as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007), the
8λ¯ can be ex-post proved to be finite.
9It can be proved expost that in the current model setup, once two counterparties are matched, since
their reservation value is strictly increasing in utility type δ, they will either sell or buy as much as possible
to obtain gains from trade, thus the asset holding can always be normalized to be either 0 or 1. And we
implicitly assume here that short selling is allowed.
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agent’s problem is:
U(W, δ, a) = sup
c,λ
Et[−
∫ ∞
t
e−β(s−t)e−γcsds|Wt = W, δt = δ, at = a]
s.t.
dWt = (rWt − ct + atδt − C(λt))dt− P [(W, δt, at), (W ′, δ′t, a′t)]dat
lim
T→∞
e−β(T−t)Et[e−rγWT ] = 0
C(λt) = c1λ
2
t (c1 > 0)
10
where P [(W, δt, at), (W
′, δ′t, a
′
t)] is a bilaterally bargained price from symmetric (each agent
has same bargaining power) Nash bargaining game between two randomly matched coun-
terparties with state variables as (W, δt, at) and (W
′, δ′t, a
′
t). dat is bilateral trading quantity
and dat ∈ {−1, 1}.
Using notations U(W, δ, 1) = U1(W, δ) and U(W, δ, 0) = U0(W, δ) as value functions for
asset owners and asset nonowners, as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007), we can guess
and verify the form of U1(W, δ) and U0(W, δ), and we can get HJB equation for simplified
value functions without state variable W as follows. It is important to note that, in this
paper, we focus on the rational expectation competitive equilibrium in the sense that, all
asset owners and asset nonowners adopt the common policy rule λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) to choose
their optimal meeting technology. And the matching technology is constant return to scale.
rV1(δ) = max
λ1(δ)
{δ − C(λ1(δ)) + α
∫ 1
0
(V1(δ
′)− V1(δ))dFδ(δ′)
+ λ1(δ)
∫ λ¯
0
∫ 1
0
λ′
Λ0
max{4V (δ′)−4V (δ), 0}Φ0(dδ′, dλ′)} (3.1)
10It can be proved expost that if C(λ) is linear form, then by F.O.C of λ, optimal λ(δ) will be either 0
or λ¯. And for the simpliest version of model, we assume C(λ) is convex with C(0) = 0 and C ′(0) = 0, i.e.
there is no fixed flow entry cost.
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rV0(δ) = max
λ0(δ)
{−C(λ0(δ)) + α
∫ 1
0
(V0(δ
′)− V0(δ))dFδ(δ′)
+ λ0(δ)
∫ λ¯
0
∫ 1
0
λ′
Λ1
max{4V (δ)−4V (δ′), 0}Φ1(dδ′, dλ′)} (3.2)
s.t.
4V (δ) = V1(δ)− V0(δ)
Λ1 = 2
∫ λ¯
0
∫ 1
0
λ′Φ1(dδ′, dλ′)
Λ0 = 2
∫ λ¯
0
∫ 1
0
λ′Φ0(dδ′, dλ′)
then we get,
λ∗1(δ) =
∫ λ¯
0
∫ 1
δ
λ′
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))Φ0(dδ′, dλ′)
2c1
(3.3)
λ∗0(δ) =
∫ λ¯
0
∫ δ
0
λ′
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))Φ1(dδ′, dλ′)
2c1
(3.4)
where λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) are optimal (instantaneous) search intensity chosen by asset owner
and asset nonowner of utility type (liquidity need) δ. 4V (δ) is the reservation value for
agent of utility type δ. Φ0(δ
′, λ′) is cumulative joint measure of utility type and (optimally)
chosen search intensity for asset nonowners. Φ1(δ
′, λ′) is cumulative joint measure of utility
type and (optimally) chosen search intensity for asset owners. Λ1 is the weighted average
search intensity chosen by asset owners. Λ0 is the weighted average search intensity chosen
by asset nonowners.
Proposition 1 Given the distribution of utility type Fδ(δ) with symmetric PDF fδ(δ)
and the cumulative joint measures Φ0(δ
′, λ′) and Φ1(δ′, λ′): the optimal meeting technology
chosen by asset owners λ∗1(δ) is a decreasing function of utility type δ; the optimal meeting
technology chosen by asset nonowners λ∗0(δ) is an increasing function of utility type δ; the
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reservation value 4V (δ) is a strictly increasing and positive function of utility type δ. Proof
is in Appendix 3.A.1.
For an asset owner, if his utility type is relatively low (or he has higher liquidity need so
he has relatively lower valuation for holding the asset), he will have strong incentive to sell
his current asset as quickly as possible given his expectation on the joint distribution of asset
nonowner’s utility type and meeting technology, which means he will (at least temporarily)
choose relatively more advanced meeting technology to increase his trading frequency. If
asset owner’s utility type is relatively high, which means he has lower liquidity need and he
is more willing to hold the asset, then such asset owner will behave less active in the market
since he has a relatively well-aligned asset position. Similar interpretation works for the
optimal meeting technology chosen by asset nonowners. Asset nonowners of relatively high
utility types will invest in more advanced technology to eagerly search for potential asset
sellers in the market. And asset nonowners of relatively low utility types will have weak
incentive to increase their trading frequencies, thus remaining relatively less active.
The increasing property of reservation value function 4V (δ) guarantees that once a
lower-type owner and a higher-type nonowner are randomly matched, there will always be
gains from trade, thus the bilateral trading quantity will never be zero. And the probability
that one agent being matched with another one of the same utility type will approximately
be zero.
Based on Proposition 1 and by assuming all agents in the market adopt the same policy
rules λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ), we can further simplify the HJB equations (3.1) and (3.2), and get
the HJB equation for reservation value function as follows:
r4V (δ) = δ + C(λ∗0(δ))− C(λ∗1(δ)) + α
∫ 1
0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))dFδ(δ′) (3.5)
+λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′ − λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
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s.t.
λ∗1(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′
2c1
(3.6)
λ∗0(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
2c1
(3.7)
Λ0 = 2
∫ 1
0
λ∗0(δ
′)φ0(δ′)dδ′
Λ1 = 2
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ (3.8)
φ0(δ) =
∫ λ¯
0
Φ0(dδ, dλ
′)
φ1(δ) =
∫ λ¯
0
Φ1(dδ, dλ
′)
Individual agent’s expectation on the joint distribution of asset position (either 0 or 1), utility
type δ and adopted search intensity λ can be simplified to the joint densities of asset position
and utility type which are denoted by φ0(δ) and φ1(δ), since optimal meeting technology is
monotonic with respect to utility type by Proposition 1.
3.2.2 Joint densities of utility type and asset holding
To further discuss the stationary equilibrium in next section, we need to characterize the law
of motion for densities of asset owners φ1(δ) and nonowners φ0(δ) of each utility type δ. Let
fˆδ(δ) be the distribution of new utility type in response to idiosyncratic liquidity shock and
fδ(δ) = φ0(δ) + φ1(δ) be the current distribution of utility type for the whole population.
For simplicity, we only consider the case fˆδ(δ) = fδ(δ) = 1 in stationary equilibrium
11, we
have:
11In Section 5, we will consider one form of aggregate liquidity shock with the refinancing channel defined
similar as in Duffie et al (2006). The refinancing channel means fˆδ(δ) 6= fδ(δ) = φ0(δ) + φ1(δ), in which the
distribution of utiltiy type fδ(δ) can gradually recover to the pre-shock scenario due to the function of fˆδ(δ).
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φ˙1(δ) = −αφ1(δ) + α
2
fˆδ(δ)− 2φ1(δ)λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ = 0 (3.9)
φ˙0(δ) = −αφ0(δ) + α
2
fˆδ(δ)− 2φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ = 0 (3.10)
In both equation (3.9) and (3.10), the first term is the outflow from asset owners (nonowners)
of utility type δ due to idiosyncratic liquidity shock. The second term is the inflow due to
idiosyncratic liquidity shock. For example in equation (3.9), it is the inflow of asset owners,
originally with other utility types, having their types shifted exactly to δ due to liquidity
shock. The third term is the outflow due to the implemented bilateral trades based on
random searching and bargaining. For example in equation (3.9), asset owners of type δ are
matched with asset nonowners of higher utility types, then this subgroup of asset owners
will sell their assets to their counterparties and become asset nonowners. The fourth term
is correspondingly the inflow due to implemented bilateral trades.
Moreover, φ0(δ) and φ1(δ) at each time point should also satisfy the following conditions
12:
φ0(δ) + φ1(δ) = fδ(δ) (3.11)
∫ 1
0
φ1(δ)dδ =
∫ 1
0
φ0(δ)dδ =
1
2
(3.12)
Equation (3.11) is based on the definition of pdf fδ(δ) and joint densities φ0(δ) and φ1(δ),
which shows that each group of agents of the same utility type contains both asset owners
12Here we ignore the time subscripts for simplicity since we will discuss the stationary equilibrium in next
section.
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and nonowners. Equation (3.12) is the market clear condition for the asset in fixed supply
s = 1
2
.
3.3 Stationary equilibrium characterization
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium contains a reservation value function 4V (δ), joint
densities of asset position and utility type φ0(δ) and φ1(δ), and optimal meeting technology
functions of asset owners and nonowners λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) such that:
1. joint measures φ0(δ) and φ1(δ) satisfy (3.9)-(3.12) for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1];
2. reservation value function 4V (δ) satisfies (3.5) subject to (3.6)-(3.8), given stationary
distribution Fδ(δ) and joint densities φ0(δ) and φ1(δ);
3. optimal meeting technologies satisfy (3.6)-(3.7), given stationary joint densities φ0(δ)
and φ1(δ), distribution Fδ(δ) and optimal reservation value function 4V (δ).
Proposition 2 There exists stationary equilibrium given uniform distribution of utility
type fδ(δ) ≡ 1, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] for any r > 0, α > 0 and c1 > 0. Proof is in Appendix 3.A.2.
Based on (3.9)(3.10), the distribution of utility type seems to be totally exogeneous,
since f˙(δ) = φ˙1(δ) + φ˙0(δ) = 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, our model does not exclude the
possibility of multiple equilibria characterized by different distributions of utility type. To
discuss stationary equilibria, we implicitly assume the distribution of idiosyncratic liquidity
shock is the same as the steady-state distribution of utility type in the market.13 In Section
3.5, when there comes an aggregate liquidity shock, we abandon the above assumption and
still maintain the distribution of idiosyncratic liquidity shock same as before, specifically
we focus on the case fˆδ(δ) = 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], which departs from the immediate post-shock
distribution of utility type.
13It can be ex-post shown that the stationary equilibrium distribution of utility type will eventually
converge to that of new utility types from idiosyncratic shock.
112
3.3.1 The frictionless benchmark
To understand the effect of OTC market search friction on market efficiency and welfare, we
firstly characterize the frictionless benchmark, i.e. the Walrasian market. Upon receiving
idiosyncratic liquidity shock at intensity α, every agent can adjust his asset position imme-
diately to accommodate his new utility type at the unique price p on the market at each
time point.
Assume one agent’s current asset position is a ∈ {0, 1} and his immediately adjusted new
asset position is a′ ∈ {0, 1}, V fa (δ) is the value function of agent with asset position a and
utility type δ, then we have the HJB equation for frictionless market as:
rV fa (δ) = δ ∗ a+ α
∫ 1
0
max
a′
[
V fa′(δ
′)− V fa (δ)− p(a′ − a)
]
dFδ(δ
′) (3.13)
By first order condition of a′, we get:
a′ =

1 if 4V f (δ′) > p;
1 or 0 if 4V f (δ′) = p;
0 if 4V f (δ′) < p.
Given fixed asset price p, since 4V f (δ) is strictly increasing on δ by (3.13), ∃!δ∗ ∈ [0, 1] s.t.
4V f (δ∗) = p. Since p is market clearing price, as in Hugonnier et al (2016), we have the
following market clear condition:
δ∗ = inf{δ ∈ [0, 1] : 1− Fδ(δ) ≤ 1
2
}
which means for all agents with utility δ > δ∗, they will hold the asset and for all agents
with utility δ < δ∗, they will not hold the asset. In other words, φf1(δ) = f(δ), ∀δ ∈ [δ∗, 1]
and φf0(δ) = f(δ), ∀δ ∈ [0, δ∗]. In the case of fixed asset supply s = 12 , δ∗ = 12 .
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By (3.13), we have the reservation value function for frictionless market as:
r4V f (δ) = δ + α(p−4V f (δ))
Then for δ∗ = 1
2
:
4V f (δ∗) = δ
∗
r
=
1
2r
= p
Since upon receiving the idiosyncratic liquidity shock, every agent can immediately adjust
her asset position. Let af (δ) be the instantaneously adjusted asset position for δ ∈ [0, 1],
at each time point, the expected instantaneous total trading volume in the market can be
expressed as:
TV f = α
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
|af (δ′)− af (δ)|dFδ(δ′)dFδ(δ)
= 2α
∫ δ∗
0
∫ 1
δ∗
|af (δ′)− af (δ)|dFδ(δ′)dFδ(δ)
= 2α(1− Fδ(δ∗))Fδ(δ∗)
= 2αs(1− s)
=
α
2
Intuitively, in frictionless market, all the tradings happen due to the idiosyncratic shock
and all the tradings are completed between agents and the Walrasian auctioner. As in
Gaˆrleanu(2009) and U¨slu(2015), if we sum over all agents’ continuation utilities, we can
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obtain the measure of the social welfare with fδ(δ) ≡ 1,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]:
W f =
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
(∫ 1
0
δφf1(δ)dδ
)
dt
=
1
r
∫ 1
δ∗
δfδ(δ)dδ
=
E[δ; δ > δ∗]
r
=
3
8r
In the following sections, we will calculate the instantaneous trading volume and maxi-
mized social welfare in OTC market with search friction, and compare them with the fric-
tionless benchmark above. Also, the agents with mis-aligned asset positions contain both
asset owners with δ ∈ [0, δ∗] and asset nonowners with δ ∈ [δ∗, 1].
3.3.2 Equilibrium with symmetric fδ(δ)
We firstly consider the case of symmetric and convex distribution of utility type, that is, fδ(δ)
is symmetric with respect to δ = 1
2
and decreasing in δ ∈ [0, 1
2
] and increasing in δ ∈ [1
2
, 1].
The reason we consider such exogenous distribution is, when fδ(δ) is convex, we can obtain
the equilibrium solutions where φ1(δ)(φ0(δ)) is monotonically increasing(decreasing). Such
equilibria are more interesting as being consistent with the intuition that within the group
of agents with lower(higher) liquidity needs, there should exist a larger proportion of asset
owners(nonowners). Moreover, we are more interested in the financial stability of the sym-
metric stationary equilibria characterized by Definition 2 under an aggregate liquidity shock
to the whole market (details in Section 3.5).
Definition 2 For symmetric fδ(δ)(with respect to δ =
1
2
), the symmetric stationary equi-
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librium is defined as follows:
φ0(δ) = φ1(1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.14)
λ∗0(δ) = λ
∗
1(1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.15)
and all the components also satisfy Definition 1.
By (3.14)(3.15), reservation value 4V (δ) satisfies:
4V (0) +4V (1) = 4V (δ) +4V (1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
and
d24V (δ)
dδ2
> 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
d24V (δ)
dδ2
< 0,∀δ ∈ (1
2
, 1];
d24V (1
2
)
dδ2
= 0.
Proof is in Appendix 3.A.3.
3.3.2.1 Joint densities φ1(δ) and φ0(δ) under symmetric fδ(δ)
Proposition 3 For equilibrium with symmetric (either convex or concave) distribution of
utility type fδ(δ), if the following condition is satisfied, we will obtain φ
′
0(δ) < 0 < φ
′
1(δ),
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]: For fδ(δ), 6 ∃ δ∗ ∈ [0, 1]14 s.t.
(α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ
∗)
)
f ′δ(δ
∗) +
1
c1
d4V (δ∗)
dδ
(
a(δ∗)2φ0(δ∗) + b(δ∗)2φ1(δ∗)
)
(3.16)
+2λ∗1(δ
∗)λ∗0(δ
∗)φ1(δ∗)φ0(δ∗)
(
1
Λ0
+
1
Λ1
)
= 0
where λ∗0(δ), λ
∗
1(δ), Λ0, Λ1 and 4V (δ) follow (3.5)-(3.8). And notations a(δ) and b(δ) follow
the Appendix 3.A.1. Proof is in Appendix 3.A.4.
When fδ(δ) is convex, the intuition behind condition (3.16) is, if we want to guarantee
14Actually, we just need the condition to be satisfied over δ ∈ [0, 12 ]
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φ′1(δ) > 0 on δ ∈ [0, 12 ] (equally φ′0(δ) < 0 on δ ∈ [12 , 1]), we require fδ(δ) not to drop too
quickly within δ ∈ [0, 1
2
]. If fδ(δ) drops too quickly, although higher-utility-type group tends
to have a larger proportion of agents as asset owners, the density of the asset owners may
still shrink. Similarly, when fδ(δ) is concave, if we want to guarantee φ
′
1(δ) > 0 on δ ∈ [12 , 1]
(equally φ′0(δ) < 0 on δ ∈ [0, 12 ]), we require fδ(δ) not to drop too quickly within δ ∈ [12 , 1].
Specifically, if fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], then the condition (3.16) in Proposition 3 is automat-
ically satisfied since the first term in (3.16) is zero and the sum of the following two terms is
always strictly positive by Proposition 1. For the following part of the paper, unless otherwise
specified, we automatically assume fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]. By symmetry, φ0(12) = φ1(12) = 12
and |φ′0(12)| = |φ′1(12)|. The reason that we focus on such equilibria is that, such equilibria are
interesting and more consistent with the intuition that high-utility-type agents tend to have
larger density to be an asset owner. The next proposition gives some comparative statics for
stationary measures φ1(δ) and φ0(δ).
Proposition 4 For symmetric equilibrium with uniform distribution of utility type fδ(δ) ≡ 1
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]: as c1 and/or α increases, if λ∗1(0) decreases15, then φ1(δ)(φ0(δ)) increases(decreases)
for each δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) and decreases(increases) for each δ ∈ (1
2
, 1], and the magnitude of change
shrinks as δ converges to 1
2
. Proof is in Appendix 3.A.5.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is: when α increases, every agent’s utility type be-
comes more unstable, then in each unit time, there will be more agents with mis-aligned asset
positions when the magnitude of market friction c1 does not change. Then for each specific
15The reason we need the condition “λ∗1(0) decreases” is that: by increasing the cost coefficient c1, for
asset owner with utility type δ = 0, there will be two counteractive effects that there will be more asset
nonowners with utility type higher than zero which potentially increases the benefit from searching but it
will also be more expensive for asset owner of type zero to search. “λ∗1(0) decreases” will guarantee that
the latter effect dominates. And this will determine the shape of the asset-owner density function since as
search is discouraged, there will be more mis-aligned agents in the market; by increasing the parameter α,
although the first effect above will encourage the asset owner of type zero to search but there will be more
competitors of the same type also with mis-aligned asset positions, which potentially discourages the search
at the same time, so it is also reasonable to assume that “λ∗1(0) decreases”.
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δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) (δ ∈ (1
2
, 1]), now there will be a larger proportion of asset owners(nonowners),
although the majority group is still asset nonowner; when the magnitude of market friction
c1 increases, it is more expensive to search inside the market, which discourages potential
intermediation activities. Then there will also be a larger proportion of misaligned-asset-
position agents for each δ ∈ [0, 1]16. In a nutshell, higher Poisson intensity of idiosyncratic
liquidity shock and/or more expensive searching will raise the level of market friction. Figure
3.1 gives a numerical example of the asset-owner density φ1(δ) where fδ(δ) ≡ 1, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
and we vary the values of α and c1 at the same time, leaving the risk free rate r fixed. We
let α change from 0.005 to 0.75 and c1 change from 1 to 2. We can see, as the α and/or c1
shrinks, the shape of asset-owner density will be closer to a centralized (Walrasian) case.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium joint densities in Walrasian market and OTC markets
16In our model with fixed asset supply s = 12 , if the market is frictionless (i.e. Walrasian market),
φ0(δ) = fδ(δ) = 1 (φ1(δ) = 0) for all δ ∈ [0, 12 ) and φ1(δ) = fδ(δ) = 1 (φ0(δ) = 0) for all δ ∈ [ 12 , 1],
that is, asset is allocated to the agents who currently values it most. In OTC market, we will call all the
asset owners with utility type δ ∈ [0, 12 ) and all the asset nonowners with utility type δ ∈ [ 12 , 1] as the
mismatched-asset-position agent.
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3.3.2.2 Weighted average meeting technology λ¯(δ)
Before defining the weighted average meeting technology λ¯(δ), we firstly characterize the
properties of marginal investor δ∗ = s = 1
2
defined in Section 3.3.1 inside the OTC market.
Corollary 1 In symmetric equilibria, the marginal investor δ∗ = s = 1
2
satisfies:
λ∗1(δ
∗) = λ∗0(δ
∗)
and
4V (δ∗) = δ
∗ + αEδ(4V (δ))
α + r
=
δ∗
r
= p
where p is the unique market clearing price in Walrasian market benchmark.
Intuitively, agent of utility type δ∗ is indifferent to becoming either asset owner or asset
nonowner. In his reservation value function, this agent weights more his current and future
utility types relative to his current asset position. Then his main incentive to enter the
market is to provide intermediation service, that is, to purchase at lower prices and sell at
higher prices, instead of adjusting his own asset position to become well-aligned agent. We
will call this agent as pure intermediator. Intuitively, the pure intermediator’s investment
in meeting technology should be most elastic with respect to the market environment since
this agent has no “‘inelastic’ hedging purpose” to be either a net buyer or a net seller.
Given equilibrium components φ0(δ) and φ1(δ), we can define the proportions of asset
owners and nonowners within each group of agents of utility type δ ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
S0(δ) =
φ0(δ)
fδ(δ)
S1(δ) =
φ1(δ)
fδ(δ)
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Then we can further define the weighted average meeting technology λ¯(δ):
λ¯(δ) = S1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) + S0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) =
φ1(δ)
fδ(δ)
λ∗1(δ) +
φ0(δ)
fδ(δ)
λ∗0(δ)
where λ¯(δ) can also be understood as people’s expectation on the optimal meeting technology
chosen by an individual agent (dealer) of utility type δ.
Specifically, when fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], the proportions of asset owners and nonowners
are just equal to densities φ1(δ) and φ0(δ). If condition (3.16) in Proposition 3 is satisfied, we
have φ′0(δ) < 0 < φ
′
1(δ), which is consistent with the intuition that generally in a normal/less
frictional OTC market, agents of lower liquidity needs more likely become asset owners and
agents of higher liquidity needs more likely sell their assets to hold more cash thus becoming
asset nonowners. Next we need to characterize the shape of λ¯(δ) to figure out which group
of agents will more likely choose more advanced meeting technology, thus behaving more
active (closer to the core inside the interdealer network) and which group of agents will
more likely behave less active. And how will the distribution of optimal meeting technol-
ogy change with different market environments, which can jointly be determined by c1 and α.
Proposition 5 For symmetric equilibrium with fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], the weighted average
search intensity function λ¯(δ) maintains the following properties in the range of reasonable
parameter values17:
1. λ¯′(1
2
) = 0, λ¯′(0) < 0, λ¯′(1) > 0;
2. For each α > 0 (c1 > 0), ∃c∗1(α) > 0 (∃α∗(c1) > 0), s.t. if c1 > c∗1(α) (α > α∗(c1)):
• λ¯′(δ) < 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
• λ¯(0) > λ¯(1
2
);
17Here “reasonable” values mainly refer to r > 0, c1 > 0 and α > 0 in Proposition 2, which guarantees the
existence of stationary equilibrium.
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• λ¯′′(1
2
) > 0;
3. For each α > 0 (c1 > 0), ∃c∗∗1 (α) > 0 (∃α∗∗(c1) > 0), s.t. if c1 < c∗∗1 (α) (α < α∗∗(c1)):
• ∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t. λ¯′(δˆ) > 0;
• λ¯(0) < λ¯(1
2
);
• λ¯′′(1
2
) < 0;
Proof is in Appendix 3.A.6.
By Proposition 5, we know δ = 1
2
is always a stationary point. Since it always applies
that λ¯′(0) < 0, if δ = 1
2
is a local maximum point in relatively smaller c1, by Mean Value
Theorem, there must exist a utility type δ′ ∈ (0, 1
2
) (symmetrically 1 − δ′ ∈ (1
2
, 1)) which
is a local minimum point. For specific α, when c1 changes from being small (< c
∗∗
1 (α)) to
being large (> c∗1(α)), this local minimum point will intuitively shifts from being close to
δ = 0 to being close to δ = 1
2
for the left part of λ¯(δ). Similar idea works for given specific
c1 and α changes from being small (< α
∗∗(c1)) to being large (> α∗(c1)). While this local
minimum point is difficult to be technically identified in a general model setup and the main
topic of our paper is to discuss how dealers switch their roles to behave either active or
inactive in different market environments, then in the following sections we will ignore this
local minimum point and mainly compare the expected optimal meeting technology between
the intermediate utility type agent (δ = 1
2
) and the extreme utility type agents (δ = 0 and 1)
in symmetric stationary equilibria in different market environments, to discuss which agent
will behave as the core dealer and which agent will behave as the periphery one.
3.3.3 Quantitative example
In Figure 3.2-3.4, we give three groups of stationary equilibrium solutions. The value of c1
is used as a measure of market friction and the value of α is used as a measure of market
mis-alignment. By Proposition 5, as c1 increases, extreme-value agents, who initially invest
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Figure 3.2: Stationary equilibrium solutions with c1 = 2, α = 0.05
in less advanced weighted average meeting technology than intermediate-value agents, will
behave more active than the intermediate ones in more frictional market. By the graph of
measures of asset owners and nonowners, as α increases, there are more mis-aligned agents
in the market.
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Figure 3.3: Stationary equilibrium solutions with c1 = 5, α = 0.25
3.4 Core-periphery interdealer network
Our analytical results have implications for the formation and evolution of the core-periphery
interdealer network, which is documented to commonly exist in several OTC markets, includ-
ing municipal bond market, securities market for 144a and registered instruments, federal
funds market, and etc. The centrality of dealers in the interdealer network is mainly mea-
sured by the number of completed trades (larger than a certain scale) per unit time, which
also represents the activeness of dealers. If one dealer behaves more active in the OTC
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Figure 3.4: Stationary equilibrium solutions with c1 = 10, α = 0.5
market, i.e. searches more frequently for potential counterparties to trade with, he will have
larger centrality and lie closer to the core of the network.
3.4.1 Trading frequency
We use the weighted average search intensity λ¯(δ) as a measure of the trading frequency
or centrality of the dealer of utility type δ. In unit time, the number of effective trades
completed by an individual agent also equals his (expected instantaneous) gross trading
volume (denoted as G(δ) below), since the trading quantity between any two matched agents
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has been normalized to be either +1 or −1. As a result, both λ¯(δ) and G(δ) can be used
as a measure of dealers’ centrality. The question is, which dealers will averagely choose
higher λ¯(δ) and which dealers will averagely choose the lower one? It turns out that, the
market environment determines the shape of λ¯(δ) thus the distribution of optimal meeting
technology. Referring to our baseline model, we can use the product c1 ∗ α as a measure of
the market environment. As interpreted in the model setup, higher α means more misaligned
agents in the market and higher c1 means more expensive meeting technology investment,
thus more frictional market.
For simplicity, we only focus on the extreme-value agent with δ = 0 (or δ = 1) and
intermediate-value agent with δ = 1
2
, although δ = 0 (or δ = 1) agent will never be the least
active agent inside the market due to λ¯′(0) < 0 by Proposition 5. Another reason is, we
want to emphasize the motive of these two groups of agents to “switch” their positions in
the interdealer network.
The former analytical result implies the key for the fact that “the less active agent in less
frictional market becomes (relatively) more active in more frictional market” is, the former
less active agent’s trading motivation is more robust to the market environment. For agents
with δ = 0 (δ = 1), their more robust weighted average meeting technology is mainly driven
by the investment of asset owners (nonowenrs) in the group. The latter are highly motivated
to search to hedge their highly mis-aligned asset positions instead of just waiting for their
utility type to shift up or down. While for agent with δ = 1
2
, since they are indifferent
between holding the asset or not by Corrolary 1, their motivation to hedge their mis-aligned
asset positions is the least among all agents. Then their trading motivation is mainly to gain
intermediation profit through buying low and selling high at the cost of searching, which will
be more affected by the level of market friction c1. They can also be regarded as the most
pure intermediator.
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3.4.2 Measures of liquidity
3.4.2.1 Trading volumes
To evaluate the effect of core-periphery interdealer network on the liquidity level of the
whole market, we use agent’s trading volumes and profit gained from providing interme-
diation service18 as measures of market liquidity. The intermediation service refers to the
activity that dealers buy certain amount of asset from someone and sell the same amount
of asset to the others inside the interdealer market. Correspondingly the trading volumes
include expected instantaneous gross trading volume G(δ), net trading volume N(δ) and
intermediation trading volume I(δ) of agents of utility type δ ∈ [0, 1], which are defined as
follows:
G(δ) = 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ + 2φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
N(δ) =
∣∣∣∣2φ1(δ)λ∗1(δ)∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ − 2φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
∣∣∣∣
I(δ) = G(δ)−N(δ) = 4∗min
{
φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′, φ0(δ)λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
}
where intermediation volume equals gross volume subtracts net volume and it represents the
magnitude of intermediation service that each agent provides to the whole market. Both gross
and intermediation trading volumes are manifestation of the ability of agents to reallocate
assets among investors.
Similar to the formation of core-periphery interdealer network, the levels of friction and
mis-alignment in the OTC market also determines which group of agents will make the main
contribution to the market liquidity. Here we give an quantitative example to compare gross,
18The “intermediation profit” can be regarded as proxy for bid-ask spread gained by each agent, which
comes from buying certain amount of asset at lower price and selling the same amount of asset at higher
price.
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Figure 3.5: Trading volumes in different markets
net and intermediation trading volumes in three markets with different levels of friction.
Figure 3.5 verifies the former conclusion that intermediate-type agents behave as the
most pure intermediator inside the market since they maintain the highest intermediation
trading volume in all three markets with different levels of friction. Also, in less frictional
market (c1 = 0.5, α = 0.05), the intermediate-type agents behave most active in the sense
that they contribute the highest gross trading volume. While as market becomes more and
more frictional, they behave relatively less and less active than the extreme-type agents.
Moreover, based on the magnitudes of trading volumes: as agent’s utility type becomes
more and more extreme (closer to δ = 1 (or δ = 1)), most part of his gross trading volume
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comes from hedging his own mis-aligned asset position; as agent’s utility type becomes more
and more intermediate (closer to δ = 1
2
), most part of his gross trading volume comes from
providing intermediation service to the whole market.
3.4.2.2 Centrality profit per trade
To measure the main transaction cost in an illiquid market, former literatures mainly use
intermediation profit per trade, which corresponds to dealers’ bid-ask spread per trade in
data. Since customers, as a whole, need to pay dealers bid-ask spreads to reallocate assets
among themselves, the magnitude of bid-ask spread per trade can measure how easy it is for
customers to buy from/sell to the dealers on average. Thus it can be used as one measure
of market liquidity/illiquidity.
Intermediation profit per trade for each utility type IPp(δ) is defined as:
IPp(δ) = P¯s(δ)− P¯b(δ) ∀δ ∈ (0, 1)
where
P¯s(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
4V (δ)+4V (δ′)
2
φ0(δ
′)dδ′∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ0
φ0(δ′)dδ′
and
P¯b(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
4V (δ)+4V (δ′)
2
φ1(δ
′)dδ′∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ1
φ1(δ′)dδ′
Intuitively, P¯s(δ) and P¯b(δ) are agent δ’s average selling price and average buying price
19.
In former literatures, Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014) documents the positive correlation be-
tween centrality and bid-ask spread per trade (i.e. centrality premium) in municipal bond
market while Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) documents the negative correlation
19Since agents with δ = 0 (δ = 1) either remain silent or search to sell (buy), they do not provide
intermediation service to the whole interdealer market. So we ignore these two utility types when discussing
intermediation profit per trade.
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Figure 3.6: Correlation between centrality and intermediation profit per trade
(i.e.centrality discount) in asset-backed-securities market. U¨slu¨ (2019) attributes the corre-
lation between centrality and bid-ask spread per trade to the level of market friction and
the sign of correlation is also consistent with our model. Here we also give a quantitative
example to analyze the sign of such correlation in three markets with different levels of fric-
tion and mis-alignment. In this example, we use weighted average meeting technology as a
measure of dealers’ centrality. Figure 3.6 shows that the intermediation profit per trade is
always minimized at δ = 1
2
due to our assumption of heterogeneous valuation among all the
dealers and the Nash bargaining process. Since there are different patterns of investment
in meeting technologies across different markets, “centrality premium” will appear in more
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frictional market and “centrality discount” will appear in less frictional market. In other
words, if the assumptions and the mechanism in our model are correct, we may conclude
that: the core dealers in ABS market should on average have the liquidity needs closest to
the social average level, and the core dealers in municipal bond market should on average
have either the highest or the lowest liquidity needs among all the dealers.
3.5 Aggregate liquidity shock
We consider the aggregate liquidity shock in similar form as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen
(2007). In their paper, upon each aggregate liquidity shock, a randomly chosen fraction of
agents will suffer a sudden jump of their current utility types from high state to low state.
The aggregate liquidity shock is expected to occur following a Poisson process, which is newly
added into the HJB equations of value functions. Yet in our model, since the distribution
of utility type fδ(δ) has continuous support [0, 1], we consider the aggregate liquidity shock
in a new form that, for each agent whose utility type is δ ∈ [1
2
, 1], his utility type shifts to
δ − 1
2
, i.e. 1
2
lower than his current type, with probability pi. The shifts of utility types are
independent among all the agents in δ ∈ [1
2
, 1], thus we can apply the Law of Large Numbers.
Figure 3.7 gives an example of aggregate liquidity shock with pi = 0.5.
Additionally we maintain the self-refinancing channel as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Ped-
ersen (2007) so that, for each agent, the distribution of new utility type in response to
idiosyncratic liquidity shock is assumed to be always uniform on [0, 1] and the distribu-
tion of utility type can recover to the pre-shock scenario through this channel. Since this
aggregate shock is not a permanent one, it is more reasonable to assume that agents will
expect a Poisson arrival of such aggregate liquidity shock in the future, thus generating the
“permanent price effect”20.
20In our paper, the “permanent price effect” refers to the effect of expectation on future aggregate liquidity
shock on the social (purchase/sale) price level. If agents expect that there is a high probability that there will
be an aggregate liquidity shock in next period, the social valuation on the asset will decrease thus making
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Figure 3.7: Measures of agents before and after the aggregate liquidity shock
Assuming t is the length of time after the most recent aggregate liquidity shock, we obtain
the new HJB equations for agents indirectly affected δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) and agents directly affected
δ ∈ [1
2
, 1]:
the social (purchase/sale) price decrease.
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For ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
],
4V˙ (δ, t) = r4V (δ, t)− δ + c1λ∗12(δ, t)− c1λ∗02(δ, t)− α
∫ 1
0
(4V (δ′, t)−4V (δ, t))dδ′
− λ∗1(δ, t)
∫ 1
0
λ∗0(δ
′, t)
Λ0,t
(4V (δ′, t)−4V (δ, t))φ0(δ′, t)dδ′
+ λ∗0(δ, t)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′, t)
Λ1,t
(4V (δ, t)−4V (δ′, t))φ1(δ′, t)dδ′
− η(4V (δ, 0)−4V (δ, t))
For ∀δ ∈ [1
2
, 1],
4V˙ (δ, t) = r4V (δ, t)− δ + c1λ∗12(δ, t)− c1λ∗02(δ, t)− α
∫ 1
0
(4V (δ′, t)−4V (δ, t))dδ′
− λ∗1(δ, t)
∫ 1
0
λ∗0(δ
′, t)
Λ0,t
(4V (δ′, t)−4V (δ, t))φ0(δ′, t)dδ′
+ λ∗0(δ, t)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′, t)
Λ1,t
(4V (δ, t)−4V (δ′, t))φ1(δ′, t)dδ′
− η [pi(4V (δ − 0.5, 0)−4V (δ, t)) + (1− pi)(4V (δ, 0)−4V (δ, t))]
where η is the expected Poisson intensity of future aggregate liquidity shock.
The evolution equation and market clear condition for densities φ1(δ, t) and φ0(δ, t) after
the aggregate liquidity shock are as follows:
For ∀t > 0 and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1],
φ˙1(δ, t) = −αφ1(δ, t) + α
2
fˆδ(δ)− 2φ1(δ, t)λ∗1(δ, t)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′, t)
Λ0,t
φ0(δ
′, t)dδ′
+2φ0(δ, t)λ
∗
0(δ, t)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′, t)
Λ1,t
φ1(δ
′, t)dδ′
φ˙0(δ, t) = −αφ0(δ, t) + α
2
fˆδ(δ) + 2φ1(δ, t)λ
∗
1(δ, t)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′, t)
Λ0,t
φ0(δ
′, t)dδ′
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−2φ0(δ, t)λ∗0(δ, t)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′, t)
Λ1,t
φ1(δ
′, t)dδ′
where fˆδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] and
φ0(δ, t) + φ1(δ, t) = fδ(δ, t)
∫ 1
0
φ0(δ, t)dδ =
∫ 1
0
φ1(δ, t)dδ =
1
2
Figure 3.8 and 3.9 show the trends of market average purchase and sale prices and
different measures of market liquidity before and after the aggregate liquidity shock.
We can see both the average purchase and sale prices will drop hugely right after the
unexpected aggregate liquidity shock and then recover up. Due to agent’s expectation on
future aggregate liquidity shock, the new stationary equilibrium price levels will be perma-
nently shifted down relative to the original ones. For different measures of market liquidity,
there are immediate increases in market gross trading volume and intermediation trading
volume, and immediate decrease in average bid-ask spread per trade right after the aggregate
liquidity shock. Then as time goes by, the former two measures will go down until reaching a
new lower-level stationary equilibrium. The reason for the immediate increases may be, right
after the start of crisis, agents with their utility types suddenly shifted down will have strong
incentives to sell the asset thus making all the agents to reallocate the fixed supply of asset
among themselves. This will hugely increase the total trading volume inside the market.
Then both trading volumes will go down since those agents will reach better-aligned asset
positions. Eventually, due to expectation on future aggregate liquidity shock, the market
liquidity measured by both trading volumes will also be permanently shifted down in the
new stationary equilibrium, where agents become more conservative to search to trade with
others. For average intermediation profit per trade, the reason for the immediate decrease
is the decline in the average valuation among all dealers in the market. Although it mainly
measures the average trading cost of customers, it does not necessarily mean the immediate
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Figure 3.8: Market average prices with α = 0.25, c1 = 1 and η = 0.1
increase in market liquidity since dealers may trade off between lower average intermediation
profit per trade and higher trading delay, which is beyond the discussion of this paper.
Policy choice targeting at different groups of dealers
We define the rescue policies as the actions taken by the monetary authority, to make
the directly affected dealers’ liquidity needs recover to their pre-shock levels, through, for
example, directly injecting liquidity into the targeted dealers. Due to limited resources,
rescue policies usually target on specific group of dealers with priority, that is, firstly inject
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Figure 3.9: Measures of market liquidity with α = 0.25, c1 = 1 and η = 0.1
liquidity into the specific group of dealers.
We consider two policy choices separately targeting at both asset owners and nonowners
with δ ∈ [1
2
, 3
4
] (Policy 1) and both asset owners and nonowners with δ ∈ [3
4
, 1] (Policy 2).
By the changes in different measures of market liquidity under these two policies, we can
determine which group of dealers are more important in the sense that maintaining their
pre-shock utility types more helps maintaining the market liquidity.
Figure 3.10 shows the effects of different policies (“no policy”, “Policy 1” and “Policy
2”) in response to unexpected aggregate liquidity shock, under different levels of market
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Figure 3.10: Net changes in new stationary equilibrium
(net changes are expressed as a percentage of the corresponding values in the old equilibrium)
friction. The effect is measured by changes in different measures of market liquidity in the
new stationary equilibrium as a percentage of the initial stationary equilibrium. Figure 3.11
instead focuses on the dynamic process and shows the effects on the cumulative change in
market liquidity before achieving the new stationary equilibrium.
By Figure 3.10 and 3.11, Policy 2 uniformly dominates Policy 1 and “no policy response”
across different measures of market liquidity and different levels of market friction. Intu-
itively, higher-type agents contribute more to maintaining the market liquidity. While the
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(cumulative changes are expressed as a percentage of the corresponding values in the old
equilibrium)
key implication of the model is, such higher-type agents may become core dealers in more
frictional market and become periphery dealers in less frictional market. Then we conclude
that the core dealers may not always be the most important ones that should be given pri-
ority to receive liquidity after the aggregate liquidity shock. To better maintain the level of
market liquidity, policy makers need to firstly identify the market environment (either more
frictional or less frictional), and attach more importance to the core dealers in market with
higher level of friction and attach more importance to periphery dealers in market with lower
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level of friction.
3.6 Efficiency analysis
3.6.1 Social optimal choice of meeting technologies
As in the case of frictionless market, we use the sum of discounted instantaneous utility
flows to measure the positive part of social welfare. The difference is, in frictional market,
all agents are burdened with instantaneous investment costs of meeting technologies. In this
section, we assume the investment cost is in quadratic form.
W =
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
∫ 1
0
δφ1(δ)dδdt−
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
∫ 1
0
c1λ
∗
1
2(δ)φ1(δ)dδdt
−
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
∫ 1
0
c1λ
∗
0
2(δ)φ0(δ)dδdt
=
1
r
(∫ 1
0
δφ1(δ)dδ −
∫ 1
0
c1λ
∗
1
2(δ)φ1(δ)dδ −
∫ 1
0
c1λ
∗
0
2(δ)φ0(δ)dδ
)
If we specifically focus on symmetric equilibria, the last two terms are equal, then social
welfare is simplified to be:
W =
1
r
(∫ 1
0
δφ1(δ)dδ − 2
∫ 1
0
c1λ
∗
1
2(δ)φ1(δ)dδ
)
Then we discuss in fixed market environment (characterized by fixed r, c1 and α) and
given the uniform distribution of utility type fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], what is the social optimal
assignment of meeting technology to asset owners and nonowners of different utility types
and how it is different from the competitive equilibrium one that optimally chosen by the
agents. For simplicity, we only focus on symmetric assignment between asset owners and
nonowners and we regard the density of asset owners φS1 (δ) as the second control variable
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(function) that connected with λS∗1 (δ) through the equilibrium constraint (3.17) below.
21
Define the following normed linear spaces: ΛS1 = {λS1 (δ) : λS1 (δ) ∈ C1[0, 1];λS1 (δ) ≥
0 and λS
′
1 (δ) ≤ 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]},22 ΦS1 = {φS1 (δ) : φS1 (δ) ∈ C1[0, 1]; 0 ≤ φS1 (δ) ≤ 1 and φS1 ′(δ) ≥
0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]; ∫ 1
0
φS1 (δ)dδ =
1
2
}, all with the norm ‖f‖ = max
0≤δ≤1
|f(δ)|. The simplified social
planner problem [SP ] is:
max
λS1 (δ)∈ΛS1,φS1 (δ)∈ΦS1
W =
∫ 1
0
(δ − 2c1λS1 2(δ))φS1 (δ)dδ
s.t.
φS1 (δ) =
1
1 +
α
2
+2λS1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS1 (δ
′)
Λ1
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
α
2
+2λS1 (1−δ)
∫ δ
0
λS1 (δ
′)
Λ1
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.17)
and
Λ1 = 2
∫ 1
0
λS1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
the constraint (3.17) is by the symmetry of λS1 (δ) and λ
S
0 (δ) with respect to δ =
1
2
, i.e.
λS0 (δ) = λ
S
1 (1− δ),∀δ ∈ [0, 1].
The key to explicitly solve the above social planner problem is to firstly obtain Proposi-
tion 6 that guarantees λS1
∗
(δ) ≡ 0 on the higher half of utility space [1
2
, 1].
Proposition 6 If λS∗1 (δ) and φ
S∗
1 (δ) solve the social planner problem [SP ], λ
S∗
1 (δ) ≡ 0
for ∀δ ∈ [1
2
, 1]. Proof is in Appendix 3.A.7.
21The original social planner problem has λS∗1 (δ) as its unique control variable. Given any λ
S∗
1 (δ), by the
evolution equation of densities at stationary equilibrium, we can obtain one corresponding density function
φS1 (δ) through fixed point convergence.
22It is intuitive that the social optimal meeting technology of asset owners λS1 (δ) is a decreasing function.
Suppose the social optimal function λS1
∗
(δ) has two points δ1 < δ2 with λ
S
1
∗
(δ1) < λ
S
1
∗
(δ2), then we can
switch the meeting technologies of these two agents without increasing the total investment cost. Then the
agent with lower utility type will be assigned with higher meeting technology thus having more oppotunities
to sell his asset. Since lower-type asset owners are more likely to be mis-aligned agents, the above switching
help improve the alignment of the whole market. Or for simplicity, we can just guess and verify later that
the social optimal λS1
∗
(δ) is a decreasing function on [0, 1].
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The intuition behind Proposition 6 is, it is optimal to make only mis-aligned agents
to actively search in the market to trade with others if the searching is not free and is
in quadratic form. The unique positive part
∫ 1
0
δφS1 (δ)dδ in social objective function is
maximized at φS1 (δ) ≡ fδ(δ) ≡ 1 on [12 , 1] and zero elsewhere, which is also the frictionless
case in Walrasian market. Then the level of social objective function is consistent with the
magnitude of alignment of the whole market (or negatively correlated with the mis-alignment
of the whole market). For already-well-aligned agents, it is optimal to make them silent and
only assign positive meeting technologies to those mis-aligned agents.
By Proposition 6, we can explicitly obtain the expression of the social optimal meeting
technology (details are in Appendix 3.A.9):
λS∗1 (δ) =

−2c1α2+
√
4c21α
4+4c1α2(
1
2
−δ)
2c1α
δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
0 δ ∈ [1
2
, 1].
(3.18)
We also give a quantitative example with r = 0.05, α = 0.1, c1 = 1 to compare the social
optimal and competitive equilibrium meeting technologies and densities for both asset owners
and nonowners. The weighted average meeting technology for asset owners (or nonowners)
is ΛC = 0.0766 in competitive equilibrium and ΛS = 0.0376 in social optimal solution,
which means the latter assignment costs less and is more efficient. The social welfare is
WC = 6.5764 in competitive equilibrium, which is lower than that of social optimal solution
W S = 6.7820.
Figure 3.12 compares the symmetric social optimal and competitive equilibrium meeting
technologies. The solution λS∗1 (δ) numerically searched out by MatLab exactly follows the
explicit solution (3.18). Intuitively, more searching resources (meeting technologies) are
assigned to extremely mis-aligned agents, for example, λS∗1 (0) > λ
∗
1(0). Figure 3.13 compares
the densities generated by competitive equilibrium and social optimal assignment of meeting
technologies. We can see, the densities generated by social optimal assignment are closer to
the Walrasian case which is the most efficient one.
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Figure 3.12: Competitive equilibrium and social optimal meeting technologies
Then Figure 3.14 shows that in social optimal solution, for each utility type, the ex-
pected instantaneous gross trading volume is equal to the net trading volume, which in-
tuitively shows that the intermediation trading volume is constantly zero across all utility
types. As a result, in social optimal solution, the profit per trade is essentially the expected
revenue(cost) per trade for asset owners(non-owners) with utility type lower(higher) than 1
2
,
the magnitudes of which are much larger than that of intermediation profit in competitive
equilibrium solution (the right y axis in sub-figure “profit per trade(c1 = 1, α = 0.1)). The
social optimal gross trading volume for the whole market is 1.54 compared with that of the
competitive equilibrium solution which is 2.33. This possibly implies that individual traders
do not internalize the social externality into their decisions and there exist large part(in this
case, approximately 34%) of inefficient tradings in the sense that they do not contribute to
the well-alignment of target asset in the market.
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Figure 3.13: Competitive equilibrium and social optimal densities
3.6.2 Robustness of the optimality of “no intermediation”
Section 3.6.1 essentially concludes that in social optimal solution, there is “no intermedi-
ation” in interdealer market, since no agent will be assigned positive meeting technologies
both when being asset owner and when being asset nonowner. To check the robustness, we
give Proposition 7 below to show which forms of searching cost function will guarantee the
optimality of “no intermediation”.
142
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
δ
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
G(δ)
gross vol(c 1=1,α=0.1)
Social Optimal
Competitive Equilibrium
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
δ
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
N(δ)
net vol(c1=1,α=0.1)
Social Optimal
Competitive Equilibrium
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
δ
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
I(δ)
intermediation vol(c 1=1,α=0.1)
Social Optimal
Competitive Equilibrium
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
δ
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Proper(δ)
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
IPper(δ)
profit per trade(c 1=1,α=0.1)
Social Optimal
Competitive Equilibrium
Figure 3.14: Liquidity measures between social optimal and competitive equilibrium solu-
tions
Proposition 7 For any cost function C(λ) that satisfies the following condition2324
C ′(λ)
 ≥ 0 δ = 0;> 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, λub]. (3.19)
the social optimal meeting technology λS∗1 (δ) ≡ 0 for ∀δ ∈ [12 , 1]. Proof is in Appendix 3.A.8.
Condition (3.19) applies for most cost functions including quadratic form C(λ) = c1λ
2,
linear form C(λ) = c1λ, concave form C(λ) = c1λ
p p ∈ (0, 1) and etc, where the coefficient
c1 > 0. Then we conclude that the optimality of “no intermediation” is robust to the cost
function form.
The key to this result is our assumption that agents are allowed to and also willing
23In condition (3.19), C ′(0) ≥ 0 includes the case that C ′(0) = +∞
24λub is the upper bound of meeting technology for either asset owners or nonowners. If there is no upper
bound, it is equal that λub = +∞.
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to shift to new meeting technologies in response to idiosyncratic liquidity shock through
a uniform policy rule. Compared with Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2017b), in their
paper, each agent is endowed with/chooses a certain level of meeting technology, which,
once chosen, cannot be changed forever. This can equally be regarded as the case that the
adjustment cost of meeting technology is infinity. So there is no one-to-one mapping from
agent’s utility type to their meeting technology. Meanwhile, with some other reasonable
assumptions, the main trading incentive comes from the difference in meeting technologies
between every two matched agents, and the agents with more advanced meeting technologies
will automatically play the role of intermediator. While in our paper, agents are free to adjust
their meeting technologies without any adjustment cost, then agents of each specific utility
type will either purely search to sell or purely search to buy at every time point. So the
meaning of intermediation in our paper is a little bit different from that in Farboodi, Jarosch,
and Shimer (2017b).
Next we will show, for the general cost function C(λ) that satisfies the condition in Propo-
sition 7, how to obtain the explicit expression of λS∗1 (δ). By Proposition 7 and substituting
λS∗1 (δ) ≡ 0,∀δ ∈ [12 , 1] into the equilibrium constraint to obtain the expression of φS1 (δ), we
can get the reduced-form social planner problem [RP ]:
max
λS1 (δ)∈ΛS1
W ∗(λS1 (δ)) =
∫ 1
2
0
(δ − 2C(λS1 (δ)))
1
1 +
α
2
+λS1 (δ)
α
2
dδ +
∫ 1
1
2
δ
1
1 +
α
2
α
2
+λS1 (1−δ)
dδ
=
∫ 1
2
0
(−αC(λS1 (δ)) + α2 + (1− δ)λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
)
dδ
=
∫ 1
2
0
fC(λS1 (δ), δ)dδ
s.t.
K 1
2
=
∫ 1
2
0
α
2
λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
dδ ≤ Λ (3.20)
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where in (3.20), Λ is the restricted maximum meeting technology of the whole market.25
By Hamiltonian approach,
L(δ, λS1 (δ)) = H(δ,Kδ) + µ(Λ−K 1
2
)
=
−αC(λS1 (δ)) + α2 + (1− δ)λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
+mδ
α
2
λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
+ µ(Λ−K 1
2
)
where
Kδ =
∫ δ
0
α
2
λS1 (δ
′)
α + λS1 (δ
′)
dδ′ and K˙δ =
α
2
λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
The necessary conditions for λS1
∗
(δ) : [0, 1
2
)→ R+ to be optimal are:
m˙δ = −∂H(δ,Kδ)
∂Kδ
= 0
m¯ = m 1
2
=

0 if µ = 0;
−∂W ∗(λS1 (δ))
∂K 1
2
if µ > 0.
For simplicity, we consider the case Λ = λub, i.e. budget constraint is always not binding,
then µ = 0 and m¯ = 0. Then we have:
∂L(δ, λS1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
=
∂
∂λS1 (δ)
(−αC(λS1 (δ)) + α2 + (1− δ)λS1 (δ)
α + λS1 (δ)
)
=
α
2
− αδ + αC(λS1 (δ))− α(α + λS1 (δ))C ′(λS1 (δ))
(α + λS1 (δ))
2
25For simplicity, usually we consider the case that Λ is equal to the upper bound of λ1(δ), λ
ub, i.e. budget
constraint (3.20) is always not binding, then the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers satisfy µ = 0 and
m¯ = 0.
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and
∂2L(δ, λS1 (δ))
∂λS1
2
(δ)
=
−αC ′′(λS1 (δ))(α + λS1 (δ))2
(α + λS1 (δ))
3
− (α− 2αδ + 2αC(λ
S
1 (δ))− 2α(α + λS1 (δ))C ′(λS1 (δ)))
(α + λS1 (δ))
3
Then for each δ ∈ [0, 1
2
), the optimal λS1
∗
(δ) needs to satisfy one of the following condi-
tions:
1.
∂L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
|λS1 (δ)=λS1 ∗(δ) = 0 and
∂2L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1
2
(δ)
|λS1 (δ)=λS1 ∗(δ) ≤ 0, then 0 < λS1
∗
(δ) < λub;
2.
∂L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
> 0 for ∀λ1(δ) ∈ [0, λub], then λS1 ∗(δ) = λub;
3.
∂L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
< 0 for ∀λ1(δ) ∈ [0, λub], then λS1 ∗(δ) = 0;
4. For every δ ∈ [0, 1
2
), @λS1 (δ) ∈ [0, λub] s.t. ∂L(δ,λ
S
1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
= 0 and
∂2L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1
2
(δ)
≤ 0, and
W (λS1 (δ) ≡ 0) > W (λS1 (δ) ≡ λub), then λS1 ∗(δ) ≡ 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 12);
5. For every δ ∈ [0, 1
2
), @λS1 (δ) ∈ [0, λub] s.t. ∂L(δ,λ
S
1 (δ))
∂λS1 (δ)
= 0 and
∂2L(δ,λS1 (δ))
∂λS1
2
(δ)
≤ 0, and
W (λS1 (δ) ≡ 0) < W (λS1 (δ) ≡ λub), then λS1 ∗(δ) ≡ λub ∀δ ∈ [0, 12).
In Appendix 3.A.9, we specifically solve the explicit expressions of λS∗1 (δ) with cost func-
tions of quadratic forms C(λ) = c1λ
2 and C(λ) = c2λ
2 + c3λ(c2 < 0, c3 > 0), linear form
C(λ) = c1λ and concave form C(λ) = c1λ
p p ∈ (0, 1), where in all cases c1 > 0.
3.6.3 Unidimentional policy measure with linear investment cost
In this section, we specifically focus on the case of linear cost function C(λ) = c1λ, which
generates the unidimentional policy measure. In this case, social planner only needs to iden-
tify the marginal asset-owner utility type, and the policy will be to assign all the asset owners
with utility types lower than the marginal one with the most advanced meeting technology
λub and make all the asset owners with utility types larger than the marginal one silent in the
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market. Symmetrically, we can obtain the marginal asset-nonowner utility type accordingly
and assign all asset nonowners with utility types larger than this marginal type with the
most advanced meeting technology and make those lower than this marginal type silent.
Proposition 8 In social planner problem, when C(λ) = c1λ (c1 > 0), the social opti-
mal meeting technology of asset owner λS1
∗
(δ) satisfies:
1. If c1α <
1
2
,
λS1
∗
(δ) =
 λub if δ ≤ δ∗1;0 if δ > δ∗1.
where δ∗1 =
1
2
− c1α is the marginal asset-owner utility type;
2. If c1α ≥ 12 ,
λS1
∗
(δ) ≡ 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
Details are in Appendix 3.A.9.
Finally we give a quantitative example to compare the competitive equilibrium and the
social optimal solutions. In the example, we set r = 0.05, c1 = 0.05, α = 0.35, λ
ub = 1.4 and
obtain the competitive equilibrium welfare is 6.2031 and the social optimal welfare is 6.8953.
Figure 3.15 compares the meeting technologies. It is straight forward to see that there is no
intermediation in the social optimal solution, since the optimal meeting technologies do not
overlap at the upper bound.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a search-and-bargain model to evaluate the policy responses in different
OTC market environments in response to a certain form of aggregate liquidity shock, which
affects dealers’ valuation on the target asset. In the model setup, dealers are free to choose
and change their optimal meeting technology based on their characteristics: asset position
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Figure 3.15: Social optimal and competitive equilibrium meeting technologies for linear cost
(λub = 1.4)
and liquidity need, which is new to the current literature. The model can generate the core-
periphery interdealer network which is one of the common stylized facts of OTC markets that
documented in former papers. We find that, dealers of intermediate utility types become the
core dealers in less frictional market where meeting technology is relatively cheap and fre-
quency of idiosyncratic liquidity shock is relatively low; while in the opposite more frictional
market environment, dealers with extreme utility types will become the core ones and dealers
with intermediate utility types will behave much less active than before. And these different
relationships between dealers’ liquidity needs and optimal meeting technologies have differ-
ent potential implications for policy choice in response to the aggregate liquidity shock. In
more frictional market, monetary authority with limited funding should firstly inject liquid-
ity into the core dealers; while in less frictional market, monetary authority should firstly
inject liquidity into the periphery ones. We also conclude that in the social optimal assign-
ment of meeting technologies among all dealers, there is no intermediation in the sense that
no dealer will be assigned positive meeting technologies both when being asset owner and
when being asset nonowner. Specifically, we discuss the case of linear cost function, which
generates the unidimentional policy measure.
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In this paper, we implicitly assume that there is perfect information in the market since
every agent has rational expectation on the distribution of utility types. As a result, the
main searching motive in our model is to trade with others to either gain intermediation
profit or hedge mis-aligned asset position. While the two most significant characteristics
of OTC market are accessibility/searching friction and imperfect information. The future
research direction may be to incorporate private information into the model and thus gen-
erates alternative searching motive to learn (e.g. the quality of target asset or the matched
counterparty’s expected valuation) from trading.
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Appendix 3.A Appendix of Chapter 3
3.A.1 Proposition 1
We use guess and verify approach to prove the monotonicity of reservation value function
4V (δ). Suppose 4V (δ) is strictly increasing, then the subtraction “(3.1) minus (3.2)” will
reduce to (3.5):
r4V (δ) = δ + C(λ∗0(δ))− C(λ∗1(δ)) + α
∫ 1
0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))dFδ(δ′)
+λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′ − λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
and expressions of individual and aggregate levels of optimal meeting technologies will reduce
to (3.6)-(3.8). By (3.5)-(3.8), we obtain that for ∀δ
(4V (δ))2
(
a(δ)2 − b(δ)2
4c1
)
+4V (δ)
(
r + α +
B(δ)b(δ)− A(δ)a(δ)
2c1
)
− δ − αE[4V ]− B(δ)
2 − A(δ)2
4c1
= 0 (3.21)
with the notations as:
A(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
4V (δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
B(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
4V (δ′)φ0(δ′)dδ′
a(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
b(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ (3.22)
E[4V ] =
∫ 1
0
4V (δ′)fδ(δ′)dδ′ (3.23)
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Then denote LHS of equation (3.21) as F , by Implicit Function Theorem, we verify that
d4V (δ)
dδ
= − ∂F/∂δ
∂F/∂4V (δ) =
1
r + α + λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ)
> 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
By first order conditions (3.3)(3.4), it is trival that
λ∗1(1) = λ
∗
0(0) = 0 (3.24)
and by plugging the first order conditions into the HJB equations, the optimal meeting
technology functions λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) satisfy
(α + r)V1(δ) = δ + c1λ
∗
1
2(δ) + αE[V1(δ)] (3.25)
(α + r)V0(δ) = c1λ
∗
0
2(δ) + αE[V0(δ)] (3.26)
where the expectation E[·] is using the symmetric PDF fδ(δ),
(3.25)-(3.26) =⇒
(α + r)4V (δ) = δ + c1λ∗12(δ)− c1λ∗02(δ) + αE[4V (δ)] (3.27)
apply E[·] on both sides =⇒
(α+ r)E[4V (δ)] = E[δ] + c1
(∫ 1
0
λ∗1
2(δ)fδ(δ)dδ −
∫ 1
0
λ∗0
2(δ)fδ(δ)dδ
)
+ αE[4V (δ)] (3.28)
Later by Corrollary 1, we will prove that if distribution of utility type (fδ(δ)) is symmetric
with respect to δ = 1
2
, then the equilibrium optimal meeting technology functions λ∗1(δ) and
λ∗0(δ) are symmetric to each other with respect to δ =
1
2
, i.e. λ∗0(δ) = λ
∗
1(1−δ) for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1].
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Here we just take this conclusion as given and then we can get:
∫ 1
0
λ∗1
2(δ)fδ(δ)dδ =
∫ 1
0
λ∗0
2(δ)fδ(δ)dδ
Together with (3.28), we obtain:
E[4V (δ)] = E(δ)
r
> 0
Then by (3.24)(3.27),
(α + r)4V (0) = c1λ∗12(0) + αE[4V (δ)] > 0
Together with d4V (δ)
dδ
> 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
4V (δ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
By (3.6)(3.7), we obtain:
dλ∗1(δ)
dδ
=
−d4V (δ)
dδ
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
2c1
< 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
dλ∗0(δ)
dδ
=
d4V (δ)
dδ
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
2c1
> 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
3.A.2 Proposition 2
Based on properties of the competitive equilibrium components 4V (δ), λ∗1(δ) and φ1(δ),
under fδ(δ) ≡ 1, define the following normed linear spaces: 4VS = {4V (δ) : 4V (δ) ∈
C1[0, 1];4V (δ) ≥ 0 and 4V ′(δ) > 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1];E(4V (δ)) = ∫ 1
0
4V (δ)dδ = 1
2r
}, ΛS1 =
{λ∗1(δ) : λ∗1(δ) ∈ C1[0, 1];λ∗1(δ) ≥ 0 and λ∗′1 (δ) < 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]}, ΦS1 = {φ1(δ) : φ1(δ) ∈
C1[0, 1]; 0 ≤ φ1(δ) ≤ 1 and φ′1(δ) > 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1];
∫ 1
0
φ1(δ)dδ =
1
2
}, all with the norm ‖f‖ =
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max
0≤δ≤1
|f(δ)|.
Vector of stationary equilibrium components (4V (δ) λ∗1(δ) λ∗0(δ) φ1(δ) φ0(δ))T , by
symmetry between λ∗1(δ) and λ
∗
0(δ) and symmetry between φ1(δ) and φ0(δ), is a fixed point
of the following transformation T : 4VS × ΛS1 × ΦS1 −→ 4VS × ΛS1 × ΦS1:26
T

4V (δ)
λ∗1(δ)
φ1(δ)
 =

T1(4V (δ))
T2(λ
∗
1(δ))
T3(φ1(δ))

where
T1(4V (δ)) =
δ + c1λ
∗
0
2(δ)− c1λ∗12(δ) + α
∫ 1
0
4V (δ′)dFδ(δ′)
r + α + λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ0
φ0(δ′)dδ′ + λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ1
φ1(δ′)dδ′
+
λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
4V (δ′)φ0(δ′)dδ′ + λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
4V (δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
r + α + λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ′)
Λ0
φ0(δ′)dδ′ + λ∗0(δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)
Λ1
φ1(δ′)dδ′
=
1
α + r
(
δ + c1λ
∗
1
2(δ)− c1λ∗12(1− δ) +
α
2r
)
T2(λ
∗
1(δ)) =
1
2c1
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
4V (δ′)φ0(δ′)dδ′
=
1
2c1
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (1− δ′)−4V (δ))φ1(δ′)dδ′
s.t. Λ1 = 2
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
26For each “component mapping” (T1 − T3), we assume all the other equilibrium components are given
and may/may not be the corresponding “fixed points”.
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T3(φ1(δ)) =
α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
2α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ
∗
1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
Use (4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ)) as notations of fixed points of 4V (δ), λ∗1(δ) and φ1(δ).
(1) Given fixed point λ∗1(δ), by transformation T1,
4V (δ) = 1
α+r
(
δ + c1λ∗1
2
(δ)− c1λ∗1
2
(1− δ) + α
2r
)
is a fixed point of 4V (δ).
(2) Given fixed points 4V (δ) and φ1(δ), plug them into transformation T2 which is trivally
continuous, we can prove this T2 works on normed linear space ΛS1 which is nonempty
(trivally), convex and compact.
Convexity
For ∀λ1∗1 (δ), λ2∗1 (δ) ∈ ΛS1 and ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), define the new function λˆ(δ) = λ∗λ1∗1 (δ)+(1−λ)∗
λ2∗1 (δ), it is trival that λˆ(δ) ∈ C1[0, 1], λˆ(δ) ≥ 0 and λˆ′(δ) = λ∗λ1∗1 ′(δ)+ (1−λ)∗λ2∗1 ′(δ) < 0.
So λˆ(δ) ∈ ΛS1 for ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
Boundedness
For ∀λ∗1(δ) ∈ ΛS1,
T2(λ
∗
1(δ)) =
1
2c1
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (1− δ′)−4V (δ))φ1(δ′)dδ′
≤ (4V (1)−4V (0)) 1
2c1
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
≤ (4V (1)−4V (0)) 1
2c1
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
=
(4V (1)−4V (0))
2c1
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By Proposition 1, ∀4V (δ) ∈ 4VS is strictly increasing on [0, 1]. We have,
0 < 4V (1)−4V (0) = 1− 2c1λ
∗
1
2(0)
α + r
<
1
α + r
(3.29)
then
T2(λ
∗
1(δ)) <
1
2c1(α + r)
Equicontinuity
Firstly we need to prove the boundedness of d4V (δ)
dδ
for ∀4V (δ) ∈ 4VS.
d4V (δ)
dδ
=
1
r + α + λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ)
where 0 ≤ a(δ) = ∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ ≤ 1
2
and 0 ≤ b(δ) = ∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ ≤ 1
2
.
Also by (3.29), 0 < λ∗1(0) = max
δ∈[0,1]
λ∗1(δ) <
1√
2c1
, then we get
1
r + α + 1√
2c1
<
d4V (δ)
dδ
<
1
r + α
= BdV
Then for ∀λ∗1(δ) ∈ ΛS1 and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]: given ∀ > 0, we can always choose small enough
4ˆ = 2c1
BdV
> 0, such that, by (3.6)-(3.8),
|λ∗1(δ + 4ˆ)− λ∗1(δ)| =
∣∣∣∣∣−4ˆ2c1 d4V (δ)dδ
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ + o(4ˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ∗ 12c1 2c1BdV BdV 12 = .
Since 4ˆ does not relate to specific value of δ, then any sequence of functions in normed linear
space ΛS1 is uniform equicontinuous on [0, 1]. Based on boundedness and equicontinuity
above, and refer to Arzela¨-Ascoli theorem, we prove the continuous transformation T2, under
given fixed points 4V (δ) and φ1(δ), maps ΛS1 to ΛS1, where the normed linear space ΛS1
is nonempty, convex and compact. By Schauder’s fixed point theorem, given fixed points
4V (δ) and φ1(δ), there exists fixed point λ∗1(δ) of λ∗1(δ).
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(3) Given fixed points λ∗1(δ) and 4V (δ), plug λ∗1(δ) into transformation T3 which is trivally
continuous, we can prove this T3 works on normed linear space ΦS1 which is nonempty
(trivally), convex and compact.
Convexity
For ∀φ11(δ), φ21(δ) ∈ ΦS1 and ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), define the new function φˆ(δ) = λ ∗ φ11(δ) +
(1 − λ) ∗ φ21(δ), it is trival that φˆ(δ) ∈ C1[0, 1], 0 ≤ φˆ(δ) ≤ λ + 1 − λ = 1 and φˆ′(δ) =
λ ∗ φ11′(δ) + (1− λ) ∗ φ21′(δ) > 0. So φˆ(δ) ∈ ΦS1 for ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
Boundedness
By definition of normed linear space ΦS1, it is trival that ΦS1 is bounded.
Equicontinuity
We already proved the boundedness of d4V (δ)
dδ
and thus the boundedness of λ∗1
′
(δ) =
dλ∗1(δ)
dδ
=
−1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′. Next we need to prove the boundedness of dφ1(δ)
dδ
.
dφ1(δ)
dδ
=
d
dδ
[
α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
2α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ
∗
1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
]
=
[
λ∗1(1−δ)λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ1
− λ∗1′(1− δ)a(δ)
] [
α
2
+ 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
]
(α + 2λ∗1(1− δ)a(δ) + 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ))2
−
[
λ∗1
′(δ)b(δ)− λ∗1(1−δ)λ∗1(δ)φ1(1−δ)
Λ1
] [
α
2
+ 2λ∗1(1− δ)a(δ)
]
(α + 2λ∗1(1− δ)a(δ) + 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ))2
We already proved the boundedness of λ∗1(δ), λ
∗
1
′(δ), a(δ), b(δ), and ∃ˆ > 0 s.t. ˆ ≤ Λ1 ≤
2λ∗1(0), then if we plug in the given fixed points λ
∗
1(δ) and 4V (δ) into the above equation,
we will obtain the boundedness of dφ1(δ)
dδ
, denote max
δ∈[0,1]
|dφ1(δ)
dδ
| = Bdφ1 .
Then for ∀φ1(δ) ∈ ΦS1 and ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]: given ∀ > 0, we can always choose small enough
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4ˆ = 
2Bdφ1
> 0, such that,
|φ1(δ + 4ˆ)− φ1(δ)| =
∣∣∣∣dφ1(δ)dδ 4ˆ+ o(|4ˆ|)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ∗ 4ˆ ∗ ∣∣∣∣dφ1(δ)dδ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 ∗ 2Bdφ1 ∗Bdφ1 = .
Since 4ˆ does not relate to specific value of δ, then any sequence of functions in normed linear
space ΦS1 is uniform equicontinuous on [0, 1]. Based on boundedness and equicontinuity
above, and refer to Arzela¨-Ascoli theorem, we prove the continuous transformation T3, under
given fixed points λ∗1(δ) and 4V (δ), maps ΦS1 to ΦS1, where the normed linear space ΦS1 is
nonempty, convex and compact. By Schauder’s fixed point theorem, given fixed points λ∗1(δ)
and 4V (δ), there exists fixed point φ1(δ) of φ1(δ).
By (1)-(3) above, we prove that there exists fixed points 4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ) for the trans-
formation T : 4VS × ΛS1 × ΦS1 −→ 4VS × ΛS1 × ΦS1 defined above, given any parameters
r > 0, α > 0 and c1 > 0.
3.A.3 Definition 2
By
φ0(δ) = φ1(1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
λ∗0(δ) = λ
∗
1(1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
we can obtain the following equalities:
Λ1 =
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ =
∫ 0
1
λ∗1(1− t)φ1(1− t)d(1− t) =
∫ 1
0
λ∗0(t)φ0(t)dt = Λ0
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a(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ =
∫ 1−δ
1
λ∗1(1− t)
Λ0
φ1(1− t)d(1− t)
=
∫ 1
1−δ
λ∗0(t)
Λ0
φ0(t)dt = b(1− δ) (by (3.22)(3.23))
=⇒
d4V (δ)
dδ
=
1
r + α + λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ)
=
1
r + α + λ∗0(1− δ)a(1− δ) + λ∗1(1− δ)b(1− δ)
=
d4V (1− δ)
d(1− δ)
=⇒
4V (δ)−4V (0) =
∫ δ
0
d4V (t)
dt
dt =
∫ δ
0
d4V (1− t)
d(1− t) dt = 4V (1)−4V (1− δ)
=⇒
4V (0) +4V (1) = 4V (δ) +4V (1− δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
Also, with same notations in Appendix 3.A.1, in any stationary equilibrium,
d24V (δ)
dδ2
=
−1
(r + α + λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ))
2
(λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ))
′
where
(λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + λ
∗
0(δ)a(δ))
′
=
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
[(∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
)2
−
(∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
)2]
+
λ∗0(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
Λ0
(φ1(δ)− φ0(δ))
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Specifically, in symmetric stationary equilibrium characterized in Definition 2,
(∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′
)2
−
(∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
)2
< 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
= 0 δ = 1
2
;
> 0 ∀δ ∈ (1
2
, 1].
φ1(δ)− φ0(δ)

< 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
= 0 δ = 1
2
;
> 0 ∀δ ∈ (1
2
, 1].
=⇒
d24V (δ)
dδ2

> 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
= 0 δ = 1
2
;
< 0 ∀δ ∈ (1
2
, 1].
3.A.4 Proposition 3
We firstly consider symmetric and convex fδ(δ):
f ′δ(δ)

< 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
= 0 δ = 1
2
;
> 0 ∀δ ∈ (1
2
, 1].
and
fδ(δ) = fδ(1− δ), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
fδ(δ) = φ1(δ) + φ0(δ), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
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By equilibrium condition (3.9) with fˆδ(δ) = fδ(δ),
we obtain (using the notations A(δ), B(δ), a(δ), b(δ) in Appendix 3.A.1):
dφ˙1(δ)
dδ
= 0
= −αφ′1(δ) +
α
2
f ′δ(δ)− 2λ∗
′
1 (δ)φ1(δ)b(δ)− 2λ∗1(δ)φ′1(δ)b(δ) + 2
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ0
+ 2λ∗
′
0 (δ)φ0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
0(δ)(f
′
δ(δ)− φ′1(δ))a(δ) + 2
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ1
,
∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.30)
since the sum of all the terms not including f ′δ(δ) or φ
′
1(δ) is positive, then
− (α + 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ) + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ))φ′1(δ) +
(α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
)
f ′δ(δ) < 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
By the definition and sign of f ′δ(δ), we obtain
φ′0(δ) < 0 ∀δ ∈ [0,
1
2
)
φ′1(δ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ (
1
2
, 1](α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
)
φ′0(δ) <
(α
2
+ 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
)
φ′1(δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
and since f ′δ(
1
2
) = 0
φ′1(
1
2
) = −φ′0(
1
2
) > 0
Suppose ∃δ∗1 ∈ [0, 12), s.t. φ′1(δ∗1) < 0 and 6 ∃δ∗ ∈ [0, 1] s.t.
(α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ
∗)a(δ∗)
)
f ′δ(δ
∗) +
1
c1
d4V (δ∗)
dδ
(
a(δ∗)2φ0(δ∗) + b(δ∗)2φ1(δ∗)
)
(3.31)
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+2λ∗1(δ
∗)λ∗0(δ
∗)φ1(δ∗)φ0(δ∗)
(
1
Λ0
+
1
Λ1
)
= 0
Suppose all equilibrium components are smooth, by Mean Value Theorem, ∃δ∗2 ∈ (δ∗1, 12) s.t.
φ′1(δ
∗
2) = 0. By (3.30), we obtain
(α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ
∗
2)a(δ
∗
2)
)
f ′δ(δ
∗
2) +
1
c1
d4V (δ∗2)
dδ
(
a(δ∗2)
2φ0(δ
∗
2) + b(δ
∗
2)
2φ1(δ
∗
2)
)
+2λ∗1(δ
∗
2)λ
∗
0(δ
∗
2)φ1(δ
∗
2)φ0(δ
∗
2)
(
1
Λ0
+
1
Λ1
)
= 0
which contradicts with condition (3.31). Then we conclude 6 ∃δ∗1 ∈ [0, 12), s.t. φ′1(δ∗1) < 0. So
if condition (3.31) is satisfied,
φ′1(δ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
Similar idea works for the sign of φ′0(δ) on δ ∈ (12 , 1]. Then we conclude as long as condition
(3.31) applies,
φ′0(δ) < 0 < φ
′
1(δ) ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
And the same conclusion applies when fδ(δ) is symmetric but concave.
3.A.5 Proposition 4
We use the Implicit Function Theorem to show the effects of α and c1 on all the competitive
equilibrium components 4V (δ), λ∗1(δ) and φ1(δ) on δ ∈ [0, 1]. Since we only focus on
symmetric equilibrium defined in Definition 2, we have the other two components as λ∗0(δ) =
λ∗1(1− δ) and φ0(δ) = φ1(1− δ) for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1].
We write the three competitive equilibrium conditions collectively as follows:
H(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1) =

H1(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
H2(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
H3(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
 ≡ 03×1
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where
H1(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
= 2αφ1(δ)
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ + 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
+ 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ − 2λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
≡ 0
H2(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
= (α + r)4V (δ)− δ − c1λ∗12(δ) + c1λ∗12(1− δ)− αE[4V (δ)]
= (α + r)4V (δ)− δ − c1λ∗12(δ) + c1λ∗12(1− δ)−
α
2r
≡ 0
H3(4V (δ), λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ);α, c1)
= 2c1λ
∗
1(δ)− (4V (0) +4V (1)−4V (δ))
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)
Λ1
dδ′
+
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)4V (δ′)
Λ1
dδ′
= 2c1λ
∗
1(δ)− (4V (0) +4V (1)−4V (δ))
∫ 1−δ
0
F (δ′)dδ′ +
∫ 1−δ
0
F (δ′)4V (δ′)dδ′
≡ 0
In the last but one equality, we use the notation F (δ) =
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ1
for simplicity.
By Implicit Function Theorem, we have the following general relation:
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For any i = 1, 2, 3, any δ ∈ [0, 1] and any incrementals 27 h4V (δ), hλ∗1(δ), hφ1(δ),
∂Hi
∂4V (δ)h4V (δ) +
∂Hi
∂λ∗1(δ)
hλ∗1(δ) +
∂Hi
∂φ1(δ)
hφ1(δ) +
∂Hi
∂c1
4c1 ≡ 0 (3.32)
∂Hi
∂4V (δ)h4V (δ) +
∂Hi
∂λ∗1(δ)
hλ∗1(δ) +
∂Hi
∂φ1(δ)
hφ1(δ) +
∂Hi
∂α
4α ≡ 0 (3.33)
Specifically for i = 1, we have:
∂H1
∂4V (δ)h4V (δ) ≡ 0
∂H1
∂φ1(δ)
hφ1(δ) +
∂H1
∂λ∗1(δ)
hλ∗1(δ)
= lim
m→0
{
H1(λ
∗
1(δ), φ1(δ) +mhφ1(δ))−H1(λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ))
m
+
H1(λ
∗
1(δ) +mhλ∗1(δ), φ1(δ))−H1(λ∗1(δ), φ1(δ))
m
}
= 2αφ1(δ)
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)hφ1(δ)dδ + 2αhφ1(δ)
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ + 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)hφ1(δ
′)dδ′
+ 2hφ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2φ1(δ)λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)hφ1(δ
′)dδ′
+ 2hφ1(δ)λ
∗
1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)hφ1(δ)dδ − 2λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)hφ1(δ
′)dδ′
+ 2αφ1(δ)
∫ 1
0
hλ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ + 2φ1(δ)hλ∗1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
+ 2φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
hλ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + 2φ1(δ)λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
+ 2φ1(δ)hλ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
hλ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ
− 2λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ − 2hλ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
≡ 0 on δ ∈ [0, 1]
27We will define the incrementals more formally in Section 3.A.7.
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∂H1
∂c1
(δ)4c1 ≡ 0 and ∂H1
∂α
(δ)4α =
(
2φ1(δ)
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ −
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ)φ1(δ)dδ
)
4α
(3.34)
Since by (3.34),
∂H1
∂α
(δ)4α + ∂H1
∂α
(1− δ)4α = 0
and by (3.32)(3.33),
∂H
∂φ1(δ)
hφ1(δ) +
∂H
∂λ∗1(δ)
hλ∗1(δ) +
∂H
∂φ1(δ)
hφ1(1− δ) +
∂H
∂λ∗1(δ)
hλ∗1(1− δ)
= 2(hφ1(δ) + hφ1(1− δ))
(
α
∫ 1
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′ + λ∗1(δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
+λ∗1(1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
)
≡ 0 (3.35)
we obtain that for either changing α or changing c1:
hφ1(δ) + hφ1(1− δ) ≡ 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.36)
Specifically for i = 2:
(α + r)h4V (δ) + 2c1
(
λ∗1(1− δ)hλ∗1(1− δ)− λ∗1(δ)hλ∗1(δ)
)
+4c1
(
λ∗1
2(1− δ)− λ∗12(δ)
)
≡ 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.37)
and
(α + r)h4V (δ) + 2c1
(
λ∗1(1− δ)hλ∗1(1− δ)− λ∗1(δ)hλ∗1(δ)
)
+4α
(
4V (δ)− 1
2r
)
≡ 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.38)
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By (3.37)(3.38), we can also plug in 1− δ without changing the equalities. Then we obtain
that for either changing α or changing c1:
h4V (δ) + h4V (1− δ) ≡ 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.39)
(3.36)(3.39) further give us:
h′φ1(δ) = h
′
φ1
(1− δ), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.40)
h′4V (δ) = h
′
4V (1− δ), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
h4V (
1
2
) = hφ1(
1
2
) = 0 (3.41)
Then as long as we can identify the sign of h′φ1(δ) (or h
′
4V (δ)) for any δ ∈ [0, 1], then it will
be sufficient to characterize the change in the shape of asset-owner density hφ1(δ) on the
whole interval. Here we specifically focus on the utility type δ = 0, by condition H1:
φ1(0) =
α
2
α + λ∗1(0)
(3.42)
By condition that if c1 increases, hλ∗1(0) < 0, then it is trival by (3.42) that hφ1(0) > 0;
By condition that if α increases, hλ∗1(0) < 0, then by (3.42):
(φ1(0)− 1
2
)4α + (α + λ∗1(0))hφ1(0) + φ1(0)hλ∗1(0) = 0 (3.43)
since the first and third terms in (3.43) are both negative, then
hφ1(0) > 0 (3.44)
If (3.44) applies when c1 and/or α increases, then by (3.40)(3.41), it is trival to prove by
contradiction that h′φ1(δ) < 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]. 
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3.A.6 Proposition 5
3.A.6.1
For symmetric equilibrium with fδ(δ) ≡ 1 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1],
λ¯(δ) = φ1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) + φ0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ)
Using the notations A(δ), B(δ), a(δ), b(δ) in Appendix 3.A.1,
λ∗1
′(δ) = − 1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
b(δ)
λ∗0
′(δ) =
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
a(δ)
φ′0(δ) =
2
[
(λ∗1(δ)b(δ))
′(α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ))− (λ∗0(δ)a(δ))′(α2 + 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ))
]
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2
φ′1(δ) = −φ′0(δ) =
2
[
(λ∗0(δ)a(δ))
′(α
2
+ 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ))− (λ∗1(δ)b(δ))′(α2 + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)))
]
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2
=⇒
λ∗1
′(0) = − 1
4c1
1
r + α +
λ∗1(0)
2
λ∗0
′(0) = 0
φ′0(0) =
α(λ∗1(δ)b(δ))
′|δ=0 − (λ∗0(δ)a(δ))′|δ=0(α + 2λ∗1(0))
(α + λ∗1(0))2
=
− α
8c1
1
r+α+
λ∗1(0)
2
(α + λ∗1(0))2
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=⇒
λ¯′(0) = φ′1(0)λ
∗
1(0) + φ1(0)λ
∗
1
′(0)
=
− α
8c1
λ∗1(0)
r+α+
λ∗1(0)
2
(α + λ∗1(0))2
− 1
4c1
φ1(0)
r + α +
λ∗1(0)
2
< 0
By symmetry,
λ¯′(1− δ)
= φ′1(1− δ)λ∗1(1− δ) + φ1(1− δ)λ∗1′(1− δ) + φ′0(1− δ)λ∗0(1− δ) + φ0(1− δ)λ∗0′(1− δ)
= −φ′0(δ)λ∗0(δ)− φ0(δ)λ∗0′(δ)− φ′1(δ)λ∗1(δ)− φ1(δ)λ∗1′(δ)
= −λ¯′(δ)
then
λ¯′(1) = −λ¯′(0) > 0
and
λ¯′(
1
2
) = −λ¯′(1− 1
2
) = −λ¯′(1
2
)
=⇒
λ¯′(
1
2
) = 0
3.A.6.2
Lemma A.6.2 (1) As c1 → +∞: λ∗1(δ) → 0 and λ∗0(δ) → 0 for ∀δ ∈ (0, 1); (2) As c1 → 0:
given ∀δˆ ∈ (0, 1) and ∀M > 0, λ∗1(δˆ) > M and λ∗0(δˆ) > M .
Proof:
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By boundedness of 4V (δ) (3.29), we have for ∀δ ∈ (0, 1)
0 <
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′ < (4V (1)−4V (0))
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′ <
1
2(α + r)
0 <
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′ < (4V (1)−4V (0))
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
φ1(δ
′)dδ′ <
1
2(α + r)
then it is trival that for any fixed α, as c1 → +∞,
λ∗1(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′
2c1
→ 0
λ∗0(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
2c1
→ 0
By symmetry,
λ∗1(δ) =
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (1− δ′)−4V (δ))φ1(δ′)dδ′
2c1
→ 0
and also by Section 3.A.2, λ∗1(δ) ∈ ΛS1, φ1(δ) ∈ ΦS1 and 4V (δ) ∈ 4VS where ΛS1, ΦS1
and 4VS are compact sets. Then for each fixed δˆ ∈ (0, 1), by Extreme Value Theorem,
∃(λ∗1S(δ), φ1S(δ),4VS(δ)) s.t.
(λ∗1S(δ), φ1S(δ),4VS(δ))
= argmax
(λ∗1(δ),φ1(δ),4V (δ))∈ΛS1×ΦS1×4VS
{∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (1− δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
}
and
M∗
= max
(λ∗1(δ),φ1(δ),4V (δ))∈ΛS1×ΦS1×4VS
{∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (1− δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
}
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then for any other large constant M > 0, we can always find c∗1(δˆ) = −M
∗
2M
s.t.
λ∗1(δˆ) = −
∫ 1−δˆ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (1− δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
2c1
> M ∀c1 < c∗1(δˆ)
i.e. for each fixed δˆ ∈ (0, 1),
λ∗1(δˆ)→ +∞ as c1 → 0

λ¯′(δ) = φ′1(δ)λ
∗
1(δ) + φ1(δ)λ
∗
1
′(δ) + φ′0(δ)λ
∗
0(δ) + φ0(δ)λ
∗
0
′(δ)
= φ′1(δ)(λ
∗
1(δ)− λ∗0(δ)) +
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))
where
φ′1(δ) =
(α + 4λ∗1(δ)b(δ))
(
a2(δ)
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ
)
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2
+
(α + 4λ∗0(δ)a(δ))
(
b2(δ)
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ
)
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2
Λ = Λ1 = Λ0
(1) For each α, by Lemma A.6.2,
λ¯′(δ)
=
1
2c1
{
2c1φ
′
1(δ)(λ
∗
1(δ)− λ∗0(δ)) +
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))
}
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where
lim
c1→+∞
2c1φ
′
1(δ) (3.45)
= lim
c1→+∞
(α + 4λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
(
a2(δ)d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)2c1λ
∗
1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ
)
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2
+
(α + 4λ∗0(δ)a(δ))
(
b2(δ)d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)2c1λ
∗
1(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ
)
(α + 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ) + 2λ
∗
1(δ)b(δ))
2

=
0
α2
= 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
lim
c1→+∞
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
= lim
c1→+∞
α
2
+ 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
= 1 <
b(δ)
a(δ)
∀δ ∈ (0, 1
2
) (3.46)
and notations a(δ) and b(δ) follow Section 3.A.1.
Then (3.45)(3.46) and “λ¯′(0) < 0” =⇒
lim
c1→+∞
λ¯′(δ) < 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) (3.47)
We also assume that
λ∗1(δ1; c1) = Ω (λ
∗
1(δ2; c1)) (c1 → +∞) ∀δ1, δ2 ∈ [0,
1
2
] (3.48)
∫ 1−δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′; c1)(4V (δ)−4V (1− δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′ = Ω(Λ1(c1))(c1 → +∞) ∀δ ∈ (0, 1) (3.49)
which are the negation of λ∗1(δ1; c1) = o (λ
∗
1(δ2; c1)) (c1 → +∞) and c1λ∗1(δ; c1) = o(1)(c1 →
+∞).
Then
λ¯(0) =
αλ∗1(0)
α + λ∗1(0)
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λ¯(
1
2
) = λ∗1(
1
2
)
then by (3.48) and Lemma A.6.2,
lim
c1→+∞
λ¯(0)
λ¯(1
2
)
= lim
c1→+∞
α
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
α + λ∗1(0)
=
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
> 1 (3.50)
Then we calculate that,
λ¯′′(
1
2
) =
d4V ( 1
2
)
dδ
2c21Λ1(α + 4λ
∗
1(
1
2
)b(1
2
))
×
{
−4d4V (
1
2
)
dδ
b(
1
2
)
(∫ 1
2
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
)
+
c1λ
∗
1(
1
2
)α
2
− 2λ∗1(
1
2
)c1λ
∗
0(
1
2
)b(
1
2
)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗
(3.51)
so the sign of λ¯′′(1
2
) depends on the sign of the ∗ term in (3.51).
As by Lemma A.6.2 and (3.49)
lim
c1→+∞
{
−4d4V (
1
2
)
dδ
b(
1
2
)
(∫ 1
2
0
λ∗1(δ
′)φ1(δ′)dδ′
)
+
c1λ
∗
1(
1
2
)α
2
− 2λ∗1(
1
2
)c1λ
∗
0(
1
2
)b(
1
2
)
}
= lim
c1→+∞
c1λ
∗
1(
1
2
)α
2
> 0
then
lim
c1→+∞
λ¯′′(
1
2
) > 0 (3.52)
Then by (3.47)(3.50)(3.52), we conclude that for each fixed α, ∃c11(α), c21(α), c31(α) s.t.
λ¯′(δ) < 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) for ∀c1 > c11(α)
λ¯(0) > λ¯(
1
2
) for ∀c1 > c21(α)
λ¯′′(
1
2
) > 0 for ∀c1 > c31(α)
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Then
c∗1(α) = max{c11(α), c21(α), c31(α)}
(2) For each c1, since the following components are bounded:
0 <
d4V (δ)
dδ
<
1
r + α
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
0 ≤ λ∗1(δ) <
1
2c1(α + r)
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
0 ≤ a(δ) ≤ 1
2
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
0 ≤ b(δ) ≤ 1
2
∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
=⇒
lim
α→+∞
λ¯′(δ) = lim
α→+∞
{
φ′1(δ)(λ
∗
1(δ)− λ∗0(δ)) +
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))
}
= lim
α→+∞
a2(δ)
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)φ1(δ)
Λ
+ b
2(δ)
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
+
λ∗0(δ)λ
∗
1(δ)φ0(δ)
Λ
α
+
lim
α→+∞
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗∗
= lim
α→+∞
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗∗
since
lim
α→+∞
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
= lim
α→+∞
α
2
+ 2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
α
2
+ 2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
= 1 <
b(δ)
a(δ)
∀δ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
so
lim
α→+∞
λ¯′(δ) = lim
α→+∞
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗∗
< 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, 1
2
) (3.53)
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And it is trival that
lim
α→+∞
λ¯(0)
λ¯(1
2
)
= lim
α→+∞
α
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
α + λ∗1(0)
=
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
> 1 (3.54)
lim
α→+∞
λ¯′′(
1
2
) = lim
α→+∞
λ∗1(
1
2
)
d4V ( 1
2
)
dδ
4c1Λ1
> 0 (3.55)
Then by (3.53)(3.54)(3.55), we conclude that for each fixed c1, ∃α1(c1), α2(c1), α3(c1) s.t.
λ¯′(δ) < 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
) for ∀α > α1(c1)
λ¯(0) > λ¯(
1
2
) for ∀α > α2(c1)
λ¯′′(
1
2
) > 0 for ∀α > α3(c1)
Then
α∗(c1) = max{α1(c1), α2(c1), α3(c1)}
3.A.6.3
λ¯′(δ) = φ′1(δ)(λ
∗
1(δ)− λ∗0(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
3∗
+
1
2c1
d4V (δ)
dδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
4∗
(φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ))
The terms 3∗ and 4∗ are always positive, so we only focus on the sign of φ0(δ)a(δ)−φ1(δ)b(δ).
(1) For each α, by Lemma A.6.2, ∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
lim
c1→0
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
= lim
c1→0
2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
>
b(δ)
a(δ)
∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
where the inequality “>” is by λ∗1(δ) > λ
∗
0(δ) for ∀δ ∈ (0, 12) and 0 < a(δˆ) < a(δ).
Then ∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
lim
c1→0
λ¯′(δ) > 0 ∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
(3.56)
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And we also assume that
λ∗1(δ1; c1) = Ω (λ
∗
1(δ2; c1)) (c1 → 0) ∀δ1, δ2 ∈ [0,
1
2
]
which is the negation of λ∗1(δ1; c1) = o (λ
∗
1(δ2; c1)) (c1 → 0).
Then
lim
c1→0
λ¯(0)
λ¯(1
2
)
= lim
c1→0
α
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
α + λ∗1(0)
= 0 < 1 (3.57)
Since
0 < c1λ
∗
1(
1
2
)
=
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (1
2
))φ0(δ
′)dδ′
< (4V (1)−4V (0))1
2
∫ 1
1
2
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
φ0(δ
′)dδ′
<
1
4(α + r)
and by Lemma A.6.2
lim
c1→0
λ∗0(
1
2
) = +∞
then the dominant term in term “∗” of (3.51) is “−2λ∗1(12)c1λ∗0(12)b(12)”.
So we have
lim
c1→0
λ¯′′(
1
2
) = lim
c1→0
d4V ( 1
2
)
dδ
2c21Λ1(α + 4λ
∗
1(
1
2
)b(1
2
))
{
−2λ∗1(
1
2
)c1λ
∗
0(
1
2
)b(
1
2
)
}
< 0 (3.58)
Then by (3.56)(3.57)(3.58), we conclude that for each fixed α, ∃c41(α), c51(α), c61(α) s.t.
∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
λ¯′(δ) > 0 ∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
for ∀c1 < c41(α)
λ¯(0) < λ¯(
1
2
) for ∀c1 < c51(α)
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λ¯′′(
1
2
) < 0 for ∀c1 < c61(α)
Then
c∗∗1 (α) = max{c41(α), c51(α), c61(α)}
(2) For each c1, similar to the case of “fixed α”, to discuss the sign of λ¯
′(δ), we only focus
on the sign of φ0(δ)a(δ)− φ1(δ)b(δ).
∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
lim
α→0
φ0(δ)
φ1(δ)
= lim
α→0
2λ∗1(δ)b(δ)
2λ∗0(δ)a(δ)
>
b(δ)
a(δ)
∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
where the inequality “>” is by λ∗1(δ) > λ
∗
0(δ) for ∀δ ∈ (0, 12) and 0 < a(δˆ) < a(δ).
Then ∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
lim
α→0
λ¯′(δ) > 0 ∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
(3.59)
To compare λ¯(0) and λ¯(1
2
), similarly
lim
α→0
λ¯(0)
λ¯(1
2
)
= lim
α→0
α
λ∗1(0)
λ∗1(
1
2
)
α + λ∗1(0)
= 0 < 1 (3.60)
Also, as α→ 0, the term “ c1λ∗1( 12 )α
2
→ 0” in “∗” term of (3.51), so it is trival that
lim
α→0
λ¯′′(
1
2
) < 0 (3.61)
Then by (3.59)(3.60)(3.61), we conclude that for each fixed c1, ∃α4(c1), α5(c1), α6(c1) s.t.
∃δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) s.t.
λ¯′(δ) > 0 ∀δˆ < δ < 1
2
for ∀α < α4(c1)
λ¯(0) < λ¯(
1
2
) for ∀α < α5(c1)
λ¯′′(
1
2
) < 0 for ∀α < α6(c1)
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Then
α∗∗(c1) = max{α4(c1), α5(c1), α6(c1)}

3.A.7 Proposition 6
In section 3.A.7.2, we give three lemmas, the conclusions of which will be used in the main
proof in section 3.A.7.1.
3.A.7.1 Main proof of Proposition 6
Define the following normed linear spaces: ΛS1 = {λS1 (δ) : λS1 (δ) ∈ C1[0, 1];λS1 (δ) ≥
0 and λS
′
1 (δ) ≤ 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]}, ΦS1 = {φS1 (δ) : φS1 (δ) ∈ C1[0, 1]; 0 ≤ φS1 (δ) ≤ 1 and φS1 ′(δ) ≥
0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]; ∫ 1
0
φS1 (δ)dδ =
1
2
}, all with the norm ‖f‖ = max
0≤δ≤1
|f(δ)|. We can further trans-
form the original social welfare problem to a new one with two control variables λS1 (δ) ∈ ΛS1
and φS1 (δ) ∈ ΦS1 and transfer the original equilibrium constraint as follows:
New Problem:
[P ] max
λS1 (δ)∈ΛS1,φS1 (δ)∈ΦS1
W =
∫ 1
0
(δ − 2c1λS1 2(δ))φS1 (δ)dδ
s.t.
H(λS1 (δ), φ
S
1 (δ))
= 2αφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
λS1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + 2φ
S
1 (δ)λ
S
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
λS1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ − 2λS1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
≡ 0
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If there exists subset 4+ ⊂ [1
2
, 1] s.t. λS∗1 (δ) > 0,∀δ ∈ 4+,28 and under uniform distribution
of δ on [0, 1], the measure of subset 4+ is ∫ 1
0
1{δ∈4+}(δ)dδ = m+, we choose ˆ > 0 and
δˆ2 ∈ (12 , 1) such that the Lebesgue measure of the new subset D = 4+ ∩ [12 , δˆ2 ] satisfies
µ[D] = µ[4+ ∩ [1
2
, δˆ2 ]] = ˆ
2 < m+.
Based on the ˆ and new subset D chosen above, we can construct a new solution point(
λNS∗1 (δ), φ
NS∗
1 (δ)
)
as follows:
λNS∗1 (δ) = λ
S∗
1 (δ) + hλS∗1 (δ)
where
hλS∗1 (δ) =
 −ˆλS∗1 (δ), ∀δ ∈ D0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]nD
and
φNS∗1 (δ) = φ
S∗
1 (δ) + hφS1 (δ)
where the incremental hφS1 (δ) is obtained from the following equation given the incremental
284+ may be a union of several disjoint subintervals of [0, 1].
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hλS∗1 (δ) chosen above:
∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
= lim
m→0
{
H(λS∗1 (δ), φ
S
1 (δ) +mhφS1 (δ))−H(λS∗1 (δ), φS1 (δ))
m
+
H(λS∗1 (δ) +mhλS∗1 (δ), φ
S
1 (δ))−H(λS∗1 (δ), φS1 (δ))
m
}
= 2αφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)hφS1 (δ)dδ + 2αhφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)hφS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + 2hφS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)hφS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + 2hφS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
− α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)hφS1 (δ)dδ − 2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)hφS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2αφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
hλS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + 2φ
S
1 (δ)hλS∗1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)hλS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
hλS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
− 2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − 2hλS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
≡ 0 on δ ∈ [0, 1]
Then we construct another subset B ⊂ [0, 1
2
] which is symmetric with the subset D chosen
above, i.e. for ∀δ ∈ B, 1− δ ∈ D and for ∀δ ∈ D, 1− δ ∈ B. We will show the new solution
point
(
λNS∗1 (δ), φ
NS∗
1 (δ)
)
dominates the old one
(
λS∗1 (δ), φ
S∗
1 (δ)
)
in the sense that the new
point generates higher value of social welfare without violating the constraint. In the proof,
we need to use the conclusions of Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the proof of which will
be given after the main proof.
178
Given the chosen hλS∗1 (δ) above and the obtained hφS1 (δ) from
∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)+
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ) ≡
0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1] accordingly, the marginal change in the value of objective function (the social
welfare) taking the chosen ˆ to zero is:
lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
(
∂W
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂W
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
)
= lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
∫ 1
0
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ + 4c1
∫
D
λS∗1
2
(δ′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
= lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
∫
B∪D
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ + 4c1
∫
D
λS∗1
2
(δ′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ (by Lemma 1)(3.62)
Also by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2:
lim
ˆ→0
∫
B∪D
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ
= lim
ˆ→0
(∫
B
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(
−
∫
B
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (1− δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(
−
∫
D
(1− δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(1− δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(∫
D
(2δ − 1 + 2c1λS∗1 2(1− δ)− 2c1λS∗1 2(δ))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
> 0 (D ⊂ [1
2
, 1] and λS∗1
′
(δ) < 0) (3.63)
(3.62)(3.63) lead to:
lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
(
∂W
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂W
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
)
> 0
Then by Lemma 3, any point
(
λS1 (δ), φ
S
1 (δ)
)
with λS1 (δ) > 0,∀δ ∈ 4+ where 4+ ⊂ [12 , 1]
cannot be a local extremum. 
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3.A.7.2 Three Lemmas
Lemma 1 The incremental hφS1 (δ) satisfies
hφS1 (δ) =
 O(ˆ), ∀δ ∈ B ∪Do(ˆ), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]n(B ∪D)
and
lim
ˆ→0
hφS1 (δ)
 > 0, ∀δ ∈ D< 0, ∀δ ∈ B
Proof:
We use guess and verify approach. We guess hφS1 (δ) = O(ˆ),∀δ ∈ B ∪D, and hφS1 (δ) =
o(ˆ),∀δ ∈ [0, 1]n(B∪D). Divide both sides of ∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)+
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ) ≡ 0 by ˆ and take
ˆ to zero, we get:
lim
ˆ→0
{
2αφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ + 2α
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′ + 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
λS∗1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′ + 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
− α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ − 2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
+ 2αφS1 (δ)
∫ 1
0
hλS∗1 (δ)
ˆ
φS1 (δ)dδ + 2φ
S
1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
ˆ
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (1− δ)
ˆ
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − α
∫ 1
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ)dδ
−2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − 2hλS∗1 (1− δ)
ˆ
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
}
≡ 0 on δ ∈ [0, 1] (3.64)
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(1) For ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]n(B ∪D), the value of left hand side (LHS) of (3.64) satisfies:
LHS1
= lim
ˆ→0
{
2αφS1 (δ)
∫
B∪D
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ + 2α
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
+ 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
λS∗1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
+ 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − α
∫
B∪D
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ
− 2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
− 2αφS1 (δ)
∫
D
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + 2φ
S
1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + α
∫
D
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
−2λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
}
= lim
ˆ→0
{
α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)
∫
B∪D
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ
+ 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(*-1)
+ 2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(*-2)
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′ − 2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
− α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)
∫
D
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
+ 2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − 2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
≡ 0 on δ ∈ [0, 1]n(B ∪D) (3.65)
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Denote the maximum of
∣∣∣λS∗1 (δ)hφS1 (δ)∣∣∣ over B∪D as A1, the maximum of ∣∣λS∗1 (δ)φS1 (δ)∣∣ over
D as A2, the maximum of
∣∣∣hλS∗1 (δ)φS1 (δ)∣∣∣ over D as A3, then except for the (∗− 1) + (∗− 2)
term in equation (3.65), all the other terms are o(ˆ) terms:
lim
ˆ→0
∣∣∣∣α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)∫
B∪D
λS∗1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
ˆ→0
2
∣∣α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)∣∣A1ˆ2 1ˆ = limˆ→02 ∣∣α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)∣∣A1ˆ = 0
lim
ˆ→0
∣∣∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′ − 2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)
hφS1 (δ
′)
ˆ
dδ′
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
ˆ→0
(∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∣∣+ ∣∣2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)∣∣)A1ˆ2 1ˆ
= lim
ˆ→0
(∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∣∣+ ∣∣2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)∣∣)A1ˆ
= 0
lim
ˆ→0
∣∣∣∣−α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)∫
D
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ limˆ→0 ∣∣α(2φS1 (δ)− 1)∣∣A2ˆ2 = 0
lim
ˆ→0
∣∣∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∫ 1−δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ − 2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
hλS∗1 (δ
′)
ˆ
φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
ˆ→0
(∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∣∣+ ∣∣2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)∣∣)A3ˆ2 1ˆ
= lim
ˆ→0
(∣∣2φS1 (δ)λS∗1 (δ)∣∣+ ∣∣2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)∣∣)A3ˆ
= 0
Then to make equation (3.65) still apply, we conclude that
lim
ˆ→0
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
= 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]n(B ∪D)
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(2) For ∀δ ∈ D, the value of left hand side (LHS) of (3.64) equals to the summation of
LHS value in case (1) (LHS1) and another extra term with incremental hλS∗1 (δ) outside the
integrals:
LHS2
= LHS1 + lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
ˆ
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
= lim
ˆ→0
2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
− lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (δ)
ˆλS∗1 (δ)
ˆ
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + o(ˆ)
= lim
ˆ→0
2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
− lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (δ)λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + o(ˆ)
≡ 0 on δ ∈ D
Then we conclude that
lim
ˆ→0
hφS1 (δ) = O(ˆ) and limˆ→0
hφS1 (δ) > 0, ∀δ ∈ D
(3) For ∀δ ∈ B, the value of left hand side (LHS) of (3.64) equals to the summation of LHS
value in case (1) (LHS1) and some extra terms with incremental hλS∗1 (1 − δ) outside the
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integrals:
LHS3
= LHS1 − lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (1− δ)hλS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
= lim
ˆ→0
2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
− lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (1− δ)
−ˆλS∗1 (1− δ)
ˆ
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + o(ˆ)
= lim
ˆ→0
2
hφS1 (δ)
ˆ
(
α
∫ 1
0
λS∗1 (δ)φ
S
1 (δ)dδ + λ
S∗
1 (δ)
∫ 1−δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
+λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
)
+ lim
ˆ→0
2φS1 (1− δ)λS∗1 (1− δ)
∫ δ
0
λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′ + o(ˆ)
≡ 0 on δ ∈ B
Then we conclude that
lim
ˆ→0
hφS1 (δ) = O(ˆ) and limˆ→0
hφS1 (δ) < 0, ∀δ ∈ B

Lemma 2 The incremental hφS1 (δ) satisfies
hφS1 (δ) + hφS1 (1− δ) = 0, ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
given any form of incremental hλS∗1 (δ).
Proof:
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By ∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ) ≡ 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1], we use:
∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ) +
∂H
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (1− δ) +
∂H
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (1− δ) = 0,∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
then we can trivally get29:
hφS1 (δ) + hφS1 (1− δ) = 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
for any hλS∗1 (δ). 
Lemma 3 Let f achieve a local extremum subject to H(x) = θ at the point x0 and as-
sume that f and H are continuously Fre´chet differentiable in an open set containing x0 and
that x0 is a regular point of H. Then f
′(x0)h = 0 for all h satisfying H ′(x0)h = θ. (This
lemma is from “Optimization by Vector Space Methods” by David G.Luenberger, page 242.)
3.A.8 Proposition 7
By proof of Proposition 6, the cost function C(λ) = c1λ
2 only appear in conditions (3.62)(3.63).
Then if condition (3.19) applies:
C ′(λ)
 ≥ 0 δ = 0;> 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, λub].
29The result is similar as in (3.35).
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then (3.62) becomes:
lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
(
∂W
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂W
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
)
= lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
∫ 1
0
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ + 2
∫
D
C ′(λS∗1 (δ
′))λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
= lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
∫
B∪D
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ + 2
∫
D
C ′(λS∗1 (δ
′))λS∗1 (δ
′)φS1 (δ
′)dδ′
(by Lemma 1 in Section 3.A.7.2) (3.66)
where the second term is still positive since D ⊂ [1
2
, 1] and C ′(λ) > 0 ∀δ ∈ (0, λub].
Also by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Section 3.A.7.2:
lim
ˆ→0
∫
B∪D
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ
= lim
ˆ→0
(∫
B
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(
−
∫
B
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (1− δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(
−
∫
D
(1− δ − 2C(λS∗1 (1− δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ +
∫
D
(δ − 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
= lim
ˆ→0
(∫
D
(2δ − 1 + 2C(λS∗1 (1− δ))− 2C(λS∗1 (δ)))hφS1 (δ)dδ
)
> 0 (C ′(λ) ≥ 0, D ⊂ [1
2
, 1] and λS∗1
′
(δ) < 0) (3.67)
(3.66)(3.67) still lead to:
lim
ˆ→0
1
ˆ
(
∂W
∂φS1 (δ)
hφS1 (δ) +
∂W
∂λS∗1 (δ)
hλS∗1 (δ)
)
> 0
Then we can still get the contradiction, then we conclude that any λS∗1 (δ) that satisfies there
exists subset 4+ ⊂ [1
2
, 1] where λS∗1 (δ) > 0,∀δ ∈ 4+ cannot be the social optimal solution.
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3.A.9 Solution to the social planner problem with different cost functions
3.A.9.1 Convex cost function C(λ) = c1λ
2
Social Optimal Solution
∂L
∂λ1(δ)
=
α
2
− αδ + αc1λ21(δ)− α(α + λ1(δ))2c1λ1(δ)
(α + λ1(δ))2
= 0
and
∂2L
∂λ21(δ)
=
−2c1α3 − α(1− 2δ)
(α + λ1(δ))4
< 0
Then solutions is:
λS∗1 (δ) =
−2c1α2 +
√
4c21α
4 + 4c1α2(
1
2
− δ)
2c1α
∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
), λS∗1 (δ) ≡ 0 ∀δ ∈ [
1
2
, 1]
Competitive Equilibrium Solution
λ∗1(δ) =
∫ 1
δ
λ∗0(δ
′)
Λ0
(4V (δ′)−4V (δ))φ0(δ′)dδ′
2c1
λ∗0(δ) =
∫ δ
0
λ∗1(δ
′)
Λ1
(4V (δ)−4V (δ′))φ1(δ′)dδ′
2c1
3.A.9.2 Linear cost function C(λ) = c1λ
Social Optimal Solution
∂L
∂λ1(δ)
=
α
2
− αδ + αC(λ1(δ))− α(α + λ1(δ))C ′(λ1(δ))
(α + λ1(δ))2
=
α
2
− c1α2 − αδ
(α + λ1(δ))2
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Then if c1α <
1
2
, the solution is:
λS1
∗
(δ) =
 λub if δ ≤ 12 − c1α;0 if δ > 1
2
− c1α.
If c1α ≥ 12 ,
λS1
∗
(δ) ≡ 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
Competitive Equilibrium Solution
For competitive equilibrium solutions, given parameters c1, α, r, ∃δ∗(c1, α, r), s.t. λ∗1(δ) = λub
for ∀δ ∈ [0, δ∗(c1, α, r)] and λ∗1(δ) = 0 for ∀δ ∈ (δ∗(c1, α, r), 1]; by symmetry, λ∗0(δ) = λub
for ∀δ ∈ [1 − δ∗(c1, α, r), 1] and λ∗0(δ) = 0 for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1 − δ∗(c1, α, r)). For simplicity to
compare with social optimal solution, we give numerical case such that 1− δ∗(c1, α, r) < 12 <
δ∗(c1, α, r), i.e. there exists intermediation behavior in CE equilibrium.
3.A.9.3 Social optimal solution for concave cost function C(λ) = c1λ
p, p ∈ (0, 1)
∂L
∂λ1(δ)
=
α
2
− αδ + αC(λ1(δ))− α(α + λ1(δ))C ′(λ1(δ))
(α + λ1(δ))2
=
α(1
2
− δ + (1− p)c1λ1p(δ)− αc1pλ1p−1(δ))
(α + λ1(δ))2
• Case 1: λS1 ∗(δ) that satisfies the following equation is a stationary point:
1
2
− δ + (1− p)c1λ1p(δ)− αc1pλ1p−1(δ) = 0 (3.68)
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Since
∂2L
∂λ21(δ)
=
α
(
λp−11 (δ)αc1p(p
2 − 3p+ 4) + λp−21 (δ)α2c1p(1− p)2
)
(α + λ1(δ))3
+
α (λp1(δ)c1(1− p)(p− 2) + (2δ − 1))
(α + λ1(δ))3
=
α
(
(αc1λ
p−1
1 (δ)− (12 − δ))p+ αc1λp−11 (δ)(1− p)2 + (12 − δ)α(1−p)
2
λ1(δ)
)
(α + λ1(δ))3
> 0 by (3.68)
Then the stationary point is local min point.
• Case 2: Since 0 < p < 1, then λ1(δ) ≡ 0 is a local max point, since ∂L∂λ1(δ) |λ1(δ)=0 < 0
∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
), then the social welfare trivally W ∗ = 5 for r = 0.05.
• Case 3: λ1(δ) ≡ λub is a local max point if 12 − δ + (1− p)c1(λub)
p − αc1p(λub)p−1 > 0
for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
).
The social optimal solution for concave cost function is either λS1
∗
(δ) = λub or λS1
∗
(δ) = 0
on [0, 1
2
) depending on parameters c1, α, r, p. (Also need to verify expost that the generated
4V S(δ) satisfies d4V (δ)
dδ
> 0 for ∀δ ∈ [0, 1].)
Numerical Example for Case 2: λub = 0.3, c1 = 2, α = 0.75, p = 0.5 (λ1(δ) ≡ 0 is a
local max point but λ1(δ) ≡ λub is not local max point)
Numerical Example for Case 3: λub = 1, c1 = 1, α = 0.05, p = 0.5 (Both λ1(δ) ≡ 0 and
λ1(δ) ≡ λub are local max points, but the marginal loss from deviating from λ1(δ) ≡ λub is
large in this case)
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Figure 3.16: Case 2: Social optimal meeting technologies and densities for concave cost
function C(λ) = c1λ
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Figure 3.17: Case 3: Social optimal meeting technologies and densities for concave cost
function C(λ) = c1λ
p
3.A.9.4 Social optimal solution for C(λ) = c1λ
2 + c2λ (c1 < 0, c2 > 0)
Finally, we give a numerical example for C(λ) = c1λ
2 + c2λ (c1 < 0, c2 > 0 to double check
the sufficient condition for λS1
∗
(δ) ≡ 0 on [1
2
, 1].
C ′(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ [0, λub]
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=⇒
c2 > −2c1λub
• Case 1: The analytical stationary point satisfies:
∂L
∂λ1(δ)
=
α
2
− αδ − α2c2 − 2α2c1λ1(δ)− αc1λ21(δ)
(α + λ1(δ))2
= 0
=⇒
λ1
∗(δ) =
−2αc1 +
√
4α2c21 − 4c1(αc2 + δ − 12)
2c1
,
∀δ ∈ [0, 1
2
] (require α2c1 − αc2 + 1
2
≤ 0)
and
∂2L
∂λ21(δ)
=
2α2c2 − 2α3c1 + α(2δ − 1)
(α + λ1(δ))4
≥ α + α(2δ − 1)
(α + λ1(δ))4
≥ 0 (by α2c1 − αc2 + 1
2
≤ 0)
so the stationary point is a local min point.
• Case 2: If αc2 ≥ 12 , then λ1∗(δ) ≡ 0 ∀δ ∈ [0, 12 ] is local maximum point.
• Case 3: If αc2 + 2αc1λub + c1(λub)2 ≤ 0, then λ1∗(δ) ≡ λub ∀δ ∈ [0, 12 ] is local maximum
point.
Numerical Example for Case 2: λub = 2, c1 = −0.5, c2 = 10, α = 0.5.
Numerical Example for Case 3: λub = 1.5, c1 = −0.5, c2 = 2, α = 0.05.
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Figure 3.18: Case 2: Social optimal meeting technologies and densities for convex cost
function C(λ) = c1λ
2 + c2λ
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Figure 3.19: Case 3: Social optimal meeting technologies and densities for convex cost
function C(λ) = c1λ
2 + c2λ
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